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ABSTRACT 
 
CATHERINE A. CONNER: Building Moderate Progress: Citizenship, Race, and Power 
in Downtown Birmingham, 1940-1992 
(Under the direction of W. Fitzhugh Brundage and Jerma A. Jackson) 
 
This dissertation examines the meanings of race, citizenship, and democracy in 
relation to economic restructuring in postwar metropolitan America. It argues that the 
goals of postwar New Deal liberalism to build a more inclusive society and expansive 
economy not only succeeded in broadening the middle class but also created the 
foundations for new forms of inequality and political polarization in post-1965 America. 
At mid-century, Birmingham, Alabama, was one of the most heavily industrialized cities 
and had gained national attention for its civil rights abuses. In response to civil rights 
activism and massive resistance as well as deindustrialization and suburbanization, black 
and white businessmen, doctors, media executives, and university administrators used a 
variety of federal policies to build a post-industrial, post-civil rights city. Birmingham’s 
biracial civic elite used the rhetoric of progress to justify their economic and political 
ambitions for the city. The postwar development of the local professional service 
economy, anchored by the University of Alabama at Birmingham and its Medical Center 
and A. G. Gaston Enterprises, provided citizens access to healthcare, education, and 
middle class status and safeguarded the city during an era of industrial decline. After 
changing the form of government in 1963, black and white civic elites connected to the 
professional services erected a biracial civic democracy to govern a city torn by its crises. 
Black and white civic elites and public officials supported economic restructuring, 
 iv!
expanded the size of downtown, implemented neighborhood public improvement 
programs, and broadened access to citizen participation within municipal government. 
Through these processes, white suburban businessmen and black elites formed crucial 
partnerships with black neighborhood advocates as they pursued their collective and 
sometimes conflicting goals of progress. Their collaboration created a powerful yet 
unrecognized metropolitan political coalition dedicated to redefining citizenship, 
reforming political structures, and securing economic opportunity in Birmingham. Their 
sharp attention to bridging the racial, class, and residential divides of metropolitan 
Birmingham expanded the boundaries of citizenship and democracy in unexpected ways. 
The politics of progress enhanced political self-determination for black residents of urban 
neighborhoods, yet it also narrowed economic opportunity to favor an educated suburban 
middle class.!
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1944 the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal completed An American 
Dilemma, a multi-volume study of race and democracy in the United States 
commissioned by the Carnegie Foundation.
1
 As the nation engaged in a world war 
against tyranny and oppression, Myrdal examined the contradiction between America’s 
democratic ideals of equality, freedom, and justice and its practices of racial inequality 
and segregation. Second-class citizenship for African Americans derived not from 
inherent racial inferiority, he argued, but from the limited opportunities in education, 
housing, and employment available to them. These economic and social impediments 
reinforced whites’ negative perceptions of blacks. Racism was so pervasive at the time 
that even Myrdal reduced African American thoughts and behaviors to pathologies 
created in reaction to whites rather than deliberate strategies for building a life and 
culture of their own making.
2
 Still, Myrdal’s overall findings deserve attention, for he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 In the mid- to late 1930s, scholar W. E. B. DuBois began work on the Encyclopaedia Africana that would 
have charted the history and contributions of Africans and African Americans to world history. He 
approached the Carnegie Foundation for funding. The Foundation, however, chose to proceed with its plans 
to publish a report on the state of African Americans in the United States as a way to decide its future 
funding mission. Because of DuBois’ race and Marxist leanings, the Carnegie Foundation chose Myrdal to 
conduct the study. 
2
 Myrdal overlooked DuBois, who had recently published Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a 
History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in America, 1860-1880 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
Company, 1935), as well as the “New Negro” movement of the 1920s. In The New Negro: An 
Interpretation (New York: A. and C. Boni, 1925), Alaine Locke argued that a new generation of African 
Americans began to live and speak for themselves. For criticisms of Myrdal then and now, see Ralph 
Ellison, “An American Dilemma: A Review,” 1944, TeachingAmericanHistory.org, 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=554; David W. Southern, “An American 
 2!
pointed out how the rhetoric of democracy continually obscured America’s race 
problem.
3
 Institutional and personal racism that denied full-citizenship to millions of 
Americans could only be defeated, he argued, if whites fully embraced their democratic 
values.
4
 
Few white Americans, however, believed they were responsible for racial 
discrimination and black inferiority. Whites acknowledged their racism only when it was 
brought to their attention.
5
 Such was the case with white civic elites in postwar 
Birmingham, Alabama. More than a decade of violence had passed before white 
businessmen, doctors, educators, and media executives recognized their civic 
responsibilities toward black citizens. The turning point occurred in the spring of 1963. 
Commissioner of Public Safety T. Eugene “Bull” Connor met civil rights protestors, most 
of whom were children, with high-pressured water hoses and police dogs. Within hours 
after leaders of the demonstrations negotiated a peace accord with white businessmen, a 
Ku Klux Klan bombing spree ignited the first urban riot of the decade. White civic elites 
in the Birmingham Downtown Improvement Association (BDIA) pleaded with their 
fellow citizens to “put aside personal pride and prejudice and approach the problems 
facing our city and nation with understanding and charity.” Organized with the mission to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Dilemma after Fifty Years: Putting the Myrdal Study and Black-White Relations in Perspective,” The 
History Teacher 28, no. 2 (Feb. 1995). 
3
 In reconsidering Myrdal’s observations within the context of TIME magazine publisher Henry R. Luce’s 
declaration of the twentieth century as a uniquely American one, Gary Gerstle considered the contradiction 
between civic and racial nationalism in The American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2001). 
4
 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper 
and Bros., 1944). 
5
 For an account of how white southerners experienced the end of Jim Crow, see Jason Sokol, There Goes 
My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 
Press, 2006). 
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“build a better Birmingham for the benefit and enjoyment of all its citizens,” the BDIA 
failed to convince citizens of the urgency of its call.
6
 On September 15, 1963, Ku Klux 
Klan members killed four teenage girls and wounded a dozen others when they bombed 
the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, the spiritual home of middle-class blacks and recent 
center of civil rights activity. Two teenage boys also died that day, as white extremists 
and police officers took the bombing as a license to murder African Americans.
7
    
The death of six black children in the church bombing and its immediate 
aftermath incited a range of white responses across the country and world. The city 
became a symbol of American racism in the popular imagination. Dorothy Gkonos of San 
Carlos, California, captured the sentiments of many whites who were transformed by the 
events in Birmingham: “I have been one of the ‘gray masses’ who have done nothing and 
said nothing about the racial crisis where ever it might occur but…as of today I can, as a 
loyal American citizen who believes in the Constitution, remain silent no 
longer.…Birmingham, Alabama, stands before the world today as a symbol of how low 
our nation can sink.”
8
 The incident awakened Gkonos to the dilemma Myrdal had 
described back in 1944. “Birmingham” provided the impetus for white support of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
 Resolution of the Birmingham Downtown Improvement Association, August 22, 1963, File 3.33, Albert 
B. Boutwell Papers (hereafter cited as Boutwell Papers), Department of Archives and Manuscripts, 
Birmingham Public Library. 
7
 Birmingham looms large in the civil rights historiography. For in-depth accounts of Birmingham’s civil 
rights crises, see Robert Gaines Corley, “The Quest for Racial Harmony: Race Relations in Birmingham, 
Alabama 1947-1963,” Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia (1979); Glenn T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: 
The Local and National Movements in the Civil Rights Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997); Diane McWhorter, Carry Me Home: Birmingham, Alabama: The Climatic Battle of the Civil 
Rights Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); J. Mills Thornton, Dividing Lines: Municipal 
Politics and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma (Tuscaloosa: University 
of Alabama Press, 2002), Part 2. 
8
 Dorothy J. Gkonos to Albert B. Boutwell, September 15, 1963, File 5.4, Boutwell Papers. 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 after President John F. Kennedy called on Americans to 
confront the “moral crisis” of black inequality.
9
   
The church bombing and other acts of terrorism in Birmingham, however, also  
provided a clarion call for whites who opposed equality for African Americans and the 
perceived encroaching powers of the federal government on individual liberties. H. E. 
Smith, writing from Toronto, condemned the church bombing only because “whites in 
[Birmingham] have to stoop to such depths to show your jackass government that they do 
NOT want integration.”
10
 After a failed bombing campaign in the spring of 1965 that 
targeted the homes of blacks and whites, including the mayor of Birmingham, Mack H. 
Jones of San Francisco congratulated the would-be bombers by declaring, “God knows 
we need white men with guts these days.”
11
 
Often defined and remembered as a problem of the South, “Birmingham” was a 
bellwether signaling a nation in transition. Although no other event matched the moral 
shock of the church bombing, the crises and violence engulfing Birmingham represented 
much larger civil rights and massive resistance movements taking shape across American 
cities by the end of the decade.
12
 Indeed, urban historians have investigated those social 
and political transformations in industrial and Sunbelt cities. To hold Birmingham as 
exceptional to other cities is to miss the power and subtlety of racism in postwar 
America. As historian Matthew D. Lassiter has argued, the insistent quibbling about the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
 John F. Kennedy, “Civil Rights Address,” June 11, 1963, American Rhetoric: Top 100 Speeches, 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcivilrights.htm; Eskew, But for Birmingham. 
10
 H. E. Smith to Gentlemen, September 16, 1963, File 5.4, Boutwell Papers 
11
 Mack H. Jones to Albert B. Boutwell, March 21, 1965, File 5.8, Boutwell Papers. 
12
 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of 
American History, 91, no. 4 (March 2005). 
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differences between de jure and de facto segregation that ascribe regional and historical 
meanings to racial inequality obscures the fact that racism continues to exist in every 
facet of American life.
13
  
Postwar deindustrialization, ghettoization, urban renewal, and white flight 
ravaged Birmingham and a host of cities, including Chicago, Detroit, Newark, Oakland, 
and Pittsburgh.
14
 African Americans outside of the South experienced these destructive 
processes and demanded civil rights, equality, and justice through a variety of strategies, 
including rioting.
15
 After studying the cause of mid-1960s urban rioting, the US 
Commission on Civil Disorders came to the same conclusion Myrdal did nearly a 
generation before. Instead of issuing a moral plea, the 1968 Kerner Report directly 
implicated white Americans for the stark living conditions of blacks that led some of 
them to engage in violent acts of civil disobedience. Its dire warning, “our nation is 
moving toward two societies, one black, one white––separate and unequal,” largely fell 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13
 Matthew D. Lassiter, “De Jure/De Facto Segregation: The Long Shadow of a National Myth,” in The End 
of Southern Exceptionalism, ed., Joseph C. Crespino and Matthew D. Lassiter (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 25-48. 
14
 Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983); Roy Lubove, Twentieth Century Pittsburgh: Government, Business, 
and Environmental Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968); Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. 
Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993); Thomas J. Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar 
Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit? Politics, 
Labor, and Race in a Modern American City (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Robert O. Self, 
American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005). 
15
 In addition to previously cited literature, see Matthew J. Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black 
Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Devin Fergus, Liberalism, 
Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 1965-1980 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
2009); Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting Til’ The Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of the Black Power 
Movement (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2006); Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten 
Struggles for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008).  
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on deaf ears.
16
 By most accounts, a nation seemingly sympathetic to civil rights sharply 
turned rightward in the late 1960s, rejecting its moral and legal responsibility to ensure 
the full equality of all citizens.
17
   
Returning to Birmingham after its civil rights and economic crises sheds light on 
how blacks and whites reordered their society in response to these problems and the 
contradiction between democracy and racial inequality.
18
 The city remained a site of 
public debate, contestation, and collaboration over the meanings of race and citizenship 
well after 1965. As the center of political, economic, and cultural life, downtown 
influenced the development of metropolitan Birmingham. Citizens defined themselves in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16
 “Our Nation Is Moving Toward Two Societies, One Black, One White—Separate and Unequal”: 
Excerpts from the Kerner Report, History Matters: The U.S. Survey on the Web, 
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6545/. 
17
 In “The Problem with American Conservatism,” American Historical Review 99, no. 2 (Apr. 1994), Alan 
Brinkley called on historians to investigate conservatism. Works that followed include Dan T. Carter, The 
Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of 
American Politics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995); Joseph C. Crespino, In Search of 
Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007); Michael J. Klarman, “How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,” Journal 
of American History 81, no. 1 (June 1994); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of 
Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: 
The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Others argue that 
liberalism imploded based on federal officials’ inability to meet the promises the ideology offered. See 
Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, ed., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989); Allen Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in 
the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984) and Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis. For a counter to the 
“backlash” argument and the rise of conservatism, see Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban 
Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2007).  
18
 Much of the scholarship on Birmingham after 1965 concentrates on either the civil rights movement or 
its memory. See S. Willoughby Anderson, “The Past on Trial: Birmingham, the Bombing, and Restorative 
Justice,” California Law Review, 96, no. 2 (2008); Glenn T. Eskew, “The Birmingham Civil Rights 
Institute and the New Ideology of Tolerance,” in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory, ed. by 
Renee C. Romano and Leigh Raiford (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 28-66; Renee C. 
Romano, “Narratives of Redemption: The Birmingham Church Bombing Trials and the Construction of 
Civil Rights Memory,” in The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory. The exception to civil rights 
and memory studies is Charles E. Connerly, “The Most Segregated City in America”: City Planning and 
Civil Rights in Birmingham, 1920-1980 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006). Connerly best 
explains how African Americans gained political power in Birmingham. These works, however, do not 
focus on the white and black power structure that negotiated the economic and political transitions in 
Birmingham. Consequently, their accounts do not provide a full picture of post-1965 Birmingham.  
 7!
relation to how they perceived the city, and their ideas of citizenship differed based on 
their race, class status, and location of residence.
19
 Thousands of whites and blacks left 
the city for the suburbs throughout the 1960s and beyond, yet a powerful biracial 
coalition across the metropolitan area arose and continued to invest in Birmingham.
20
 Led 
by black and white civic elites, this coalition designed a biracial civic democracy in order 
to confront the various problems the city faced. They fashioned a new economic order, 
expanded the boundaries of citizenship, changed the politics of race, and remade the 
urban environment. Throughout this generational process, they created new urban public 
spaces of racial interaction and understanding.
21
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19
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This post-civil rights, post-industrial vision of Birmingham partly emerged out of 
the city’s transition from an industrial to a professional service economy, which began in 
the early 1940s.
22
 By then, Birmingham’s designation as a “Magic City” must have 
seemed ludicrous to the hundreds of thousands of black and white residents living and 
working there. So named by civic boosters in the 1880s who wanted to attract industrial 
investors and labor, Birmingham grew like “magic” from an unpopulated, undeveloped 
area into one of the nation’s fastest growing cities by the turn-of-the-century. Boosters 
promised opportunity and prosperity to the thousands of whites, blacks, and immigrants 
who flocked to Birmingham. Early industrialists and civic leaders erected beaux-art and 
art deco style buildings to mark the city as modern and prosperous. Citing its emergence 
after the Civil War and its industrial economy, civic boosters and national news media 
championed Birmingham as an exemplar of the “New South.”
23
 The “Magic City” was 
supposedly free of the region’s old labor and racial practices, yet its economy quickly 
came under the control of an industrial aristocracy.
24
 White industrialists and civic 
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leaders violently enforced Jim Crow, largely withheld social welfare services for citizens, 
and profited enormously from rampant inequality in metropolitan Birmingham.
25
 In 
contrast to the masses of residents who failed to find opportunity and prosperity in the 
“Magic City,” a small corps of white and black elites harnessed the professional service 
economy in the postwar era to gain civic prominence and wealth.  
The cornerstone of Birmingham’s professional service economy was the 
University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) and its Medical Center. The growth of 
UAB was part of a national movement to expand access to healthcare services and higher 
education in the postwar era.
26
 In 1941 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt defined 
“freedom from want” as the development of secure economic systems to provide for the 
health of a nation’s citizenry.
27
 In a near literal interpretation of Roosevelt’s pledge, 
academic healthcare provided a framework to build a growth economy in Birmingham 
and elsewhere across the nation. Healthcare was a service everyone needed, and its 
employment structure derived from the continuing breakthroughs in medical research and 
development of specialized care. In 1948, President Harry S. Truman insisted that 
healthcare was a “public responsibility” and outlined access, standards, and an 
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individual’s ability to pay as key legislative goals.
28
 Democratic politicians from 
Alabama agreed.
29
 Senator J. Lister Hill, a surgeon’s son, co-sponsored the Hill-Burton 
Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946. Intended to serve rural areas that lacked 
medical services, the act also funded hospitals and medical complexes in urban areas like 
Birmingham that had physician shortages, high patient-per-bed ratios, and generally poor 
public health services. 
As the product of New Deal liberalism, UAB created an alternative political 
economy that challenged Birmingham’s Jim Crow industrial order. Even before the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, UAB provided African Americans with spaces of opportunity and 
middle-class respectability. The university also welcomed measures of racial inclusion 
that increasingly became attached to the federal funding used to expand its healthcare 
programs and physical campus. Led by Dr. Joseph F. Volker, UAB became a site of 
utopian urban aspirations for a city struggling to reinvent itself, politically and 
economically. Volker imagined an “urban university” that served and responded to all 
metropolitan citizens of Birmingham.
30
 UAB also encouraged civic elites to establish a 
meritocratic society in which education rather than race dictated a person’s access to 
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opportunity. By 1976, when Volker left UAB after nearly thirty years of overseeing its 
development, the university was the largest employer in metropolitan Birmingham.  
Another important aspect of the professional service economy in Birmingham that 
challenged Jim Crow was the strengthening of black capitalism between 1940 and 
1965.
31
 Incorporating the perspectives of entrepreneur A. G. Gaston and other black elites 
illuminates often overlooked strategies to wage the black freedom struggle. 
Discriminatory federal policies and Birmingham’s segregated markets provided Gaston 
with the means to develop a professional services empire of banking, insurance, and 
education catering to the black middle class.
32
 In 1937, 132 black businesses employed 
89 people.
33
 By 1963, Gaston had over 500 African Americans working for him as 
bookkeepers, bankers, insurance agents, instructors, and secretaries.
34
 Following in the 
footsteps of his childhood hero Booker T. Washington, Gaston firmly believed in 
economic self-determination and education as tickets to first-class citizenship. He also 
never directly challenged segregation, preferring instead to work behind the scenes in 
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negotiating small to major concessions.
35
 Although many black civil rights activists 
labeled him an “Uncle Tom,” the businessman’s public silence on the issue of 
segregation stemmed from his belief that protecting black economic power, his as well as 
his customers, was foundational to achieving civil rights. A multimillionaire, Gaston 
garnered the trust and respect of white civic elites who frequently called on him 
whenever a racial crisis emerged in the 1950s. The phenomenal growth of his business 
empire before 1965 provided him and other black civic elites with the economic power to 
negotiate Birmingham’s transition from a segregated to a desegregated society and to 
determine what civil rights meant.  
Collectively, the growth of UAB and black capitalism expanded Birmingham’s 
white and black middle class, and those who belonged to it increasingly demanded the 
recognition of their citizenship in Birmingham. Indeed, what made Birmingham so 
explosive in the long summer of 1963 was not the demands for full citizenship by African 
Americans but the ones made by white suburbanites.
36
 Commissioner Connor’s actions 
and the dynamite terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan were assertions of white working-class 
power reeling from the recent takeover of municipal government by affluent middle-class 
white suburbanites. Financed by members of the Birmingham Downtown Improvement 
Association, white civic elites initiated a municipal reform campaign that began in 
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August 1962 and ended in April 1963. Suburban whites partnered with their black urban 
counterparts to remove Connor, his working-class white supporters, and their industrial 
bosses from power. The change in government successfully accomplished what black 
activism could not do alone––overthrow Jim Crow. Biracial civic elites across 
metropolitan Birmingham launched a new political order defined by democracy, civility, 
and shared citizenship in the city of Birmingham. Citizenship, they argued, extended to 
anyone who considered themselves a Birminghamian. Their intentionally vague 
rhetorical strategy collapsed class, racial, and residential distinctions in citizenship 
codified by law and practice.    
In an era of white flight, some of Birmingham’s most influential white 
suburbanites refused to abandon the city. Although most scholars have ascribed 
conservatism to white suburbanites, their attitudes on racial equality and expanding 
government involvement look different when focused on the city.
37
 Living in the 
prestigious “Over-the-Mountain” suburbs directly south of Birmingham behind Red 
Mountain, middle-class white suburbanites entered the city nearly every day because of 
the locations of their workplaces, civic institutions, and religious houses. Yet they could 
not vote in the city. To rectify their loss of citizenship rights, they launched democratic 
reform measures and lobbied for suburban annexation and metropolitan consolidation 
from 1949 to 1969. Their reasons for joining the city varied, from promoting economic 
development to diluting the black vote, but they continually failed in their efforts. That 
they continued to work toward improving Birmingham, however, speaks to how they saw 
themselves as citizens of the city rather than the suburbs of Birmingham.  
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Black and white civic elites used expressions of civic identity––the connection 
between space and citizenship––to claim their rights to Birmingham. Historian Heather 
Ann Thompson implicitly explored civic identity in Whose Detroit? by showing how 
labor union activists, white politicians, and African Americans first fought over and then 
negotiated the transition of power in Detroit from whites to blacks.
38
 Expressions of civic 
identity add crucial new dimensions to postwar change because they show how 
individuals saw themselves in relation to the state of the city.
39
 Birmingham’s 
increasingly tarnished reputation reflected poorly on white and black civic elites who did 
not see themselves as violent racists or as conciliatory Uncle Toms. Rather, they saw 
themselves as concerned citizens of Birmingham who, up until the municipal reform 
campaign, lacked the political power to shape the city. Elites used middle-class values of 
respectability and civility to determine who had the right to the city, thus excluding those 
they saw as militant civil rights activists or as recalcitrant segregationists. Their vision of 
citizenship, however, extended beyond their own identities marked by race, class, and 
residence toward others who were different from them. 
Gaston, Volker, and other elites who led the restructuring of Birmingham after 
1965 were men of difference. They were Jews or Unitarians in a Baptist town, blacks in a 
city made for whites only, or northerners or immigrants denied acceptance as southerners. 
Usually a quiet, unassuming man, Volker erupted in frustration when others denied him 
the southern identity he claimed. He came to Birmingham from the northeast in 1948. He 
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had spent decades building UAB, the most powerful public institution in the state, and 
raising his family in Birmingham. “Hell, don’t tell me I’m not a southerner,” he would 
yell when others questioned him.
40
 Volker’s love of Birmingham derived from the 
opportunities, power, and influence he gained in the seemingly unwelcoming “Magic 
City.”  
In letters from personal manuscript collections, memoirs, and dozens of oral 
interviews, elites increasingly expressed desperation over their inability to reverse the 
downward course of the “Magic City” and steer it back toward progress. That became 
their singular goal, yet civic elites had different ideas of what progress meant.
41
  They 
increasingly defined it as evidence of change they could see and experience on a near 
daily basis after 1963. Progress was not just empty rhetoric to disguise their political and 
economic ambitions. They strove to distance themselves and the city from the events that 
placed Birmingham in the harsh international spotlight by erasing the landscape, 
economy, and politics of a Jim Crow past. Within this context, almost anything was 
better than what came before. Yet, as blacks and whites claimed victory over social 
problems, new ones always arose.
42
  Black and white civic elites, however, did not expect 
structural change overnight. In fact, they were erecting the new economic and political 
systems that would guide Birmingham’s post-1965 development. Building progress was a 
continual process that allowed for new goals and ideas to emerge, even some that were 
antagonistic or contradictory.  
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Metropolitan whites and blacks who saw themselves as citizens of Birmingham 
had a stake in its redevelopment, and they used a broad politics of representation to 
demand access to and shape post-1965 public life. Although some civic leaders believed 
that the new Birmingham was color-blind, they prominently featured race in their claims 
of progress. White civic elites launched a national media campaign overtly promoting 
areas of black advancement, yet elite African Americans seized on these images to push 
open the doors of power. Black civic elites used publicity campaigns highlighting biracial 
communication and racial disturbances as tools to initiate substantial dialogue and reform 
in Birmingham. It mattered to civic elites that the other race was involved in the process 
of remaking Birmingham. Biracial leadership indicated to themselves and outsiders how 
much the city had changed.  
The politics of representation also extended beyond race to include residence and 
class as identifying markers of citizenship. Because white suburban elites lacked formal 
representation in the city of Birmingham, they used Operation New Birmingham (ONB), 
the successor to the BDIA, to access City Hall. ONB was the city’s public-private 
redevelopment agency initially focused on downtown revitalization; it also acted as the 
shadow government of Birmingham. The majority of African Americans who lived in 
Birmingham, however, rejected ONB’s control of Birmingham. In response, City Hall 
implemented a citizen participation program that provided blacks representation through 
their neighborhoods. This system allowed those previously excluded by elites to exert 
their rights of citizenship in Birmingham and shape it according to their ideas. By the 
mid-1970s, metropolitan citizens used their race, class, and residence to gain access to 
Birmingham’s biracial civic democracy.  
 17!
Civic elites used federal urban renewal programs and public-private partnerships 
to rebuild downtown Birmingham from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. Beginning in 
the 1950s, downtown had become tainted by the rampant violence against civil rights 
activists as well as neglect. Like their counterparts in other cities, civic elites used urban 
renewal programs to stimulate economic growth. The largest one was the expansion of 
UAB by forty-five blocks in the late 1960s, but the city of Birmingham also built new 
cultural facilities, such as the Civic Center, to entice visitors to the new “Magic City.” 
Suburban whites gained access to downtown through the construction of the Red 
Mountain Expressway, a highway that cut through the physical barrier separating the city 
from its prestigious suburbs. All of these urban renewal programs, however, destroyed 
middle-class and working-class black neighborhoods. To rectify the loss of these 
neighborhoods, ONB and City Hall launched major public improvement campaigns to the 
ones still standing. In addition, the rise of blacks to high-profile positions in municipal 
government remade the once lily-white City Hall. By the 1990s, this new landscape 
announced the emergence of the professional service economy, led by UAB, and the 
opening of City Hall to African Americans as the centerpieces of a new Birmingham.  
Birmingham’s biracial civic democracy enhanced citizens’ involvement in public 
life by transforming the local political economy. Their project attests to the longevity of 
postwar New Deal liberalism that simultaneously promoted economic development and 
civic inclusivity. In practice, postwar liberalism was never as expansive or as inclusive as 
New Deal rhetoric made it seem, but the ideas and the structures that enabled it were 
elastic. The local implementation of federal programs gave them different outcomes and 
contours. In Birmingham, postwar liberalism served to counter conservative and radical 
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forces that sought to exclude those they disagreed with from power. It also undermined a 
racially and economically inequitable industrial order by fostering a meritocratic and 
multiracial society in post-1965 America.  
In their efforts to rebuild Birmingham, black and white civic elites created a 
liberal democratic vision of society and sustained it through continued growth in the 
professional service economy. The broad expansion of public education provided by 
UAB enhanced citizen access to this new order, but the decline in public funding and 
concentration of private resources disrupted the balance. The contours of urban decline 
and suburban growth reflected this long-term economic shift, creating a metropolitan area 
marked by white affluence and black inequality. Theorist David Harvey and other 
scholars have called these consequences of a meritocratic society the foundations of a 
neoliberal order devised by white economic elites.
43
 African Americans, however, have 
made substantial economic and political gains that accelerated after federal and local laws 
in the mid-1960s barred racial discrimination in public life. Far from receding into the 
background as conservatism reemerged, postwar New Deal liberalism adapted to the 
fundamental economic and political restructuring of society it wrought after 1965.  
To chart the trajectory of a post-civil rights, post-industrial Birmingham, I 
organize my dissertation into two parts to show how a black urban middle class and a 
white suburban middle class gained power before 1965 and how they wielded that power 
after 1965. In the first section, “Building Power: The Rise of a Black and White Middle 
Class,” I explore the economic and political impact of the postwar New Deal welfare 
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state in Birmingham from the early 1940s to the early 1960s.
44
 In chapter 1, “City of 
Perpetual Promise,” I show the development of a “consumers’ republic” by looking at the 
black and white men who provided the professional services necessary to achieve middle 
class status through higher education and homeownership.
45
 The postwar growth of UAB 
and A. G. Gaston’s enterprises created new spaces of racial interaction and economic 
mobility in Birmingham. In the second chapter, “Who Speaks for Birmingham,” I 
investigate white suburbanites’ claims of citizenship and the municipal reform campaign. 
Although whites fronted the campaign, blacks were crucial to its success. Gaston and 
other black civic elites who believed in the strategy of biracial communication rather than 
protest politics served as mediators between black civil rights activists and white 
suburbanites not yet ready to abandon their beliefs in segregation. 
In Part 2, “Building Progress: Making Birmingham a Place to Live and Work,” I 
examine how blacks and whites across class and residential lines implemented a biracial 
civic democracy after the fall of the Jim Crow industrial order. White suburbanites and 
black urbanites had little in common with each other, but both groups strongly desired 
economic and political change. The at-large nature of the new city council promoted 
consensus and biracialism as the guiding principles of governance in a new Birmingham. 
After the Voting Rights Act of 1965, elites cultivated the black vote. Municipal reformer 
and eventual mayor David J. Vann, along with other civic elites, used political 
moderation rather than conservatism or militancy to create the broadest possible electoral 
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base to support biracial civic democracy.
46
 Moreover, Birmingham’s civic leaders relied 
heavily on federal funding to rebuild Birmingham. Racial liberalism within the Great 
Society pushed them to adopt new policies and programs that further distanced the new 
city from the old one.  
In Chapter 3, “Design for Progress,” I investigate how elites used urban renewal 
programs and the desegregation of public life to build the foundations of a new 
Birmingham from 1965 to 1970.
47
 Operation New Birmingham (ONB), the political 
organization of white suburbanites, constructed a narrative of progress by using 
advertising campaigns, press releases, and news accounts. The explosive growth of UAB 
also strengthened claims of progress. The remaking of forty-five urban blocks in 
Southside––a project so immense that it shifted the boundaries of downtown––announced 
academic healthcare as Birmingham’s new economic anchor.
48
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In Chapter 4, “One Great City,” I show how the postwar university transformed 
higher education and healthcare from public services to economic sectors at the same 
time desegregation unfolded.
49
 After 1965, UAB administrators celebrated African 
American presence in the university as evidence of diversity.
50
 Volker also adopted a 
comprehensive affirmative action program he continually modified to meet demands 
from black and female employees, who filled service and support roles for a white male 
clinical faculty. Led by superstar cardiologist John W. Kirklin, white physicians rebelled 
against the public nature of academic healthcare at UAB. They won the privatization of 
healthcare services that siphoned off revenue from the public university, turning federally 
supported knowledge and resources into engines of private wealth generation. However 
much it created a “new” economy, UAB simultaneously replicated aspects of the racial 
and gender hierarchies of the old industrial order.  
In Chapter 5, “All-America City,” I examine the rise of black political power and 
the opening of City Hall to non-elite African Americans. Black and white civic elites 
worked primarily with African American women advocates to make Birmingham’s 
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declining neighborhoods livable.
51
 Progress for black urban residents and women differed 
substantially from suburban elites, yet the shared philosophy of self-help as well as the 
continual desire for material evidence of progress made these two opposing groups 
political partners. African Americans demanded and won public improvements for their 
neighborhoods as well as representation in City Hall. Black civic elites and white liberals 
helped to usher in this transition of power. The new relationships between white 
suburbanites, black civic elites, and neighborhood advocates were critical to maintaining 
a biracial civic democracy as Birmingham changed from a majority white to a majority 
black city during the tumultuous 1970s. 
As I show in Chapter 6, “City Stages,” the culmination of civic elites’ efforts was 
the mayoralty of Dr. Richard Arrington Jr., Birmingham’s first black mayor. Throughout 
the post-1965 period, black civic elites remained the crucial mediators of progress. 
Arrington and others bridged the communication gap between black Birminghamians and 
white suburban businessmen. They also communicated with white civic elites operating 
through ONB and UAB when its leaders often acted independently of each other. Under 
Arrington’s mayoralty, black Birminghamians, white liberals, and white suburban 
businessmen all found open access to City Hall. Arrington provided urban blacks with a 
political voice to express their claims on the city, while he worked to ensure the 
continued growth of UAB and the revitalization of downtown. Yet, most whites in the 
city and the suburbs rejected biracialism when led by an African American. In 1989, 
white urbanites dismantled the consensus-building nature of the city council by suing the 
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city of Birmingham for violating rights protected by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. They 
won district seats, turning Birmingham from a city working for all its residents into one 
that served identity-based groups living in specific neighborhoods.    
Birmingham’s biracial civic democracy was short lived, but from the mid 1960s 
to the early 1990s, it transformed the economic and political structures of the “Magic 
City.” Whites and blacks across the metropolitan area continually asserted their 
citizenship rights to the city. Civic identity enabled biracial communication because black 
and white civic elites recognized that they needed each other to accomplish their goals. 
Black and white elites, however, never convinced the majority of metropolitan citizens of 
their visions of inclusive citizenship and shared power in Birmingham. Thus, they built 
moderate progress rather than securing transformative changes. That some blacks and 
whites continually worked with each other to accomplish structural and material change 
speaks to their efforts to face the problems of citizenship and race outlined by Myrdal in 
1944 and the Kerner Report in 1968. Birmingham’s postwar history shows the 
complexities of reconciling democratic values and practices with the personal attitudes 
and power structures that govern modern life. By considering the perspectives of others 
who were different from them as valid and important, blacks and whites reached across 
class, ideological, and residential lines in Birmingham to reinterpret what the “Magic 
City” meant to them. In the process, they created two different versions of Birmingham: 
one black and one white.             
  
!
CHAPTER 2 
 
“CITY OF PERPETUAL PROMISE”: BLACKS AND WHITES IN THE 
POSTWAR PROFESSIONAL SERVICE ECONOMY 
 
In 1940, a group of white civic leaders and physicians lobbied the Works Progress 
Administration to fund a new hospital in Birmingham. With the help of high-placed 
Alabama politicians in Washington, DC, the group received $4.25 million to construct 
Jefferson Hospital. Shortly thereafter, Oscar Wells, president of First National Bank of 
Birmingham, raised $160,000 in a campaign to attract a four-year medical school to the 
city. Wells’ lobbying along with other factors led Gov. Chauncey Sparks to reopen the 
Medical College of Alabama, which had been in Mobile but closed in 1919. The decision 
to locate the renewed college in Birmingham, however, was not a given. Competing with 
boosters from Mobile, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa, Wells and others involved with the 
Birmingham Chamber of Commerce convinced the Jefferson County Commission to 
cede control of the newly constructed Jefferson Hospital and its charity hospital, Hillman, 
to the proposed college. Wells then raised funds to purchase land surrounding the 
hospitals as an extra incentive to win the Medical College. These actions, as well as the 
city’s large number of physicians and diverse patient population, successfully convinced 
the Governor’s special committee to locate the college in Birmingham. In the fall of 
1945, the state legislature also authorized the creation of the School of Dentistry, which 
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did not offer courses until three years later.
1
 These schools soon became known as the 
University of Alabama Medical Center, a collection of departments, clinics, and affiliated 
hospitals that served as the epicenter of Birmingham’s postwar professional service 
economy.
2
 
As the site of healthcare and medical education in Birmingham, the Medical 
Center benefited enormously from the postwar expansion of the New Deal liberal state. 
Alabama Senators Lister J. Hill and John Sparkman made sure to direct federal largesse 
to their home state in a variety of packages.
3
 Through the National Institutes of Health 
and the Housing and Home Finance Agency, UAB received grants to fund its research 
and expand its campus through urban renewal programs. Academic healthcare 
subsequently became an agent of economic and urban development that slowly would 
transform the Birmingham metropolitan area.
4
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This far-reaching vision of urban change was that of Dr. Joseph F. Volker, a 
Unitarian from New Jersey who rose through the ranks to become the top administrator 
of the Medical Center by 1962. Volker believed that the Medical Center could change 
Birmingham for the better, both economically and socially. In its first twenty years, the 
Medical Center became a site of racial interaction between whites and blacks and of 
social mobility for African Americans. The relationships Volker developed among black 
civic elites during the institution’s urban renewal campaigns forged new networks of 
biracial communication sorely lacking in Birmingham’s top civic and economic circles.  
The postwar New Deal liberal state also had a substantial impact on local black 
capitalism.
5
 During a time when the federal government was slow to embrace racial 
equality, entrepreneur A. G. Gaston used the openings and limitations of various federal 
programs to offer a variety of professional services to a growing black middle class. 
Birmingham’s local political culture also favored Gaston’s ambitions. Capitalizing on his 
motto, “find a need and fill it,” Gaston offered African Americans education, 
homeownership, and insurance, among other services, that whites often denied them.
6
  
His actions to build a black middle class challenged Birmingham’s Jim Crow order that 
kept African Americans as second-class citizens. 
Collectively, Gaston’s enterprises and Volker’s Medical Center transformed an 
industrial Jim Crow order into a “consumers’ republic” for a black and white middle class 
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in Birmingham.
7
 Scholars often have overlooked this economic development in 
Birmingham as well as other industrial and southern cities. It occurred simultaneously 
with deindustrialization, urban decline, suburban growth, civil rights activism, and white 
resistance, yet the professional service economy formed the economic underpinnings of 
modern middle-class and affluent status. By focusing on the emergence of professional 
services in postwar Birmingham, the broad middle ground of politics, experience, and 
collective spaces shared by blacks and whites comes to the forefront. Within the Medical 
Center and the black business district, whites and blacks developed new avenues of 
economic power and biracial communication in a city that supposedly lacked them.  
 
 
The Problem with the “Magic City”: Industrialization and Inequality 
After its founding in 1871, Birmingham quickly became the South’s iron and steel 
center because of its proximity to coal, iron ore, and limestone. Early civic leaders, a 
mishmash of industrialists and railroad men from the South, the North, and Great Britain, 
created an inequitable economy to capitalize on the wealth of Birmingham’s mineral 
resources for themselves. Competition among local industrialists reduced the number of 
major steel and iron companies in the region to just three by 1900. A few years later, the 
financer-cum-industrialist J. P. Morgan used the suspension of anti-trust laws during the 
Panic of 1907 to buy out competitors of the U.S. Steel Corporation, including the 
Tennessee Coal and Iron Company (TCI), the biggest industrial power in Birmingham.
8
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Civic leaders welcomed the national corporation by declaring it would make Birmingham 
“the largest steel manufacturing center in the universe.”
9
  
Industrialization drove Birmingham’s growth and national reputation during the 
first few decades of the twentieth century. Over 140,000 people moved there between 
1900 and 1920, resulting in a 365 percent growth rate that far outstripped its southern 
rivals and other cities such as Los Angeles (See Appendix, Table 1).
10
 New residents 
often arrived at Terminal Station, a railroad depot designed in an opulent Byzantine style. 
In 1926, the Birmingham Terminal Company erected a large red electric sign outside the 
building’s entrance that read, “Welcome to Birmingham, the Magic City.” So named for 
its astonishing growth within a few decades, one resident “marvel[ed]” at the fact that the 
“huge and wonderful city” was only “a wilderness such a short time ago.”
11
 Civic 
boosters and national news media championed Birmingham as a “New South” city 
because its industrial economy supposedly made it free from the region’s old labor and 
racial practices.
12
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Although hailed as the engine of economic and technological progress in the early 
twentieth century, industrialization was hardly a salve for the millions of workers, 
including immigrants and children, slavishly laboring in mills, mines, and plants in 
Birmingham and elsewhere across the country. In his scathing account of the Mind of the 
South, W. J. Cash blasted the southern quest for progress as a disguise for perpetuating 
the class and racial hierarchies of the Old South: “Progress—the continuing industrial and 
commercial development of our country—was felt to be at least dependent upon the 
preservation of the advantage of cheap labor.”13 By 1910, 1 percent of Birmingham’s 
population enjoyed wealth valued above $35,000, while 80 percent of all citizens earned 
less than $500 a year.14 Cheap labor poured in from the rural Alabama countryside 
creeping out of plantation slavery into new forms of slave labor. The convict-lease 
system sold the labor of mainly black men deemed criminals by the state to steel plants, 
iron mills, and coal mines. Industrialists used convict labor to inhibit unionization among 
their workforce. They also implemented a race wage in which whites, who held skilled 
positions, enjoyed a higher racial and class status than unskilled African Americans 
workers. Company towns such as Bessemer, Ensley, and Fairfield began to surround 
Birmingham to the west to house these industrial workers.  
Union organizers and reformers attempted to combat industrialists’ exploitation of 
their workforce. By the turn of the century, white steel workers, some of whom came 
from the North and abroad, formed unions but excluded blacks on account of their 
unskilled labor. In 1910 African Americans held 90 percent of all unskilled positions in 
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the mining and production of coal, iron, and steel.
15
 Unions had more success in bridging 
racial barriers in the iron ore and coal mines, the most significant of which was the 
United Mine Workers (UMW) of Alabama.  In 1908, the UMW held a two-month strike 
when the U.S. Steel-owned TCI Company sharply reduced wages to root out union 
workers. Black and white coal miners maintained their solidarity in the face of lynchings, 
other mob violence, and a concentrated lobbying effort among Birmingham’s 
industrialists to use the power of the state to quash the strike. The UMW lost their battle 
against the owners of the coal mines, but they continued to organize workers until the 
Red Scare of 1919.
16
 White reformers, especially women, led a crusade to end convict 
labor, one of the main weapons industrialists used to undermine unionization. Their 
efforts finally succeeded in 1928 when the state of Alabama outlawed the practice.
17
  
The city commission, which was implemented in 1911 to advance business 
efficiency in government, developed a civically bankrupt relationship with absentee 
industrialists who desired low taxes, fixed municipal borders, and little economic 
competition. Consequently, the city failed to meet the demands for public services and 
employment from nearly 260,000 residents.
18
 Birmingham placed dead last in every 
category imaginable, such as public health, literacy, and murder, for a city its size.
19
 The 
Great Depression exacerbated the city’s inability to provide for its citizens. Over one-
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third of Birminghamians were unemployed.
20
 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
declared Birmingham the “hardest hit city” in the nation.
21
 White civic elites responded 
philanthropically to the depression through the Community Chest, but the overwhelming 
need for relief quickly depleted these private sources. In dire circumstances, civic elites 
and municipal officials welcomed various New Deal agencies to the city. Overseen at the 
state level by Thad Holt, a local broadcaster, New Deal programs eased the burden of 
white families while doing little for black ones.
22
  
In the late 1930s and 1940s, Birmingham’s reputation as an exception to the 
South’s economic and social backwardness turned into one that epitomized what was 
wrong with the region.
23
 Although industrial corporations and local and federal 
governments were decidedly anti-labor before the depression, the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 extended legitimacy to unions. Birmingham’s anti-labor stance 
was now out of fashion. Whites increased their union organizing activities among 
themselves, while rural and urban blacks organized under the southern wing of the 
Communist Party based in Birmingham to advocate for racial equality, higher wages, and 
the right to vote. Communists exposed Alabama’s grotesque racial terrorism by 
publicizing the case of the Scottsboro boys, nine African Americans ranging in ages from 
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thirteen to twenty-one falsely accused of raping two white women. The case garnered 
international attention for the guilty verdicts and death sentences that came with them.
24
  
Within this hotbed of civil rights and union activity, industrialists amped up their 
control of Birmingham. They cajoled the populist and very popular state legislator T. 
Eugene “Bull” Connor to run for a seat on the city commission. He easily won. In charge 
of the Birmingham Police Department, Connor turned it into paramilitary organization 
dedicated to running the communists out of the city, stifling union activity, and 
terrorizing African Americans.  
By the postwar era, industrialization and the political system that supported it had 
failed Birmingham. The city’s Jim Crow industrial order had concentrated wealth and 
power in the hands of the few, while it had robbed citizens of equality, justice, and 
opportunity. A wartime boom briefly reignited the fires of blast furnaces, but the city’s 
plants never regained their pre-depression levels of output. Industrialists and the 
Birmingham City Commission continued to poorly manage Birmingham. They 
discouraged new industries, fought unionization, ignored smoke pollution laws, and 
encouraged widespread suburbanization that threatened to swallow the city whole. 
 
The New Postwar Economy: Joseph F. Volker, Academic Healthcare, and the 
University of Alabama Medical Center 
 
A “defeatist symphony” arose among white civic elites who bemoaned 
Birmingham’s failure to live up to its name as the “Magic City” in the postwar era. In 
1948, Birmingham News journalist Irving Beiman described Birmingham as a “steel giant 
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with a glass jaw,” easily broken by demands, changes, and structural shifts largely 
outside of local control. Beiman diagnosed Birmingham with a severe case of “civic 
anemia” and criticized civic leaders for inflicting violence in all its forms against the city. 
With a hefty dose of sarcastic contempt, Beiman noted, “Wheels in the war plants have 
ceased to turn and the stream of returning GI’s increase the rolls of the unemployed, [yet] 
businessmen smile benignly as the jingle of cash registers goes on unabated.”
25
 Change 
few recognized at the time was afoot. 
 Despite the power of white civic elites who lobbied for the University of Alabama 
Medical Center, the development of the postwar professional service economy largely 
went unnoticed in Birmingham. That was in part due to the rocky infancy of the Medical 
Center, which experienced poor state funding and frequent turnovers in leadership. The 
latter was especially disruptive. Roy R. Kracke, the first dean of the Medical College, 
came back to his home state of Alabama after a successful career in hematology at Emory 
University. Unlike Oscar Wells and other civic leaders, Kracke had rather radical views 
on race. Between 1945 and 1950, Kracke consistently challenged segregated medical 
education in the University of Alabama (UA). He also established collegial relationships 
with black doctors in Birmingham and elsewhere. His actions clashed with the racially 
conservative UA President John Gallalee. Kracke eventually lost fiduciary and 
administrative control of the College to the president.
26
 In 1950, the fifty-year-old Kracke 
suffered his second and fatal heart attack. For the next four years, the College ran through 
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a series of administrative leaders, none of who had a coherent vision for the Medical 
Center. 
 After 1950, it was Kracke’s counterpart in the School of Dentistry, the young 
Dean Joseph F. Volker, who gave the Medical Center a sense of mission. He shared with 
Kracke the goal of making the Medical Center a world-class research university. 
Working through the perpetually slighted School of Dentistry, Volker infused the 
Medical Center with his dynamic energy and vision for its future. He also benefitted from 
the 1950 arrivals of internist Tinsley Harrison and surgeon Champ Lyons, both of whom 
specialized in cardiology and enjoyed national stature. Indeed, Harrison’s textbook, 
Principles of Internal Medicine, was so influential that it remains in publication today.
27
 
Both doctors enjoyed personal relationships with some of Birmingham’s white civic 
elites and directed their supporters’ attention to Volker and the development of the 
Medical Center. US Senators Lister J. Hill and John Sparkman also were crucial players 
in carrying forth Volker’s vision. Sparkman, who was Kracke’s roommate at the 
University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, chaired the Housing subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency, and Hill drove federal sponsorship of the health 
sciences through the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act and the National 
Institutes of Health.
28
 Volker used these powerful networks at the local and federal levels 
to accomplish his goals. One protégé remarked, “Once Joe gets into a network, it’s his, 
because…he works it…and he delivers.”
29
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 Volker was an unlikely leader of postwar Birmingham. Born in 1913, Volker 
grew up in Elizabeth, New Jersey, where his German grandparents ran a corner store. 
Volker’s father, who never finished grade school, made a living as an electrical 
contractor, and his mother volunteered for the Catholic Church and Democratic Party. 
The Volker household was loud, gregarious, and fit in with their “melting pot” 
neighborhood. Volker’s awareness and sensitivity to religious and ethnic diversity made 
him “very liberal with his approach to people,” his wife Juanita recalled.
30
 He left the 
New York City area for dental school at Indiana University, but returned to the northeast 
for a Ph.D. in biochemistry at Rochester University. His research connecting the use of 
fluoride to cavity prevention won him international acclaim. Administrators at the School 
of Dentistry at Tufts College, one of the best in the country, soon courted Volker for a 
faculty position; he quickly became the youngest dean ever to run the school. While 
living in Boston, Volker cultivated an active spiritual life through Unitarianism. Its 
tolerance of difference, promotion of humanitarianism, and foundation in objective 
reasoning appealed to him.  
 In June 1948, UA President Gallalee lobbied the path-breaking Volker to become 
the dean of the new School of Dentistry. It was a hard sell. Gallalee wanted classes to 
start that fall, and the Medical College, barely four years old, had struggled to secure 
minimal funding. Volker also knew of Kracke’s impotence as dean of the Medical 
College. With a young family to support, Volker would be leaving his position as dean of 
the dental school at Tufts to start a program without status or support. Despite these 
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concerns, the chance to start a new school proved too tempting for Volker.
31
 “I want the 
intellectual challenge of building something from the beginning,” Volker told Gallalee, 
and he demanded and received the full autonomy to do so.
32
  
Building the School of Dentistry from the ground up allowed Volker to shape it 
around his ideas and values. Volker saw Birmingham as a “land of opportunity,” a place 
he “felt he could make a difference.” Dentist Leonard Robinson also remarked, Volker 
“liked challenges, and the idea of a Northerner coming down and becoming dean of the 
dental school in the deep South was something that would appeal to him.” Given the lack 
of medical and dental education in Alabama since 1919, Volker recruited faculty from 
outside the state. He persuaded Tufts faculty members and former students to come to 
Birmingham, bringing together a diverse, young faculty of immigrants, veterans, and 
Unitarians. They found a different world in Alabama. Robinson, a veteran and Unitarian 
from Rhode Island, recalled, “Birmingham was alien to me. First of all, the summers 
were very, very hot and humid, and secondly, I’m not a radical, but I sort of found the 
separation of the two races somewhat distasteful.”
33
 Volker also recruited Frederick 
Kraus, a Czechoslovakian immigrant who entered the US Army in 1943 to have “a stake 
in avenging some of my relatives who had perished under Hitler.” In Birmingham, Kraus 
would become involved in civil rights organizations led by whites, such as the Alabama 
Council on Human Relations and the Concerned White Citizens of Alabama.
34
 Volker’s 
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subtle yet powerful influence within the Medical Center made it a forceful agent of 
change that had far reaching implications for Birmingham’s future. 
 By choosing men who shared his personal philosophy and background, Volker 
created an institutional culture of inclusion and community that extended beyond the 
Medical Center. The camaraderie he encouraged among his faculty was partly to assuage 
their culture shock. As Robinson stated, “In 1950 Birmingham wasn’t the greatest place 
to live.…Birmingham society was focused around the church and the country club.”
35
 
While some medical faculty joined clubs, Volker established the Unitarian Universalist 
Church of Birmingham where he gave many sermons on public welfare, leadership, and 
the importance of independent thought.
36
  
Despite resistance from local Baptist preachers, Volker’s small Unitarian 
congregation found space in suburban Mountain Brook’s town hall, thanks to fellow 
Unitarian and mayor Charles F. Zukoski Jr.
37
 Zukoski, a senior trust officer at First 
National Bank of Birmingham, was fifteen years senior to Volker and had consistently 
advocated for racial liberalism and other social justice causes since his arrival in 
Birmingham in 1926. The two men not only shared a common ethnic heritage but also 
had converted from Catholicism to Unitarianism while living in Boston.
38
 Zukoski often 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35
 Robinson, interview. 
36
 For examples, see Joseph F. Volker, “A Free Mind,” ca. 1952, File 6.44, Office of the Dean, School of 
Dentistry, Joseph F. Volker, UAB Archives; Joseph F. Volker, “The Need for Leadership,” ca. 1952, File 
6.51, Office of the Dean, School of Dentistry, Joseph F. Volker, 1948-1962. 
37
 On resistance and local reaction to the new Unitarian church, see Roy Rachford Kracke Jr., interview by 
Virginia Fisher, March 2, 1990, File 2.49, transcript, UAB Oral History Collection, UAB Archives; Dorah 
Hayden Sterne, interview by Virginia Fisher, July 11, 1989, File 3.14, transcript, UAB Oral History. 
38
 Zukoski graduated from Harvard University. Charles Frederick Zukoski Jr., “A Life Story” (unpublished 
manuscript, ca. August 1980), 415, 1, 28-36, Southern History Collection, Linn-Henley Research Library, 
Birmingham Public Library. 
  38!
served as an advisor to both Kracke and Volker, which brought Medical Center faculty 
closer to the small networks of white liberals and African Americans working toward 
social change in Birmingham. By the end of the decade, Volker regularly held round-
table discussions on reform and the city’s future with blacks and whites at the Dutchman, 
a pub a few blocks east of the Medical Center that did not follow strict adherence to Jim 
Crow laws.
39
  
 Within the Medical Center, Volker earned praised for his administrative skills in 
building the School of Dentistry. Unlike his colleagues in the Medical College, Volker 
ran a solvent and expanding school. After Kracke’s death in 1950, Volker continued to 
pursue federal grants for research and clinical space for faculty across the Medical 
Center.
40
 His vision of a university came one step further with the 1954 release of the 
Duckett Jones Report, an independent audit. In response to its findings, the UA Board of 
Trustees combined the Medical Center and the Extension Center into one administrative 
unit, Birmingham Affairs. The Extension Center had set up shop in 1936 to cater to 
adults in need of continuing education; it had been experiencing large enrollment growth 
since World War II.
41
 Although praised in the report, Volker was passed over for the top 
administrative position, executive vice-president for Health Affairs. Volker’s political 
views and position in the School of Dentistry hindered his ability to climb the 
administrative ladder. Many believed only a doctor could manage the Medical Center. 
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Volker intended to resign, but University of Alabama President Oliver C. Carmichael 
convinced him to stay by offering him another administrative position.42  
Continuing in his capacity as dean, Volker enhanced his influence within the 
Medical Center through his new role as director of Graduate and Research Studies. In this 
position, Volker created an interdisciplinary research environment that “didn’t have any 
walls” typically separating academic disciplines.43 The core of that environment was the 
Basic Sciences program, initially funded by the National Science Foundation, because it 
academically bridged the Medical and Extension Centers.44 Faculty also began to 
collaborate across discipline lines, particularly making strides in the development of 
public health as a distinct discipline within academic healthcare. The city’s poor public 
health record and the Medical Center’s function as an indigent hospital gave its faculty 
abundant teaching and research material. In response to its needs and continuing 
scientific breakthroughs, the Medical College created new departments in growing fields 
like microbiology and allied health sciences. Volker tapped into funds from the National 
Institutes of Health to launch new clinical programs and the Hill-Burton Act to build new 
facilities. Between 1955 and 1960, outside research grants and donations grew by over 
200 percent to reach nearly $1.3 million––one-sixth of the total Medical Center budget.45  
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Volker’s administrative style facilitated rather than managed this rich research 
environment. John Dunbar, one of Volker’s protégés, believed the administrator created 
an exciting place for research and knowledge. “It was the advancing of knowledge, the 
curiosity about research…the idea of having an imagination, [and] of exercising that 
creating side” that defined academic life under Volker’s tutelage. These lessons had an 
effect because students and faculty could see the growth of a university on a monthly 
basis. Dunbar believed Volker’s vision “was coming true.”
46
 According to S. Richardson 
Hill, a faculty member of the Medical College, Volker’s philosophy in building a 
university was to “get the best person you can,…develop the resources that they need to 
do their job as they see it and remove roadblocks.”
47
 Another colleague later recalled, 
“Everybody around here who worked for Joe had total freedom.”
48
 Volker’s style gave 
clinicians and academics an opportunity to develop their own national or international 
reputations. But, as Hill explained, “Everybody had complete faith that everybody was 
working toward the same goal,” which was the overall development of the Medical 
Center.
49
  
 To Volker, the expansion of the Extension Center was crucial to his vision of an 
urban university with a world-class medical center. According to Dunbar, Volker often 
talked about how “all of the university skills and sets of knowledge…tended to reinforce 
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one another for the good of society.”
50
 The organization of the Extension and the Medical 
Centers into one administrative unit in 1954 was one step toward creating a full-fledged 
university. The rapid development of the Extension Center filled a gap in Birmingham, 
which lacked a public four-year institution of higher learning. It offered classes in 
business and education, and it was better suited for emerging healthcare-related fields 
such as hospital management.  
Community demands often shaped the Extension Center’s programs. In 1957, one 
prominent white family donated the Clark-Little Theater to the Extension Center to 
encourage the teaching and enjoyment of the dramatic arts. Alabama Power Company’s 
Thomas W. Martin called for the development of an engineering school and extensively 
lobbied support for it among high-placed industrial executives. Martin’s efforts paid off 
in 1962 when the UA Board of Trustees created the School of Engineering, the first non-
clinical school for the University of Alabama, Birmingham Affairs.  
Urban educational institutions like the University of Alabama, Birmingham 
Affairs experienced tremendous growth throughout the 1950s as the result of demand 
stimulated by federal programs and local needs. Urban academic centers also faced 
barriers to expanding beyond campus lines into the neighborhoods surrounding them. 
Volker and his allies wanted to build new research and teaching facilities to satisfy 
growing enrollment and developing disciplines, but the four-and-a-half block campus 
constrained his ability.  
In late 1951, officials for the Housing Authority of the Birmingham District 
(HABD) began the process of applying for urban renewal funds to purchase nine-and-a-
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half blocks in the Southside neighborhood to expand the Medical Center. These 
maneuvers were done before policy changes regarding urban renewal laws. The federal 
Housing Act of 1949 allowed a public agency such as the HABD to buy private land for 
public housing; the 1954 version of the act gave the HABD the right to acquire land for 
commercial purposes. This new act was an attempt to revitalize aging downtowns. In the 
Birmingham’s case, urban renewal was used to build a world-class medical center. 
University administrators and HABD officials announced their plans to 
Birmingham’s white civic elite in a large, open meeting at the city auditorium in the 
spring of 1953. Frank E. Spain, the lawyer for the HABD, invited Birmingham City 
Commission President W. Cooper Green, realtor Robert Jemison Jr., and former 
Birmingham Chamber of Commerce president and realtor William P. Engel to speak at 
the meeting. Speeches touched on the need for land, the purpose of the Medical Center, 
and the importance of collaboration between city officials, private citizens, and university 
administrators.
51
 The meeting, required by federal law, represented the continuation of 
the partnership between Birmingham’s white civic elite and physicians. As historian 
Charles E. Connerly has argued, four main interest groups trumpeted Medical Center 
expansion: the HABD, city planners, physicians, and realtors, who were “the single 
largest source of leadership” in the project.
52
  
 Sen. John Sparkman of Alabama also played a significant role in shaping the 
Medical Center’s urban renewal project. Despite the changes to the Housing Act of 1949, 
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the University of Alabama could not afford the land necessary to expand its Birmingham 
Affairs campus. Presidents of Columbia University, the University of Chicago, and the 
University of Pennsylvania also lobbied federal officials to revise urban renewal laws in 
favor of academic institutions. In 1959, Sparkman pushed through two amendments to 
the Housing Act that enabled universities to expand more easily. One allowed them to 
receive “credits” from their building activities toward the cost of land. The other 
excluded projects for educational institutions from the requirement of constructing 
sufficient numbers of public housing for displaced residents.
53
 These amendments 
transformed universities into agents of urban development.  
 As the director of Graduate and Research Studies, Volker intimately knew the 
demands of the Medical Center and shaped its urban renewal program. He had 
coordinated with the dean of the Medical College in designing a “master plan” for the 
campus. It called for sixty-five blocks, far more than the nine-and-a-half the University of 
Alabama bought. They had envisioned the expansion of the Extension Center, too. 
Volker’s reliance on federal funding to drive the creation of a university created a 
cyclical process of growth.
54
 As it won more grants and contracts, the Medical Center 
needed space to fulfill them; as it received more clinical and research space, faculty 
developed new subfields or made major scientific discoveries that then prompted more 
grant applications. Volker brilliantly used federal funding and his network of local and 
federal allies to a build world-class academic medical center.  
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By the late 1950s, Volker had earned an international reputation for his expertise 
in developing universities. The University of Iceland and the University of Kansas called 
on him for his consulting services for their dental schools. Volker also advised the 
Regents of the University of Arizona on the need for and location of the first Medical 
Center for that state. All of these activities took Volker away from Birmingham in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. He welcomed them; he had grown frustrated with the 
administrative structure of Birmingham Affairs and his lack of advancement. As one 
protégé who collaborated with Volker on the Arizona study and Icelandic research 
remembered, Volker’s advisory trips stemmed from “politics back home” and his desire 
“to send messages” to the University of Alabama administration.55 In September 1962, 
the University of Alabama president and Board of Trustees finally recognized Volker’s 
contributions to the Medical Center by asking him to become the executive vice-president 
of Health Affairs. Volker insisted and won full autonomy to pick his administrative team, 
most of whom he had worked closely with throughout the 1950s.  
In 1960, the Medical Center was Birmingham’s third biggest employer, the 
largest private real estate developer, and the most visible symbol of federal largesse. 
Most Birminghamians, however, gave little attention to the developments in Southside. 
Local financing accounted for a very modest $547,000 of the total cost of the urban 
renewal project, or roughly 11 percent.56 Few national media outlets reporting on 
Birmingham’s civil rights crises recognized the new growth industry either. Heavy 
industry, both its promises and abuses, still held the city in its grip. Volker and his 
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administrative team built the foundations of Birmingham’s professional service economy 
without anyone but their federal and local allies paying attention.     
 
Figure 2.1 Aerial view of the University of Alabama Medical Center, from the northwest, 1955. (Courtesy 
of UAB Archives.) 
Forging New Spaces of Interaction: African Americans and the Medical Center 
 The Medical Center’s expansion highlighted the central tensions over black and 
white spaces in postwar Birmingham. African Americans were a part of the Medical 
Center from the very beginning, as patients, employees, and neighbors. In its role as 
Jefferson County’s indigent hospital, the Center served vastly more black patients than 
white ones. Because of local segregation laws governing healthcare, the Medical Center 
needed blacks as nurses and other allied health employees. Its mid-1950s urban renewal 
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campaign, however, would destroy almost ten blocks of African American housing, 
businesses, and churches. Yet, the effects of Jim Crow as well as the racial liberalism of 
key administrative leaders surprisingly made the Medical Center a space for African 
American middle-class respectability and biracial communication. Drs. Joseph F. Volker 
and Roy R. Kracke, first dean of the Medical College between 1944 and 1950, often 
worked with black civic elites in ways that challenged the boundaries of segregation in 
Birmingham and the healthcare profession. Black civic elites and white racial liberals 
forged personal and professional relationships as they faced the challenge of both 
removing and expanding black presence in and around the growing Medical Center.    
 In Birmingham and other cities, creating more white spaces of employment and 
education came at the cost of destroying black living spaces. The Medical Center’s 
expansion project would displace 529 African American families, 90 percent of whom 
were renters.
57
 Attorney Oscar A. Adams Jr., whose father had decried racial zoning and 
residential segregation as editor of the Birmingham Reporter in the 1920s, represented 
twenty-four black residents at the spring 1953 meeting officially announcing the project. 
The fundamental objection, as Adams and other leaders stated, was the lack of adequate 
public housing and private residential developments for blacks.
58
 The year before, the 
Birmingham City Commission opted not to proceed with plans to fund three new public 
housing projects even though urban renewal laws at that time required units for displaced 
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residents.
59
 The current number available to blacks was woefully inadequate, and few 
black neighborhoods could meet the incoming wave of displaced residents.  
 Racially-motivated bombings against black homeowners had begun four years 
before, making black housing a subject of intense public debate, but black and white civic 
leaders engaged in a relatively open one regarding the effects of the Medical Center’s 
expansion. Many of those involved in the discussions were members of the newly 
established Interracial Committee.
60
 Its subcommittee on public housing, which included 
one of Volker’s advisors, Charles F. Zukoski Jr., already had discussed the consequences 
of the Medical Center expansion. White civic elites also recognized the value of black 
presence, however small, in the urban renewal process to help deflect local and federal 
charges of discrimination. Attorney Arthur S. Shores was the only black member of the 
Medical Center Planning Committee, a position he won based on his work overturning 
local racial zoning laws. Rev. John W. Goodgame Jr., pastor of one of the largest black 
churches in the city, gave the public meeting’s closing benediction. He did so after 
publicly criticizing whites for failing to discuss or solve the issue of black housing: “We 
find ourselves hemmed in in Birmingham. We cannot move right or left because of 
certain regulations and laws.”
61
 Adams, Shores, and Goodgame publicly shamed white 
civic elites for limiting black living spaces through the use of urban renewal and other 
legal measures.  
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 Local and national black leaders wanted to use the Medical Center expansion 
project as a way to change federal urban policy and challenge discrimination in 
Birmingham. Adams represented thirty-six property owners, including a few white 
families, who sued the HABD and Medical Center. He and others involved with the local 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) worked with 
their counterparts at the national level to contest the Medical Center expansion project. 
These middle-class black professionals met with white officials at the Housing and Home 
Finance Agency (HHFA) in Washington, DC, to discuss the project and their complaints 
of racial discrimination. Earlier plans had included public housing for whites only, and 
the Medical Center was a segregated institution that barred black physicians and paying-
patients.  
 
Figure 2.2 Urban renewal project area, 1958. (Courtesy of UAB Archives.) 
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 Although HHFA officials initially entertained the NAACP’s objections, they 
eventually lost interest in making the HABD, and thus the city of Birmingham, an 
equitable agent of public housing. By 1955, before Sparkman’s amendments to the 
Housing Act, the HHFA approved expansion plans for the Medical Center that did not 
include new public housing construction. The agency accepted the city commission’s 
preposterous claim that enough was available for displaced residents. The small minority 
of homeowners received direct fiscal compensation. The vast majority was shunted to 
inadequate public housing facilities and substandard rental housing. Only 5 of the 146 
urban renewal projects in the nation at that time put more displaced residents in 
substandard housing than the Medical Center expansion.
62
 The cost of the continuing 
legal battle, after its first dismissal by a federal court, was enough to pull the plug on the 
NAACP lawsuit and lobbying efforts by the spring of 1955. 
Adams, who eventually became the most prominent black Republican in Alabama 
as one of its Supreme Court justices, later acknowledged other reasons for the failure of 
the case against the Medical Center project. Although he and other middle-class black 
professionals associated with the NAACP wanted to use the case to upend racial 
discrimination, the homeowners they represented were uninterested in the politics of the 
case. “It turned out that they really were not that upset about having to move,” Adams 
remembered. “They wanted to be sure that they were given a fair, adequate compensation 
for the property.” The overall feeling in the affected community, Adams declared, was 
supportive of the Medical Center. “‘We’re not really opposed to’” it, he restated their 
argument. “‘We think it’s a good thing, but we don’t want the Medical Center built…on 
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our backs.’”
63
 Other early opponents of expansion such as Rev. J. B. Carter changed their 
minds for financial reasons: “I am in dire need of the money.”
64
 For some African 
Americans, the forced move relieved them of living in one of the three worst slums in 
Birmingham. Over 80 percent of housing in the project area had no indoor or private bath 
and nearly 95 percent were without central heating.
65
 If black civic leaders saw the  
forced removal as an issue of discrimination, some of the affected residents may have 
seen it as an improvement in living standards. 
 The Medical Center also escaped sustained protest and criticism by African 
Americans because its expansion provided some of them with new opportunities and 
professional networks. As an indigent hospital, the Medical Center needed black 
healthcare professionals, excluding physicians, to treat African American patients. Black 
women, in particular, benefitted from a state law that banned white female nurses from 
caring for black male patients. Medical Center administrators, however, gave little regard 
to following Alabama law in the application of health services.
66
 Dean Roy R. Kracke of 
the Medical College admitted three black women into the hospital’s nursing certificate 
program in the fall of 1947, quietly desegregating education at a University of Alabama-
affiliated institution. After Commissioner Eugene T. “Bull” Connor called to threaten an 
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injunction against the Medical Center, Kracke quipped, “I need nurses. I don’t care 
whether they are white, black, red, or green.”
67
 Kracke eventually bent to the will of the 
UA Board of Trustees and removed the women a year later.  
Black women found employment at the Medical Center in a variety of healthcare 
positions such as registered nurses, medical technicians, and lab aides.
68
 Nellie Felder, a 
licensed practical nurse (LPN), had worked in Jefferson Hospital since it had become part 
of the Medical College in 1945. Her Baptist church was three blocks south of her 
workplace. As an LPN, Felder took vital signs, tended to small wounds, and assisted in 
personal hygiene for patients. An integral part of an expanding healthcare team, LPNs 
were vocationally trained in a system that increasingly valued formal academic 
education. LPNs like Felder, however, received informal continuing education at the 
Medical Center as they moved around the hospital to different clinics specializing in 
medical services. Felder eventually worked with the highly demanding Department of 
Surgery. Felder would become involved with the local chapter of the National Federation 
of Licensed Practical Nurses; professional associations asserted the value of LPNs and 
other groups in the expanding hospital system.
69
 At the same time the Medical Center 
acquired a national and international reputation for healthcare services, Felder gained 
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respectability. When she received her 25 year service pin in 1969, she stated she had 
“really enjoyed” her experience in the Medical Center.
70
  
 
Figure 2.3 Nurse training African American hospital orderlies in the use of the tank respirator (iron lung) as 
part of the University of Alabama Hospital's in-service education program, 1958. (Courtesy of UAB 
Archives.) 
Felder’s experience reveals the central if hidden roles African American women 
played in the development of the Medical Center. By the early 1960s, one-third of its  
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workforce was African American, and there was one black healthcare technician like 
Felder for every ten employees.
71
 Moreover, nearly 60 percent of its patient base was  
African American.
72
 Felder’s more than 25 years of service to the Medical Center is even 
more impressive given the significant turnover rate and the extremely low wages 
healthcare aides and service workers received in the early, lean years.
73
 Of course, black 
healthcare workers had few places to work in Birmingham. The Medical Center, which 
had both racially liberal and conservative clinicians and administrators, was their only 
viable option until 1953. Although limited by race, gender, and local customs to specific 
professions and education within healthcare, African American women such as Felder 
found new spaces of self-expression, personal pride, and respectability at the Medical 
Center. 
 Black male clinicians, however, found cracking the Medical Center more 
difficult, but some influential Medical Center faculty and administrators continually 
reached out to them on a host of issues. Both Kracke and Volker collaborated with their 
peers at the Tuskegee Institute, a black educational institution made famous by Booker T. 
Washington. Kracke often visited the campus over 120 miles away in southeast Alabama 
to escort Howard University medical faculty members on trips to recruit students and 
give speeches. Volker worked with Tuskegee dentist Cliff Dummett Jr. to develop an 
exchange program of continuing education.
74
 Black clinicians could use the Veterans 
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Affairs Hospital, which was a part of the Medical Center and desegregated according to 
federal statues. That hospital often served as a site of black-white clinical collaboration. 
Black physicians often consulted with their white counterparts as a way to legitimize 
their practice among their patients. The majority of African Americans, one black 
clinician explained, believed that “if you got sick you went to see a white doctor because 
they had the training.”
75
 
The most pressing problem for the thirty-five black physicians in private practice 
was the lack of hospital space in Birmingham. Segregated healthcare practices denied 
black clinicians the use of modern equipment and facilities in an age of rapid 
technological advancement. In 1947, Kracke negotiated with the Mineral District Medical 
Society to build a hospital for black physicians and their paying patients within the 
Medical Center complex. The space demands of the Jefferson County Department of 
Health, however, which had been a planned part of the Medical Center since 1945, 
pushed this hospital out of the four-and-a-half block campus. Kracke then opted to cede 
use of the fourteenth floor in Jefferson Hospital for Mineral District physicians, but 
internal pressure from faculty and UA President John Gallalee forced him to renege on 
his promise.
76
 After Kracke’s death in 1950, Volker continued to support efforts to build 
a new black hospital in Birmingham. He joined Zukoski, department store owner Louis 
Pizitz, and financier Mervyn H. Sterne to raise funds for the all-black Holy Cross 
Hospital. When ground broke in 1953, nearly seven years after Kracke began discussions 
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with black doctors, Pizitz reportedly told Volker, “We should have done it a long time 
ago.”
77
  
A few black doctors saw the segregated conditions in Birmingham as a reason to 
practice there. In 1957, Dr. James T. Montgomery returned to his hometown after 
completing his medical education. Upon hearing Montgomery’s decision, one of his 
mentors at Howard University School of Medicine reportedly told him, “I thought you 
had more sense.”
78
 Montgomery moved back to Birmingham in the midst of extremely 
high racial tensions such as the return of house bombings and public beatings of high-
profile African Americans.
79
 He saw himself as both a civil rights activist and a doctor. 
When one white colleague told Montgomery to choose between the two, he retorted, “I 
was a man before I was a doctor.”
80
 Montgomery also saw an opportunity in 
Birmingham. The city had lost a generation of black doctors. That nearly one-third of the 
thirty-five black doctors in Jefferson County were nearing retirement by the early 1950s 
acutely pointed to the detrimental effects of segregated healthcare education and the lack 
of such education in Alabama for nearly 25 years before the re-establishment of the 
Medical College.
81
   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77
 “Dr. Volker’s Remarks at Memorial for Mrs. Smolian,” n.d., File 1.67, Office of Public Relations and 
Marketing, Benefactor Reference Files, UAB Archives. 
78
 Montgomery, interview. 
79
 After Brown vs. Board of Education (1954), bombings against black housing or construction projects 
returned as a form of white resistance to desegregation. In April 1956, white Ku Klux Klan members 
dragged singer Nat “King” Cole from the stage of the Birmingham Municipal Auditorium and beat him 
savagely.     
80
 Montgomery, interview. 
81
 Mrs. J. K. Robertson and Miss Wattie T. Cole to Clifton H. Penick, April 23, 1951, File 023K, Emmett 
B. Carmichael/Alabama Museum of the Health Sciences Collection, UAB Archives. Robertson and Cole 
represented the Auxiliary to the Mineral District Medical Society; other organizations such as Delta Sigma 
  56!
 With a postgraduate specialization in cardiology from Harvard University, 
Montgomery’s credentials matched or exceeded some white clinicians at the Medical 
Center. He also came from a middle-class background. The light-skinned Montgomery 
grew up with his extended family in Rosedale, an African American neighborhood in an 
Over-the-Mountain suburb. His uncle D. M. Montgomery was the principal for Rosedale 
High School, and the younger Montgomery was a few years ahead of future civil rights 
leader Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth in school. The young doctor easily moved between 
black and white Birmingham from the privileged position education and class provided. 
Abraham H. Russakoff, a cardiologist and friend, invited Montgomery to informal 
meetings with clinicians at the Medical Center every other Friday to discuss cases for 
consultation. “I’ll never forget it,” he said, about those late 1950s and early 1960s 
meetings; “everybody else was Jim or Jack or Joe, but I was always Dr. Montgomery.” 
Around 1960, Montgomery approached Wally Frommeyer, a “very good friend” and 
dean of the Medical College, about officially attending clinical rounds in the hospital that 
would give him the hands-on learning experience he needed to qualify for national board 
certification in internal medicine. “It was the only time in my life I’ve ever asked 
anybody could I come and sit on the back row or something,” Montgomery recalled, but 
his friend, constrained by policies outside his control, said no.
82
  
 As early as 1958, Russakoff encouraged Montgomery to file a suit to desegregate 
the faculty of the Medical Center, but the temper of racial politics in Birmingham and the 
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University of Alabama was too hot at the time.
83
 Between 1956 and 1963, civil rights 
activities led by Shuttlesworth, Montgomery’s good friend and patient, placed pressure 
on white civic elites to desegregate Birmingham and its public spaces. In the Medical 
Center’s original contract with Jefferson County in 1944, only physicians who belonged 
to the Jefferson County Medical Society (JCMS) could practice in either Hillman or 
Jefferson Hospitals. The society, of course, was whites-only. Its members initially filled 
out the faculty, which caused a split within it between those who pushed racial and 
medical boundaries and those who kept them closed.  
In October 1963, Montgomery applied for membership to the JCMS with the full 
support of Russakoff, Frommeyer, and Volker, who by then was executive vice-president 
of Health Affairs. Volker incessantly lobbied JCMS members who practiced across the 
Birmingham area to admit Montgomery, which they did unanimously.
84
 In this one act, 
the Medical Center became publicly desegregated, with its first black faculty member 
with hospital privileges. Volker, Montgomery, and others trumpeted this accomplishment 
as a breakthrough in civil rights, a designation that rendered invisible the Medical 
Center’s long history of employing black women and providing healthcare to indigent 
black patients since its establishment in 1944.  
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 African Americans played crucial roles in shaping the early development of the 
Medical Center and forging spaces of interaction and opportunity within it. Women 
provided the often overlooked, less glamorous aspects of healthcare that white men, 
because of their sex or education, would not do. Poor, indigent African Americans 
received healthcare, with varying degrees of compassion and respect from white 
clinicians. In their capacity as patients, however, they fulfilled both the teaching and 
research mission of the academic Medical Center. Black middle-class professionals such 
as Montgomery and Adams challenged the Medical Center and found friendly if 
constrained white allies who would continue to advocate for racial inclusion. As 
Montgomery explained years later, “Liberal white folks helping black folks” was central 
to the local civil rights movement. “We could [not] have done anything about it without 
liberal white folks. Don’t misunderstand me. You need both.”
85
 Laws prevented the 
Medical Center from being an equitable space for African Americans, yet in the 1950s it 
remained one of the most open public spaces for them in Birmingham.  
 
The Emergence of Black Economic Power: A. G. Gaston, the Black Middle Class, 
and Suburban Homeownership 
  
 The business empire of A. G. Gaston served as the center of postwar black 
middle-class development in Birmingham.
86
 Gaston made the most of segregation, as did 
the men and women who came before him. Beginning in the 1890s, Birmingham’s 
segregated markets had produced a thriving black business district and sites of racial 
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uplift that catered to the larger African American community. Carrie Tuggle, a woman of 
African American and Cherokee ancestry, for example, began a school for black boys 
that enjoyed the support of white philanthropists who believed in making “separate-but-
equal” a reality. Rev. William Pettiford and other Knights of Pythian established the 
Alabama Penny Savings Bank, which unfortunately closed in 1915. Black men and 
women moved into the middle class by providing services whites denied African 
Americans. Historian August Meier has called this class a “small petit bourgeois” who 
served as models of economic, moral, and racial uplift.
87
 Gaston, who grew up with Jim 
Crow and idolized Booker T. Washington, became the most powerful African American 
in postwar Birmingham.    
 The grandson of former slaves who owned their land, Arthur George Gaston was 
born in Demopolis, Alabama, in 1892. He experienced a lonely childhood, with a mother 
who worked for a white family in Birmingham and other children who thought he was “a 
square.”
88
 Gaston followed the rules, even when his peers encouraged him to break them 
during play. His first business venture was selling rides on his tree swing for a button, 
which was also an attempt to win friends. At age eleven, he moved to Birmingham to be 
with his mother Rosie and the Lovemans, a white Jewish family who owned one of the 
state’s largest department store chains. Bernie Loveman was his constant playmate and 
one he did not have to bribe. While he lived with the Lovemans, Gaston experienced 
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“true kindness and affection from white people,” a belief that would influence how he 
related to white elites as an adult.
89
    
 Although life with the Loveman family provided Gaston with a safe, comfortable 
home, Rosie wanted her son to see the other side of Birmingham. She sent Art to the 
Tuggle Institute in the black middle-class neighborhood of Enon Ridge; her employer 
Minnie Loveman was a major donor to the school.
90
 Rosie explained to her son, “A boy 
your age, he needs to go to school. He needs to have some education or he’ll wind up 
swabbing by the flames in the blast furnace and falling into bad company. He needs to 
meet well-to-do, educated colored people early.”
91
 Rosie wanted to teach her son that he 
could be more than the son of a favored servant. By sending Art to the Tuggle Institute, 
she hoped he would learn race pride by living in a world created by African Americans.  
 Through his experience at the Institute, Gaston learned early that racial uplift, 
while created and nurtured by African Americans, needed the financial support whites 
gave to black institutions. When he left school, however, he quickly realized the limits of 
white benevolence. Despite his connections to the white elite community, Gaston found 
few employment opportunities that suited his entrepreneurial ambitions. He wandered 
down to Mobile, but his only significant employment there was as a hotel porter. He sired 
a child out-of-wedlock, a fact he considered so shameful and unbecoming he made no 
mention of his son in his autobiography. After a tour of duty in World War I, he came 
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back to the United States expecting first-class citizenship. Instead, he found his position 
as a black man had not changed. Fulfilling his mother’s speculation, he “w[ou]nd up 
swabbing by the flames in the blast furnace” at the Tennessee Coal and Iron plant in 
Fairfield where he earned “top dollar––$3.50 a day.”92  
 Gaston’s desire to be his own man continued while he labored for one of the 
worst industrial companies in Birmingham. He diligently saved his money and earned a 
reputation for “being cheap” among the ladies.93 He started selling his mother’s home-
cooking to his co-workers and soon graduated to a loan shark business, charging 25 
percent interest to the men courting the women who spurned him. In 1923, Gaston started 
the Booker T. Washington Burial Society from these growing assets. The business was 
practical, given the high mortality rate of African Americans due to disease, murder, and 
poor industrial working conditions, and symbolic, acting as a new institution of race pride 
within the black community.94 Gaston funneled profits from the burial society into his 
next logical project: the Smith and Gaston Funeral Home.    
 In 1940, Gaston moved his funeral business headquarters from the industrial 
suburb of Fairfield to a building he renovated at the corner of Kelly Ingram Park in 
downtown Birmingham. The park served as one of the borders of the small black 
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business district. Gaston’s new building, formerly a coal baron’s colonial residence, held 
the Smith and Gaston Funeral Home, the Booker T. Washington Insurance Company, and 
the newly established Booker T. Washington Business College. Over the next twenty 
years, he commissioned more buildings in the black business district to house 
administrative operations for his bottling company, cemetery, hotel, radio station, realty 
investment company, and bank.   
 Gaston’s business expansion depended on his relationships with local white 
bankers, particularly those at First National Bank of Birmingham (FNB), and his ability 
to capitalize on segregation’s effect in Birmingham’s consumer marketplace. Gaston 
carefully cultivated race relations and largely followed the dictates of whites to maintain 
his entrepreneurial empire. Because FNB approved capital investment loans and 
mortgages for his businesses and home, white banks often used economic intimidation 
against Gaston and other African Americans who challenged segregation. In 1957, for 
example, banks in Tuskegee used loan payments to threaten African Americans who 
launched a boycott of department stores in response to recent citizenship restrictions.
95
 
Gaston personally experienced the limitations white bankers placed on African 
Americans, such as when one FNB banker denied him a loan to buy his first Cadillac in 
the 1930s. After that experience, he admonished blatant consumerism as irresponsible in 
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light of the need for African Americans to own homes, run businesses, and earn 
degrees.
96
     
 Gaston launched the Booker T. Washington Business College in 1939 out of 
frustration in finding educated African Americans to work as secretaries, bookkeepers, 
and other skilled office jobs in his businesses. He realized what few white businessmen 
did at the time: Demand for professional consumer services would reshape the local 
economy. “The vast need for unskilled labor had passed,” he noted in his memoir; “the 
need for skilled workers was greatly increasing.”
97
 Consignment to unskilled labor jobs 
kept many African Americans from enjoying economic stability, mobility, and the 
privilege of a federally-designed social security system. New opportunities in 
professional or skilled jobs opened up through local initiative and state action. The effects 
of the GI Bill, although concentrated on white students and universities, created demand 
for higher education among African Americans. According to Gaston, the college grew 
faster in its first few years than either his funeral home or insurance company.
98
   
 Federal opportunities buoyed the young college and extended its reach beyond the 
borders of Birmingham. In 1943, the college became a testing site for the civil service 
exam; the federal government needed African American office workers during World 
War II. Professional office jobs for local blacks, however, were limited. African 
Americans used their education at the college to become secretaries and bookkeepers all 
over the nation as they migrated out of Birmingham. The college was aided yet again by 
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the state through the desegregation of the armed services at all levels in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, driving demand for more professionally-trained African Americans in 
the federal government. African American men and women used the college to tap into 
areas of employment in Birmingham and elsewhere that previously were unavailable to 
them.  
 Gaston used his college to provide first-class citizenship denied to him and 
African Americans in Birmingham’s Jim Crow industrial order. The college gave him the 
workforce he wanted, and he often underwrote the tuition for some of his employees. His 
desire for a professional work staff was part of his effort to create a new image of local 
black capitalism. He believed education taught young African Americans about “personal 
responsibility, self-respect and good citizenship,” and he drew personal “satisfaction of 
seeing our people learn to perform efficiently and avoid the ‘nigger business’ 
stereotype.”
99
 Gaston personally wanted to steer clear of such characterizations, and he 
molded his workers and protégés into reflections of himself. The professionalism Gaston 
demanded of his workers was part of his quest to fashion himself as a respectable and 
profitable businessman in black and white Birmingham.  
Through his business and educational endeavors, Gaston significantly contributed 
to the development of a black middle class in Birmingham. Although secretaries and 
bookkeepers hardly earned an income comparable to accountants or doctors, African 
Americans who worked in these positions gained middle-class respectability, an 
intangible symbol of social status. Other African Americans found new work within the 
growing Medical Center or other places of professional employment created by Gaston 
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and other African Americans. Together, these employment opportunities, though small, 
were significant enough to push some African Americans into new social and economic 
positions within Birmingham. 
 Professional opportunities as well as salary equalization for teachers and labor 
activism wrought substantial change in economic mobility for some black 
Birminghamians in the 1950s. Overall family income for African Americans grew in the 
postwar era. Labor activism, both on the factory floor and the school room, partly 
accounted for this increase. Skilled black industrial laborers made more in Birmingham 
than elsewhere in the South, and their recent entry into craft unions enhanced their ability 
to earn decent wages. Similarly, Birmingham World editor Emory O. Jackson, a former 
educator, drummed up support for salary equalization for teachers in the early 1940s.100 
By 1959, the average annual income for African American teachers was $4,583, which 
was nearly $100 more than white ones. Over 10,000 black Birmingham families earned 
more than $4,000 a year, which was two-thirds of the national average in 1960.101 
Although this discrepancy reflected the racial discrimination in the industrial and 
professional workforce, the number of families who made this level of income grew by 
nearly 300 percent in 10 years. 
 Gainful employment in professional or skilled labor enhanced the ability of 
African Americans to become consumers. Although black retailers did exist, their 
inventory and selection did not compare to the national or regional chains like 
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Loveman’s, Pitzitz’s, and Sears & Roebuck, Co., that dominated the downtown central 
business district. Gaston’s sole business failure, the Brown Belle Bottling Company, was 
his only venture that offered consumer goods rather than professional services. African 
Americans instead bought household and consumer items from white retailers. In 1959, 
98.2 percent of black homes had refrigerators, 84.7 percent had televisions, and 76.2 
percent had washing machines, all of which were increases from their consumption levels 
in 1948.
102
 Clearly, wage increases and new professional employment opportunities 
provided African Americans with the means to buy goods indicative of homeownership.  
 Postwar black homeownership in Birmingham reflected the legacy of a Jim Crow 
industrial order that forced African Americans into the poorest quality neighborhoods and 
the emergence of a suburban middle class that demanded more living spaces. Slightly 
more than 50 percent of African Americans in metropolitan Birmingham owned homes in 
1960, but the number and location of their neighborhoods were limited.
103
 Black 
suburban residential neighborhoods were squeezed in by industrial plants, rail lines, and 
white neighborhoods; they were also extremely limited. Shortly after racial zoning laws 
governing residential spaces were overturned in 1949, whites associated with the Ku 
Klux Klan bombed the recently-acquired home of William German in an area separating 
black Smithfield from the white Graymont neighborhood, launching a fifteen-year 
terrorism campaign to preserve white supremacy.
104
 As Oscar Adams stated at the open 
meeting for the Medical Center expansion project in the spring of 1953, “[The Negro] has 
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been forced to confine himself into particular areas because of legal restrictions in some 
cases, and because of physical violence in the form of bombings in other cases.”
105
   
 African Americans also faced major obstacles in acquiring their own homes in 
Birmingham due to the discriminatory policies of the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) and the legacy of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). Under HOLC 
guidelines established in 1933, federal officials designated areas unsuitable for home 
construction, improvements, or mortgages. The “redlined” areas were often residential 
neighborhoods for African Americans and were considered ill-suited for investment, a 
policy that continued after World War II. African American neighborhoods decreased in 
land value, experienced blight, and fell victim to urban renewal projects. FHA mortgage 
policies discriminated against potential African American homebuyers, a policy local 
white banks in Birmingham readily upheld.
106
 Gaston observed, “This resulted in 
Negroes living in sub-standard homes and paying exorbitant rates of interest, if any 
money at all was available to them at white lending institutions.”
107
  
 In 1957 Gaston launched Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association in 
response to the demands for and the federal and local obstacles to black homeownership. 
He could use his bank to support his own business expansion and take bolder actions in 
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supporting the local civil rights struggles without fear of reprisal. Local white bankers 
opposed the creation of Citizens Federal, partly as a way to control the market for home 
mortgages but also to prevent Gaston and other middle-class blacks from challenging the 
racial status quo. Initially denied a charter, Gaston appealed to the Federal Home Loan 
Banking Board in Washington, DC. It agreed to approve the bank if Gaston and his 
fellow black investors could raise $350,000.108 Some of those investors, and the first 
members of the board of directors, included Arthur S. Shores, Oscar A. Adams Jr., 
businessmen John Drew, and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. They quickly raised the 
money to form Citizens Federal. Gaston supposedly told his associates at First National 
Bank of Birmingham, “I am free of you people.”109 
 Citizens Federal provided home mortgages, capital loans, and economic security 
to hundreds, if not thousands, of African Americans for homes and churches. Its creation 
was a direct response to local and federal discrimination in mortgage lending. Gaston 
used these limits to strengthen black middle-class citizenship claims as well as the local 
economic power of black Birminghamians. Moreover, a black-owned and -operated bank 
would be less likely to cheat illiterate African Americans out of their deposits. Gaston 
claimed Citizens Federal also strengthened the leverage of prospective black 
homeowners, who could either conduct business with his bank or white banks. It was 
Gaston’s “special joy to drive through the streets of Birmingham and see the better homes 
being built and purchased by our people.” Black suburban neighborhoods in the city also 
became evidence of middle-class gains and a way “to improve the image of the 
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[Birmingham] community” after it had gained notoriety as “Bombingham” in the 
1950s.
110
  
 Although Gaston pledged that his various businesses served all African 
Americans across income, most of his business enterprises in fact served those who could 
afford professional services. Indeed, middle-class blacks in Birmingham represented a 
midcentury version of the “Talented Tenth,” and Gaston was the most preeminent of 
them all. Gaston’s business success brought him international stature, and he was an 
invited guest of the heads of states of Ghana and Liberia in the 1950s. He noticed the lack 
of a middle class in Liberia and the division between rich and poor, yet he did not make 
the connection that this economic caste system closely resembled Birmingham’s, either 
across race or within the black population.
111
 Rather, he saw Birmingham’s black middle-
class––the customers he served––as evidence that Birmingham transcended such a strict 
class hierarchy.   
 Gaston lived a separate life from most black Birminghamians, but race still 
governed how he lived his life. His hometown denied him the first-class citizenship he 
received abroad. A lover of the downtown Chinese restaurant Joy Young’s, he ordered 
take-out and picked it up in the back alley because local segregation ordinances and 
customs denied him entrance and seating in the restaurant.
112
 In the mid-1950s, he bought 
a sprawling suburban home in the outskirts of Tarrant City, an industrial suburb to the 
northeast of downtown Birmingham. His race excluded him from living in the prestigious 
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Over-the-Mountain suburbs.
113
 Jim Crow erased his class privilege and placed him on the 
same plane as the poorest African American, which undergirded his belief that there was 
a total entity called the “black community.”   
 
Figure 2.4 In the spring of 1960s, A. G. Gaston opened the new Booker T. Washington Insurance 
Company building on Fifth Avenue and Seventeenth Street South. (Courtesy of Birmingham Public 
Library.) 
 Gaston’s empire of professional services dominated the black business district, 
which expanded to accommodate the growth of local black capitalism and consumerism. 
The renovation and construction of new buildings there contrasted sharply with the white 
central business district in which no new building had been erected since the 1920s. In 
1954, Gaston opened the A. G. Gaston Motel to serve non-white visitors to Birmingham, 
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but some whites stayed there as well. He also opened a Supper Club near the Motel, 
which protected out-of-town black guests and locals from having to endure the same 
treatment that he did at Joy Young’s. Both establishments were modern architectural 
structures with first-class amenities that projected images of progressive race relations 
and the strength of local black economic power.114 Although he was not immune or 
oblivious to Birmingham’s racial terrorism, Gaston desired these images because he 
believed in them. His buildings and business holdings were concrete examples of his 
lifetime work in serving others as well as his navigation of segregated markets, 
discriminatory policies, and racist attitudes.  
 Gaston shaped the local black freedom struggle through his commitment to 
building the foundations for economic self-determination and a black middle class. 
Segregated local markets and discriminatory federal policies allowed him to build the 
spaces and capital for African American citizenship claims that subverted and challenged 
the unequal racial status quo in Birmingham. By the early 1960s, Gaston employed over 
500 African Americans whose collective payroll exceeded $1.5 million dollars, making 
the black business district buzz at a time when the central business district laid stagnant 
two blocks away.115 White civic elites took notice. In 1960, John E. Bryan, general 
manager of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, expressed great pride in the new 
building for the Booker T. Washington Insurance Company that represented Gaston’s 
accomplishments and contributions to Birmingham: “His financial investment in the area 
where his business is located is, perhaps, one of the finest examples of local citizens 
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investing their financial successes in their own community. There is no limit to what the 
economic growth of Birmingham could be if we could get more citizens like Dr. Gaston 
who not only believes in Birmingham but is doing something about it.”
116
 Following his 
life-long philosophy of finding a need and filling it, Gaston’s contributions to local black 
capitalism symbolized the postwar emergence of African American economic power, 
consumerism, and suburban homeownership.  
 
Conclusion 
On the periphery of downtown Birmingham, businessman A. G. Gaston and 
university administrator Joseph F. Volker separately built the foundations for a 
“consumers’ republic” for middle-class blacks and whites. They offered professional 
services in short supply in Birmingham. Gaston became the king of the black business 
district by capitalizing on Birmingham’s strict adherence to racial segregation and 
discriminatory federal policies, while Volker oversaw the development of the University 
of Alabama Medical Center by tapping into the abundant federal programs that supported 
the expansion of higher education and healthcare services. Both men deftly navigated the 
opportunities and limits of Birmingham and postwar New Deal policies. In doing so, they 
constructed spaces of complex interaction, loose coalitions, and shared ideals for a black 
and white suburban middle class across metropolitan Birmingham.  
Although part of the same professional service economy, Gaston and Volker 
operated under different constraints in Birmingham’s Jim Crow industrial order. As an 
African American multimillionaire, Gaston drew the attention of whites who either 
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celebrated him as proof that “separate-but-equal” worked or attempted to curb his access 
to first-class citizenship. His continued success challenged racial hierarchies in 
Birmingham for himself and other African Americans with middle-class aspirations. The 
politics of respectability gave them a platform to issue complaints and grievances to 
white civic elites. Yet, whites often used evidence of black consumerism and 
homeownership to support their claims of “separate but equal” and economic mobility for 
both races. The presidents of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce and Committee of 
100 cited such gains to dispute the image of Birmingham as a “city of fear and hatred,” so 
described in a blistering New York Times article in 1960.
117
 These white civic elites 
implicitly were pointing to men such as A. G. Gaston, Oscar A. Adams Jr., and Dr. James 
T. Montgomery who symbolized a black middle class.   
Volker, on the other hand, escaped intense scrutiny of his actions that challenged 
the racial and cultural orthodoxy of Birmingham at the time. He operated within one of 
the most powerful public institutions in the state––the University of Alabama. The nature 
of the services Volker provided also gave him and others room to bend the rules 
regarding segregation. Because healthcare was seen as a service rather than as a sector of 
the local economy, high-placed Birmingham officials and civic elites hardly contested 
African American presence within the Medical Center. Although poor African Americans 
living in the Southside neighborhood paid the price for the institution’s expansion, some 
blacks received benefits from the project in the 1950s and beyond. Black women such as 
Nellie Felder gained middle-class respectability while working there, while Adams and 
Montgomery established new networks of interaction and understanding with white racial 
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liberals at the Medical Center. Volker also created alternative spaces of thought and 
interaction within metropolitan Birmingham, from encouraging black-white clinical 
collaboration to establishing the Unitarian Universalist Church. Because of his race and 
ability to work behind the scenes, Volker avoided strict oversight in his efforts to build an 
alternative economic and racial order in postwar Birmingham. 
Collectively, the efforts of Gaston and Volker would transform the economy of 
the “Magic City” and produce new avenues of racial mobility and biracial 
communication for black and white citizens. Professionals determined who had access to 
the wide variety of services in a “consumers’ republic,” and the postwar surge in 
consumerism ensured the continued growth of this new sector of Birmingham’s 
economy. Professional services offered citizens education, homeownership, and 
healthcare and generated the development of local capital in Birmingham. The 
achievements of Gaston and Volker created the economic foundations of middle-class 
political power. In the early 1960s, Birmingham’s new middle class would challenge 
industrial elites and the white working class for control of the city. Their campaign would 
answer a call to action first voiced by an outside critic over twenty years before: “If 
Birmingham, the city of perpetual promise, at last comes into its own…‘equal justice to 
all men of whatever state or persuasion’ might actually come to pass in a region where 
democracy never had a chance.”
118
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“WHO SPEAKS FOR BIRMINGHAM”: CITIZENSHIP, MUNICIPAL REFORM, 
AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY, 1956-1965 
 
 
 By the late 1950s, Birmingham had gained national notoriety for its particularly 
virulent form of white supremacy and public displays of violence against African 
American property and bodies.
1
 One neighborhood to the west of downtown was the site 
of over fifty racially motivated bombings throughout the 1950s, recasting the faded 
“Magic City” as the less distinguished “Bombingham.” In April 1956, Ku Klux Klan 
members dragged the singer Nat “King” Cole off the stage at the Birmingham Municipal 
Auditorium and beat him. Nearly eighteen months later, the Klan struck again, this time 
kidnapping Edward Aaron, an illiterate black veteran walking down a street. On the night 
of September 2, 1957, six white men pistol-whipped and then castrated Aaron with a dull 
razor blade, doused him with turpentine, and left him on the side of the road for dead. 
One week later, white segregationists and Klan members attacked the Rev. Fred L. 
Shuttlesworth and his wife Ruby in downtown as they attempted to enroll their children 
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in the all-white Phillips High School.
2
 Such atrocities placed Birmingham at the near 
center of mass media reporting on the civil rights movement.
3
  
 In the spring of 1961, CBS News sent reporter Howard K. Smith to Birmingham 
to investigate local race relations in response to the previous year’s front-page article in 
the New York Times that declared “Fear and Hatred Grip Birmingham.”
4
 As Smith and 
his producers were finalizing their report, downtown Birmingham burst into violence yet 
again when, on May 14, 1961, the Ku Klux Klan attacked white and black Freedom 
Riders intent on desegregating interstate travel. Pictures documenting the assault traveled 
around the world, causing civic and national leaders embarrassment over the discrepancy 
between the claim of American democracy and the existence of American apartheid in 
Birmingham.
5
 Smith’s report aired four days later. Shuttlesworth recounted his 
experiences and displayed his battle scars, while acclaimed journalist John Temple 
Graves of the Birmingham Post-Herald steadfastly defended segregation and denied the 
existence of violence. Throughout the documentary, a national audience heard two vastly 
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different accounts of life in Birmingham, one for whites and one for blacks. At the heart 
of the documentary was the rhetorical question, “Who Speaks for Birmingham?”
6
 
 At the time, white extremists and black militants spoke the loudest. Historian 
Thomas J. Sugrue recently summarized the popular narrative of the southern civil rights 
movement, one Birmingham epitomizes, as a “morality play, one that pits the forces of 
good (nonviolent protestors) against evil (segregationist politicians, brutal sheriffs, and 
rednecks).”
7
 Poised between those opposing forces stood the white moderate as Martin 
Luther King Jr. observed in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”
8
 Across the South, 
these “men of good will”––lawyers, businessmen, educators, and clergy––were members 
of local power structures who protected economic growth and suburban independence 
above all else.
9
 King indicted these white moderates for the slow pace of desegregation. It 
was the “shallow understanding of people of good will” more than the “absolute 
misunderstanding from people of ill will” that was “the Negro’s great stumbling block in 
his stride toward freedom.” The white moderate, King explained, “prefers a negative 
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peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of 
justice.”
10
 
 Until a few months before King’s letter, Birmingham’s black and white “men of 
good will” lacked the political power to negotiate a negative or positive peace in the city. 
The growth of the University of Alabama Medical Center and local black capitalism had 
created the foundations of a professional service economy and new communication 
networks for affluent and middle-class whites and blacks. Their emergent economic 
power, however, had failed to translate into political power in Birmingham by the early 
1960s. Between the summer of 1962 and the spring of 1963, white suburban businessmen 
sought to correct this power imbalance by launching a municipal reform campaign. They 
very loosely worked with black civic elites to overthrow the city commission and replace 
it with a strong-mayor council system.
11
 The culmination of their success in changing the 
political structure of Birmingham coincided with the infamous civil rights movement led 
by King that was subsequently followed by violent acts of white resistance. At the heart 
of the spring of 1963 conflict was the right to city as expressed by groups with different 
ideas of what Birmingham should be.
12
  As one reformer observed, the storm of protest 
brought the city “almost to the point of a civil war.”
13
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 The dialogue over municipal reform began when there was an “absence of 
tension” in Birmingham between June 1961 and March 1963. During that time, no major 
violence over civil rights activism occurred in downtown. This brief cold war between 
black activists and white extremists followed five years of explosive confrontations that 
continually scared whites from working toward or accepting desegregation. White 
extremists took aim at bombing targets such as Temple Emanu-El in addition to black 
housing. In 1958, TIME magazine described white civic elites as living in “the silence of 
fear” when it identified Birmingham as “Integration’s Hottest Crucible.”
14
 Nevertheless, 
the continual fear white men of good will lived in finally pushed them to initiate 
dialogues with their black counterparts over how to end the constant terror in 
Birmingham.  
White and black men of good will recognized that they belonged to a larger 
Birmingham community that transcended political borders, geography, and identity. An 
increasingly powerful coalition of whites and blacks, Christians and Jews, and 
conservatives and liberals across the metropolitan area banded together to create that 
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larger, more inclusive vision of Birmingham. Mervyn H. Sterne, a prominent Jewish 
investment banker, described Birmingham’s men of good will as civic leaders who had 
“the ability to sit together and discuss problems on which they may disagree in a 
reasonably objective way.”
15
 Internal disagreements existed, and resistance from black 
civil rights activists and white segregationists to elites’ vision continued. These black and 
white civic leaders, however, worked toward finding mutual agreements to better the 
city––their home––at a time when Birmingham nearly imploded. Changing the municipal 
government was an immediate necessity to gain what they separately wanted: the 
political power to accomplish economic growth, civil rights goals, and metropolitan 
consolidation. Their dialogue would fashion a moderate biracial politics for the post-civil 
rights and post-industrial era.  
  
The Geography and Political Culture of Metropolitan Birmingham 
 Throughout the 1950s, the Birmingham metropolitan economy and landscape 
experienced growing pains. The city’s population grew by a paltry 4.6 percent throughout 
the decade, while the metropolitan area grew slightly more at 13.6 percent, with 
approximately 635,000 people living in Jefferson County by 1960 (See Appendix, Table 
1). In the city and metropolitan area, respectively, African Americans represented 39.6 
percent and 34.6 percent of the population, the highest proportion of all major southern 
cities (See Appendix, Table 2).
16
 Class also marked areas of black and white 
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Birmingham. An emergent professional service economy had created a dispersed and 
expanding suburban middle class at the same time industrial decline squeezed the urban 
black and white working class.  
 Laws, land use patterns, and violence shaped segregation in the city of 
Birmingham. After a federal circuit court overturned discriminatory local zoning laws in 
1949, Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene T. “Bull” Connor attempted to pass a 
municipal ordinance that would make it illegal for blacks to buy homes for sale by whites 
and vice versa.
17
 Even without these formerly legal means, long-term land use patterns 
acted as substitutes to confine blacks to a few areas of the city. Industrial plants, mass 
transportation routes, and commercial districts helped to separate blacks and whites 
within an economic class, such as steel workers in Ensley. In reference to these laws and 
land use patterns, Emory O. Jackson of the Birmingham World declared that blacks were 
“bottled in the slums and restricted to the blighted areas.”
18
 The forthcoming interstate 
system threatened Jackson’s home in Enon Ridge, an historic neighborhood for the black 
middle class. When middle-class African Americans attempted to move across these legal 
and physical barriers, whites retaliated through violence, turning the North Smithfield 
neighborhood into “Dynamite Hill.” 
 “Red Mountain” separated the urban working class from the suburban affluent 
and middle class in the Birmingham metropolitan area. Birmingham sits at the bottom of 
the Appalachian valley and ridges range, and a tree-lined, red iron ore crest called Red 
Mountain separates urban Jones Valley from suburban Shades Valley. A large cast-iron 
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statue of Vulcan, god of iron, stands on top of Red Mountain overlooking Jones Valley 
and defining it as a place of production. Vulcan, as local mythology has it, represented 
the white industrial captains of Birmingham who lived in Shades Valley. One resident 
 
Figure 3.1 Aerial view of Birmingham from Red Mountain, looking north, 1962. (Courtesy of Birmingham 
Public Library.) 
called Red Mountain an imaginary Maginot Line that separated working-class blacks and 
whites from affluent whites.
19
 While enjoying an overview of the city, Mrs. George 
Bridges remarked in 1961, “I haven’t heard of Negroes just spontaneously break into 
song in four, five years, and that’s bad, because they’re not happy and we’re not happy 
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about it.”
20
 Red Mountain reinforced class privilege and a nascent racial innocence by 
protecting affluent white suburbanites, mainly women and children, from witnessing or 
experiencing industrial decline, rampant violence, and racial turmoil that occurred in the 
city.  
 Home to some of Birmingham’s most prominent white civic leaders and an 
expanding middle class, the three politically-independent “Over-the-Mountain” suburbs 
were more diverse than their caricature suggests. Established in 1926 through the 
incorporation of three separate communities, Homewood was a mishmash of architectural 
styles and peoples. One of the original communities, Rosedale, was home to a black 
middle class. It served as the site for one of the few black high schools in Jefferson 
County, which local civil rights leader Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth attended in the 1940s. 
Robert S. Jemison Jr. planned Mountain Brook during the 1920s in ways that avoided 
what were to him the aesthetically and racially undesirable results of Homewood. His 
designs for the suburb called for bigger homes with more acreage and stricter covenants. 
Located directly south down Red Mountain and east of Homewood, Mountain Brook was 
home to some of the city’s wealthiest and most prominent white families in Birmingham 
and their African American domestic servants. Mountain Brook and Homewood 
experienced growth rates of over 50 percent in the 1950s (See Appendix, Table 3). 
Powerful Jewish men such as department storeowner Isadore Pizitz and investment 
banker Mervyn H. Sterne lived in the area that became Vestavia Hills in 1951. That 
suburb’s incorporation drew more development for middle-class homes, attracting Dr. 
Joseph F. Volker and some of his colleagues at the University of Alabama Medical 
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Center. The Jefferson County school system served all three politically independent 
suburbs. Differences of race, religion, and class status shaped these developing areas, but 
all of them shared the common identifier of “Over-the-Mountain.”  
 While Over-the-Mountain suburbanites crossed over Red Mountain to access 
downtown Birmingham, black and white working-class residents of Jones Valley rarely 
entered Shades Valley as anything but employees or bused school children.
21
 Class 
antagonisms ran strong in 1950s Birmingham. Economically and socially, some members 
of the urban white working class felt under assault.
22
 Unlike Over-the-Mountain 
suburbanites, they could not buy out of the implications of desegregation. Neither could 
whites living in the industrial suburbs of Bessemer, Fairfield, or Tarrant City. They did 
not have the economic means to safeguard their homes or families from perceived threats 
by moving to independent suburbs, sending their children to private schools, or using 
recreational facilities at country clubs (See Appendix, Table 4).  
 The prospect of desegregation in public facilities coincided with economic 
restructuring, a double blow for the urban white working class. A long industrial 
production slump in Birmingham led to mass lay-offs. The inability of civic leaders to 
attract new industry after 1957 further constricted the blue-collar job market.
23
 By 1961, 
unemployment hovered at 7 percent. African American miners were hit hard, with one 
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out of every seven unemployed.
24
 Economic growth fueled by the University of Alabama 
Medical Center created professional, middle-class jobs or low-wage service ones. Its 
sister institution, the Extension Center, largely catered to professionals such as engineers 
or teachers in need of continuing education. Birmingham’s industrial working class was 
left out of an emerging professional service economy.  
 Working-class whites used their political power, however, to counter the effects 
of desegregation and increased civil rights activism. After the 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, whites across the state of Alabama demanded political redress over 
the potential loss of their way of life. Politicians listened. In 1956, Alabama Lieutenant 
Governor John Patterson demanded that the state’s chapter of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) hand over its membership list. When 
the group did not comply, state courts issued injunctions that crippled its ability to 
organize in Alabama. Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth launched the Alabama Christian 
Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR) to fill the void. Shuttlesworth took his activism 
to the courts and streets in downtown Birmingham, and whites, some associated with the 
Ku Klux Klan, usually met him and others they deemed troublemakers with violence. In 
the fall of 1957, Connor returned to his post as Commissioner of Public Safety with the 
smallest margin of victory in his political career.
25
 Connor’s re-election resulted in a 
hardening of white resistance and a revival of Klan violence in Birmingham. 
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 Connor was a master politician of industrial Birmingham. A former radio 
announcer for the Birmingham Barons baseball team, Connor’s gruff, bullhorn voice and 
idiosyncratic speech patterns reflected his working-class background. Connor never went 
to college, and he briefly worked security for the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, a 
subsidiary of U.S. Steel. These were concrete experiences of working-class life in 
Birmingham that he shared with a large portion of Birmingham residents. They 
differentiated him from his fellow commissioners, who were smoother and more 
polished. In 1960, U.S. Steel, Republic Steel, and other industrial companies employed 
30 percent of the metropolitan area workforce (See Appendix, Tables 5 and 6).
26
 Their 
executives, Over-the-Mountain suburbanites who supported Connor, fiercely resisted 
unionization. Connor balanced these two components of an industrial economy: He spoke 
for the concerns of a threatened and exploited white working class by virulently 
upholding segregation while working with their industrial bosses to prevent further 
unionization, enforce racial hierarchies in labor, and keep the price of doing business in 
Birmingham to a minimum.
27
   
 Although Connor and his supporters controlled Birmingham, they did not 
necessarily represent the views and opinions of all area or city residents. His 1957 return 
to office represented the political indecisiveness of urban whites over the issue of 
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desegregation. While some whites favored the incumbent and moderate Robert 
Lindbergh, others wanted Connor in office either to take a stronger stand against 
Shuttlesworth or to control the Klan. Of the 340,000 people who lived in the city, only 
half of the 80,000 who had the right to vote did so.28 Less than 12 percent of Birmingham 
residents typically decided the outcome of municipal elections. Connor’s wins in 1957 
and 1961 were the results of electoral power concentrated in the hands of the few who 
increasingly spoke less for the overall metropolitan area and more for white working-
class and industrial interests.  
 
In Search of Progress: Suburban Citizenship, Downtown Birmingham, and 
Challenges to an Industrial Jim Crow Political Order 
 
 Led by prominent white civic leaders who lived in the Over-the-Mountain 
suburbs and the city’s affluent suburban neighborhoods, postwar annexation campaigns 
sought to make the city of Birmingham reflect its white middle-class population.29 White 
elites wanted to attract economic growth derived from the postwar boom in consumer and 
professional services. In 1949, suburban industrialists mounted a counter-campaign 
against annexation, and Connor publicly supported them. Potential revenues from an 
increased tax base would have funded a $29 million capital improvement campaign. 
Federal urban renewal programs for public projects and commercial developments 
required matching local funds.30 Ten years later, suburban annexationists bemoaned the 
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loss of urban vitality. In the 1959 campaign, editor Vincent S. Townsend of the 
Birmingham News pleaded, “If Birmingham, strangled as it is by smaller municipalities 
on all sides, deteriorates into a second class city every suburb will suffer with it.”
31
 
Although the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, the Birmingham Downtown 
Improvement Association, and the Birmingham Real Estate Board supported annexation, 
Connor and the Committee of 100, a group of politically powerful suburban industrialists, 
opposed it.
32
 Connor’s active stance against annexation, unheard of among municipal 
leaders, was to the city’s detriment. By insisting Birmingham did not need Shades Valley, 
he engaged in class politics that reinforced the supremacy of white working-class 
political power.  
 Altogether, the two annexation drives revealed an increasing split among 
Birmingham’s white suburban business leaders. Only one-fourth of the 700 self-
designated civic, economic, political, and religious leaders were born in Birmingham, and 
a little over half were from Alabama. In a 1959 survey of Birmingham’s leadership class, 
respondents listed their top four goals, in order, as personal success, corporate success, 
personal power and prestige, and personal wealth. A personal commitment to 
Birmingham and its prosperity and welfare came in last.
33
 One historian inferred that the 
dearth of native leadership and the overwhelming taste for personal gain indicated that 
Birmingham’s leaders were absentee landlords. Consequently, civic leaders would be 
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“less concerned with Birmingham’s problems and their solutions.”
34
 A contemporary 
local critic called Birmingham “a farm club for Pittsburgh.”
35
   
 In 1959, a small group of white civic leaders commissioned a management 
consulting firm to perform an audit of metropolitan Birmingham and recommend 
solutions to its problems.
36
 The authors of the audit found that the city still suffered from 
the “civic anemia” journalist Irving Beiman diagnosed a decade before.
37
 Based on a 
survey of nearly 14,000 citizens, the large majority of whom were middle class whites, 
the audit concluded Birmingham possessed “a chilling and inhibiting fear of failure” and 
“doubt of self.”
38
 The “people of Birmingham do not speak well of their city,” but “they 
feel, even though unconsciously, an embarrassing need” to defend it. Plagued by 
economic decline, racial turmoil, City Hall corruption, and downtown deterioration, there 
was “evidence of frustration” among white civic leaders whose confidence had been 
“replace[d]…with a virtual admission of futility, even inferiority.” Secretly, whites felt 
“afraid, without daring to admit…that [they] ha[ve] forfeited the title of the Magic 
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City.”
39
 The authors’ urged Birmingham’s leadership class to adopt a communal spirit: 
“The citizens of Birmingham [must] realize their community directly affects them and 
that their selfish interest is in most cases completely dependent on the thoroughness of 
Birmingham’s development and progress.”
40
   
             The metropolitan audit came as a shock to the white civic leaders who had 
commissioned it primarily because they recently had taken proactive stands to combat 
“civic anemia.” In 1957, white suburban men who were invested in the professional 
service economy formed the Birmingham Downtown Improvement Association (BDIA). 
The BDIA promoted pro-growth policies, downtown revitalization, annexation, and an 
expressway to connect the Over-the-Mountain suburbs to downtown by cutting through 
Red Mountain. The civic organization represented the interests of an affluent white 
middle class who increasingly lost power to affect change in downtown as they moved to 
the suburbs. The 1957 election, in which Connor was re-elected, saw the three-man 
commission government fall to the hands of two arch segregationists whose political 
support came from the white working class resentful of token desegregation and Over-
the-Mountain suburbanites. After the 1961 municipal election, all three commissioners 
took public stands against “daylight” citizens who lived Over-the-Mountain. 
 “Daylight” citizens, as Connor and his working-class supporters called them, were 
those white suburban businessmen who spent their daytime hours in Birmingham but left 
the city at night. Two-thirds of Over-the-Mountain suburbanites owned or worked in 
downtown banks, department stores, law firms, and other professional services such as 
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architecture, engineering, and healthcare.
41
 Not all of them were divested from 
Birmingham, as the formation of the BDIA suggests. Original members of the BDIA had 
engaged in an active citizenship with the city of Birmingham by using philanthropy and 
civic organizations to expand its opportunities and improve its public welfare. To these 
white men, Red Mountain merely separated their suburban homes from their downtown 
offices, churches, temples, and civic spaces; it did not mark the political boundaries of 
their personal citizenship. These civically engaged white suburbanites gave back to the 
city that provided them with the opportunities to become affluent and powerful.  
 Realtor William P. Engel epitomized a “daylight” citizen who had close ties to the 
city. Born in 1895, Engel was a first-generation Jewish immigrant from modest rural 
beginnings, but he rose to powerful positions within the Birmingham business 
community. After a postwar industrial boom failed to materialize in Birmingham, Engel 
advocated a “hold that steel” policy as president of the Chamber of Commerce in 1950 to 
attract industrial companies that made consumer-end goods to the area. He often served 
as a liaison between leaders of the industrial and professional service economy, serving 
as the first president of the BDIA in 1957 and then two years later as president of the 
industrial Committee of 100. In his farewell address to the latter organization, he 
lambasted its members by telling them they had “too much labor trouble” exacerbated by 
“the violence and attempted mob rule” that began in 1956. He advised, “The three 
principals––management, labor, and the public––must approach the problem with a full 
spirit of cooperation and willingness to meet together on a reasonable give and take 
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basis.”
42
 Engel, a powerful civic leader, increasingly questioned how the Birmingham 
business community and its government operated by the end of the decade.  
 Engel’s leadership roles in Birmingham were expressions of his suburban 
citizenship to the city. He raised his family in the prestigious Highland Park suburban 
neighborhood before he moved to a Mountain Brook home one street away from 
Birmingham’s city limits sometime after World War II.
43
 He amassed substantial wealth 
based on real estate and finance in Birmingham, and he volunteered his time and donated 
money to support favored causes such as Zionism and healthcare. He explained his 
philosophy of philanthropy as an exchange between an individual citizen and his larger 
community: “I do not believe in a one way street. I believe if a community is acting well 
toward you and you’re making a living there and have a position in the community, then 
you owe a great deal back.”
44
 All of Engel’s philanthropic activities were a part of his 
“civic rent,” as he called it, and they informed his sense of ownership and belonging in 
the city of Birmingham. 
 Downtown held a special significance for suburbanites like Engel. As the 
Birmingham News declared, downtown “is the FOCAL POINT, the IMAGE, of our 
community,” but it was in a state of decline by the late 1950s.
45
 Sagging power lines, 
overflowing sewers, potholes, obnoxious electrical signs, the dark cast of smog, and the 
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absence of greenery marred the man-made beauty of downtown’s beaux-art and art-deco 
architecture built to resemble a “Magic City.” The News asked, “Who would want to 
establish a new business or industry in a city whose heart seemed to be failing? Who 
would want to move into such a city to make a home?”
46
 The BDIA adopted a new 
master plan paid for by member donations that the city needed to qualify for urban 
renewal funding. Announced in the News in a special insert in August 1961, the 
ambitious “Sky City” planned for open air plazas and aboveground walkways to invite 
pedestrian use in downtown. Nineteenth and Twentieth Streets North, which were the 
central arteries of the downtown central business district, also would be repaired. Despite 
the hype, city voters rejected financing for Sky City in a failed bond issue in the fall of 
1961.  
 Faced with the rejection of the BDIA’s master plan for Birmingham, Engel took 
matters into his own hands. Birmingham was Engel’s home, despite his official residence 
outside of its political borders, and downtown Birmingham was a landscape on which he 
could write and invest his values. “The growth of any city rests upon the progress of its 
building,” he wrote, “and the progress of its building lies in the foresight of its men.”
47
 
To revitalize downtown, Engel commissioned the seventeen-story Bank for Savings 
Building. Its completion in September 1962 marked the first addition to Birmingham’s 
skyline since the 1920s. The new downtown building represented Engel’s belief that he 
was a city builder leading Birmingham toward economic progress. 
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 Engel stood to make a sizable return on his economic investment through the 
attraction of new business, but he also understood his actions as his “civic rent” to 
Birmingham. Other white suburbanites paid theirs by directly advancing social justice 
causes. Engel’s friend James A. Head followed him as president of the Committee of 
100. Like Engel, Head also had connections with leaders of industry and professional 
services. As owner of Alabama’s largest office supply store, Head worked with industrial 
companies, businesses, department stores, and libraries most of all. He supported the real 
estate magnate’s challenge of the industrial political economy and shared his belief that 
economic growth “can cure every other ill,” including racism and anti-Semitism.
48
   
 Historian and former municipal official Edward S. LaMonte recently noted that 
no other “high-profile [white] person in Birmingham…was as consistently outspoken” in 
advancing social justice causes as Head.
49
 Born in Ohio, Head moved with his widowed 
mother and brothers to Birmingham’s Norwood neighborhood, about three miles north of 
downtown, when he was ten. A devout Southern Baptist, Head accepted a more inclusive 
view of Christianity than most of his fellow southerners. In 1932, amid economic, 
religious, and racial turmoil in Birmingham, he co-founded the Alabama Chapter of the 
National Conference of Christians and Jews.
50
 One peer dismissively described him as a 
“white Negro with red stripes” because of his long-standing commitment to human rights 
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issues that ran counter to the “southern way of life.”
51
 Head reflected in his twilight years 
that “the good Lord directed me” to work towards social justice causes.
52
 
 Head served on nearly every biracial organization in Birmingham until 1956, 
when most of them disbanded under pressure from massive resistance campaigns. Head 
eagerly signed on as a member of the Alabama Advisory Committee of the United States 
Civil Rights Commission in 1960 and served for ten years. In that same year, he served as 
president of the industrial Committee of 100. Although shunned by some white peers 
because of his views and actions, his presidency gave the group a much-needed image 
makeover as one working toward rather than against change. While he served as its 
nominal leader, Head was an outspoken activist for civil rights and critical of his peers 
who remained silent on civil rights or supported Jim Crow. A year later, he toured the 
state of Alabama with the National Conference of Christians and Jews speaking out 
against segregation. The fact that Head owned his own business, which by the early 
1960s largely supplied libraries across the state’s growing secondary and higher 
education systems, provided him with some protection against reprisals and the security 
to speak his mind freely.      
 There were costs for suburban white men who challenged Birmingham’s Jim 
Crow industrial order. Charles F. Zukoski Jr., a former four-term mayor of Mountain 
Brook, lost his job with the prestigious First National Bank of Birmingham after critically 
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questioning Gov. John Patterson’s commitment to segregation in the spring of 1962.
53
 He 
had been with the bank since he first arrived in Birmingham nearly forty years before. 
During the 1950s, Zukoski voiced his concerns over the state of Birmingham affairs in 
his weekly editorials under the pen name “Button Gwinnett” in the Shades Valley Sun, a 
newspaper distributed across the Over-the-Mountain suburbs. Although he was a vocal 
racial liberal involved in many civic organizations dedicated to civil rights and social 
welfare, Zukoski needed the cover of anonymity to protect his position with the bank and 
Birmingham society. That he was fired after a long history of expressing opposing views, 
in private and in public, spoke to the heightened tensions that silenced any voice of 
opposition or difference in early 1960s Birmingham. Feeling the sting of rejection, 
Zukoski largely focused his attention away from Birmingham toward global health and 
family planning issues after 1962.  
 Another white suburbanite stung by the backlash against him was the outspoken 
young lawyer Charles A. Morgan Jr. who fled Birmingham in disgust to work for the 
American Civil Liberties Union in 1964. Unlike Head, Morgan increasingly refused to 
collaborate with those with whom he disagreed on social justice issues. He also criticized 
fellow white suburbanites who viewed progress solely through an economic lens. At the 
dedication of Engel’s Bank for Savings building, Morgan critically reflected on the 
absurdity of a few thousand spectators standing on the broken streets of downtown 
Birmingham and sweating on a hot, humid summer night. “They were that hungry for a 
sign of progress,” he commented; “the frustrations of decades were wrapped in the hope 
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that those lights represented a ‘new era’ for Birmingham.”
54
 The young lawyer knew the 
city needed more than new lights and economic development to address structural 
inequality and overthrow Jim Crow.  
 Morgan had moved to Birmingham as a teenager and attended the University of 
Alabama, establishing connections there that he later would use in the early 1960s to 
challenge the distribution of political power in Alabama. He worked with other lawyers 
in the Young Men’s Business Club, a junior, more progressive alternative to the 
Chamber, to reapportion the state legislature and advocate for stronger social services. 
Crossing Red Mountain every workday from his Mountain Brook home to his downtown 
office, Morgan donated legal services to poor African Americans accused of crimes. He 
often made home visits to clients who lived in neighborhoods outside of the “civilization” 
of downtown and the Over-the-Mountain suburbs. Every time he entered these 
neighborhoods, Morgan confronted “the other side of [his] own li[fe] that [he] had never 
known existed.”
55
 Morgan’s experiences with the underbelly of Jim Crow led him to fight 
for social justice in a city that he called “home.” “For some,” he noted, “there was no 
peace in our valley.”
56
 Along with pro bono cases for poor African Americans, Morgan 
also represented Rev. Robert Hughes in a slander suit filed by the city commission in 
1960. Hughes was the New York Times informant who dared to speak the truth about 
Birmingham. 
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 Morgan, Head, and Engel used the economic, judicial, and civic spaces of 
downtown Birmingham to express citizenship claims and by extension to shape 
Birmingham’s larger political culture according to their values and priorities. These men 
did not act alone. Rather, they represented the varied approaches reform-minded 
suburban white men took to advance economic growth and social justice. Downtown was 
still the center of civic, cultural, and economic life in Birmingham, but these men no 
longer had the political power to direct the city. As suburban citizens, they could not 
vote. They tried to influence Birmingham politics through downtown-based civic 
associations, but they often compromised with conservative businessmen and paid some 
personal costs. Stymied by the Jim Crow industrial order, this minority of white 
suburbanites remained committed to fashioning progress for Birmingham. 
 
The Political Power of Consumer Citizenship: Lucius H. Pitts and Miles College 
 White suburban citizenship claims on Birmingham coincided with new 
developments in the local and national civil rights struggles. In February 1960, four black 
students from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College attempted to 
desegregate the lunch counter at a Woolworth’s department store in Greensboro, North 
Carolina. In a few days, over 300 African Americans participated in the “sit-in.” Local 
white businessmen quickly acquiesced to black students’ demands to desegregate semi-
public facilities in an effort to save their city from a negative image and possible 
economic decline that had greeted cities of resistance such as Birmingham.
57
 The sit-ins 
reflected a new strategy for direct action that called attention to inequities through 
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consumerism and hit white suburban businessmen in their pocketbooks.58 As one 
Birmingham civil rights leader later explained, “How come a Negro can spend $100 on a 
dress and not a dime on a Coke?”59 African American students in Birmingham soon 
adopted this form of protest that emphasized consumer citizenship. 
 This shift in tactics also represented a change in local civil rights leadership. In 
the summer of 1961, the Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth left the city for a pastorship in 
Cincinnati. Shuttlesworth’s confrontational style of activism often incited retaliatory 
physical violence from whites. Temperatures also rose in Birmingham in response to the 
spring 1961 riot that greeted Freedom Riders seeking to desegregate interstate travel. It 
was precisely this perpetual violence that led Ruby Shuttlesworth to urge her husband to 
leave Birmingham.60 Shuttlesworth frequently returned to the city and retained his 
presidency of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR). When he 
moved to Cincinnati, white leaders labeled him an “outside agitator” with the same denial 
of citizenship that Connor and the commission used against suburban citizens. 
Shuttlesworth’s departure, however, gave other black leaders more room to assert their 
own ideas over how to achieve racial progress.       
 One such person was Lucius H. Pitts, who arrived from Atlanta to become the 
new president of the historically black Miles College in the fall of 1961. Miles had 
recently lost its accreditation due to an insufficient library, lack of faculty with Ph.D.s, 
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and capital deficiencies. Charged with restoring its accreditation, Pitts deftly used the 
media and existing networks of biracial communication to address Birmingham’s 
separate and unequal society. Pitts strove to convince Birmingham’s philanthropic class 
that, despite their financial contributions, African American education was woefully 
unequal. He remarked to CBS News in the “Who Speaks for Birmingham?” report, “The 
inadequacy in Negro education would astound the average white man if he knew it.”
61
 
Pitts had an unshakable faith in education, and he dedicated his career to not only 
explaining the costs of segregation to whites but also to African Americans themselves. 
Pitts described how segregation negatively affected him: “It’s a painful thing to be…an 
educated Negro in the South, with a family, to try to decide how much you tell your child 
and how you interpret the situation to him, so that he doesn’t develop the kind of hatred 
and fear and conditioning that I’ve had to strive to get rid of.”
62
    
 Born in rural Georgia and educated at Paine College and Fisk University, Pitts 
worked hard to earn self-dignity and middle-class respectability in the Jim Crow South. 
Similar to the white civic elite philosophy of “civic rent,” Pitts gave back to the 
communities that provided him with opportunities. Although an ordained minister in the 
Christian Methodist Episcopal (CME) Church, Pitts was primarily a teacher and principal 
in grammar schools. In Atlanta, he was the executive secretary of the Georgia Teachers 
and Education Association, vice-president of the Georgia NAACP, and president of the 
Georgia Council of Human Relations. Perhaps because of his existing service 
commitments, he turned down an invitation to join the leadership ranks of the Southern 
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Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Initially, Pitts thought his move to 
Birmingham and new role as college president signaled a change in his activism. “I 
thought my involvement in civil rights was over,” he confessed. The urgency of the 
situation in Birmingham soon changed that.
63
   
In the winter of 1961, a group of students at Miles College began planning a 
“selective buying campaign” to force owners and managers of downtown department 
stores to desegregate services and hire blacks.
64
 Frank Dukes, president of the Miles 
student body, led the Anti-Injustice Committee. Raised in Birmingham, Dukes was a 
thirty-three-year-old Korean War veteran who had worked in an automobile factory in 
Detroit. After being laid off at a Dodge plant, he returned to his hometown, “hustling in 
the pool room, shooting craps,” he recalled, before he enrolled at Miles in 1959. Dukes 
had experienced a different world in Detroit. “Oh it beat Birmingham in a thousand 
different ways in terms of discrimination and segregation,” he remembered. Detroit “was 
not a panacea,” but Dukes’ experience there taught him to want, expect, and demand 
more back home.
65
   
 Pitts quickly became aware of Dukes’ plans for a boycott, and he called him and 
leaders of the Anti-Injustice Committee into his office to advise them on how to protest 
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effectively.
66
 He even contributed his name to the Anti-Injustice Committee literature, 
emphasizing his full support of his students rather than attempting to hide behind them. 
As Dukes recalled, “He wanted us to do it in organized fashion and to do it in such a way 
that hopefully, we wouldn’t get killed off the bat.”
67
 The year before, Pitts had 
encouraged his students to use CBS News to air their complaints rather than demonstrate 
in downtown after the Freedom Rider riot because “a march would be murder at that 
tense time.”
68
 Pitts believed the group benefitted from a lack of “associat[ion] with any of 
the existing Negro organizations” such as Shuttlesworth’s ACMHR.
69
 White 
businessmen might be more willing to negotiate with the students. The president’s 
penchant for biracial communication also led to an initial delay of the boycott, originally 
slated for January but began in March of 1962. 
 Pitts continued to arrange a series of meetings between Miles students, black 
leaders, and white businessmen before and during the selective buying campaign.
70
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Dukes was initially hesitant about meeting with white businessmen because he knew that 
they “didn’t have any power to change anything in Birmingham because they lived in 
Mountain Brook.”71 Pitts, however, realized the necessity of forging new dialogues with 
businessmen already shamed by the 1961 Freedom Rider riot episode. He had established 
relationships with white liberals, such as Head, Zukoski, and Joseph F. Volker, and he 
had joined regional biracial organizations such as the Alabama Council on Human Rights 
and the Alabama Advisory Committee of the US Civil Rights Commission. Although 
they often disagreed, Pitts and Dukes worked together to create a potent mix of Pitts’ 
older form of black activism that focused on legal battles and biracial communication 
with Dukes’ new model based on direct action and consumer citizenship.  
 The students’ protest was a form of black activism that economically-minded 
white elites understood best. The selective-buying campaign changed the look of 
downtown by encouraging African Americans to disappear from it, thus protesting 
segregation through absenteeism. Instead of insisting on their right to be served, these 
students expressed their rights as consumers by boycotting stores that discriminated 
against them.72 African Americans spent $4 million a week in downtown department and 
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retail stores, the absence of which cut deeply into 15 percent profit margins.
73
 The recent 
pull of white suburban shoppers to Eastwood Mall located near Mountain Brook 
amplified the loss of blacks to downtown’s daily population. Dukes and other students 
walked in front of targeted stores with placards, further keeping suburbanites away, and 
Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene T. “Bull” Connor ordered their arrests. 
Downtown became “lily white” and less alive in the absence of black shoppers.
74
 When 
asked about the campaign, an anonymous retailer retorted, “Don't ask us how effective it 
is. Just tell us how the hell to get out of it.”
75
     
 Although the campaign failed in its efforts to desegregate downtown stores, it 
succeeded in pushing Miles College and Pitts into the national spotlight and onto the 
local political stage. The boycott, which dwindled by May, was not much of a story but 
the city commission’s response to it was. Led by Connor, the city slashed its contribution 
to the county food surplus program, which largely benefitted poor African Americans, 
and prevented Miles from conducting a fundraiser for its library. Pitts held a press 
conference exposing these actions, which provoked a national response and further 
shamed downtown’s daylight citizens in their failure to lead Birmingham and embrace 
the times. Large and small donations flooded Miles; Pitts later remarked, “We’ve gotten a 
great deal of good will from the outside.”
76
 Miles’ reaccreditation process benefitted from 
the boycott and his deft use of media.  
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 Pitts also emerged as a new black leader in Birmingham by harnessing collective 
consumer power into political power. By largely removing themselves from the 
retaliatory violence that greeted black activism in Birmingham, Miles students challenged 
popular conceptions that linked the two. Pitts believed it “was a beautiful way to register 
protest” because it prevented African Americans from being “beaten up and arrested” en 
masse.
77
 The college president spoke in a measured, moderate tone of voice that 
conveyed common sense to local actors and the wide national audiences of CBS News, 
Newsweek, and the New York Times. By playing the role of a black moderate in a local 
drama broadcast to a national audience, Pitts became a leader both white and black 
Birminghamians called on during the early 1960s. The relatively quiet tenor in the spring 
of 1962 enabled Pitts and others to politicize black economic power in ways downtown’s 
daylight citizens understood and did not fear.  
 
A Metropolitan Coalition: Reynolds v. Sims and the Beginning of Municipal Reform 
 In mid-August 1962, a golden opportunity for reform presented itself to area 
citizens of Birmingham who had grown tired and frustrated with the city commission led 
by Eugene T. “Bull” Connor. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs 
in Reynolds v. Sims, a case led by Birmingham attorneys, including Charles A. Morgan 
Jr., George “Peaches” Taylor, and David J. Vann, who sought to reapportion the state 
legislature. Postwar demographic movements rewrote the political landscape of the South 
as rural folk moved to cities, and new suburbs sprouted up around major cities to house 
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these and other migrants.
78
 Birmingham was no exception, but the distribution of political 
power did not follow Alabama’s demographic realignment. Although 1 out of 5 
Alabamians lived in the Birmingham metropolitan area by 1960, citizens there elected 
only 6 percent of state legislators. Designed by the 1901 state constitution, legislative 
districts reflected the political economy, racial order, and spatial configuration of late-
nineteenth-century Alabama.
79
 The court called for a special election on August 28 to 
select new representatives on a conditional basis. 
 Legislative reapportionment was the first step toward consolidating metropolitan 
Birmingham, a goal that became more urgent after the failed annexation campaign of 
1959. The Alabama constitution discouraged the emergence of urban political power by 
adopting strict annexation laws. It supported a landowning class composed of white elites 
and industrial corporations that gained power through tax codes, the disfranchisement of 
black residents, and legislative malapportionment. The state legislature also discouraged 
annexation by drawing school districts as coterminous with municipal boundaries, which 
established the legal justification for all-white suburban cities roughly around the same 
time public schools emerged in the state.
80
 Suburban housing developed outside central 
cities because most municipal borders, limited by annexation laws, became fixed at the 
turn of the century. Independent, all-white suburbs had been a three-generation 
phenomenon in Birmingham.  
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 An astute analyst of Alabama politics, Vann recognized that the spatial separation 
of blacks and whites who shared similar views prevented the emergence of new political 
coalitions. Using the returns of the May 1962 gubernatorial primary, Vann deduced that 
there existed “an unconscious coalition of voters” in Jefferson County located in its 
middle-class white suburbs and black voting districts in the city.
81
 The plurality of 
Jefferson County voters chose moderate Ryan DeGraffenreid over George C. Wallace 
and “Bull” Connor in the Democratic primary. Vann believed an extremist minority ruled 
municipal politics to the detriment of area citizens. As Morgan, one of Vann’s colleagues 
in the Reynolds case, explained, “The city was locked into a box––it’s every avenue of 
escape blocked by the vote of a majority of its white population.”
82
 Reapportionment 
would help Vann and other annexation advocates in reshaping the political boundaries of 
Birmingham around this moderate metropolitan coalition. 
 Vann himself was a recent convert to racial equality. Like Morgan, Vann had 
arrived in Birmingham as a teenager from rural Lee County in southeast Alabama. His 
family cook moved with him to Birmingham because, he recalled, “she was just part of 
our family.”
83
 Raised in “a completely segregated society,” Vann “never questioned” a 
separate-but-equal society until he was an adult. In 1954, he clerked for US Supreme 
Court Justice and Alabama native Hugo Black during the Brown decision, an experience 
that redirected the young lawyer toward seeking the legal end of segregation. Once he 
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was back in Birmingham, Vann reconnected with Morgan in various civic and 
professional organizations. A deep rivalry had existed between them while both were 
students at the University of Alabama. Vann, the more politically ambitious of the two, 
often sought compromise in his efforts to reform Birmingham.  
 Vann believed that the shift in metropolitan electoral behavior indicated that 
white voters had grown increasingly wary of the costs of segregation. One cost was the 
closing of city parks at the beginning of 1962. The actions of the city commission 
dumbfounded suburban citizens. In a full-page advertisement in the Birmingham News, 
over 1,200 white civic leaders who lived in the city’s prestigious suburban neighborhoods 
and the Over-the-Mountain suburbs boldly declared their citizenship to Birmingham in “a 
plea for courage and common sense”:  
Some of us live within the Birmingham City Limits. Some of us live in adjacent 
municipalities but within metropolitan Birmingham….All of us depend for our 
livelihood and happiness upon the well-being of Birmingham. All of us are 
devoted to the city and to its future. We believe it entitles us to be heard. All of us 
have in the past given of our time, our energy, and our financial resources to the 
betterment of Birmingham.
84
    
 
 In a public hearing on the issue of closed parks, Connor rejected these 
suburbanites’ claims of citizenship. He lambasted some of the most respected and 
progressive white civic leaders by asking them, “How many of you live in 
Birmingham?”
85
 Vann retorted that he lived in the city’s Crestview neighborhood, which 
abutted Mountain Brook. One commission supporter said, “Nearly all of them live 
outside of our city limits and should not have a say-so as to how our city should be run,” 
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while another one called open-park advocates “the Mt. Brook ruling clique and money-
mob.”
86
 Clearly, citizenship in Connor’s Birmingham was not based on a personal 
connection. The artificial lines creating the city and its political borders cut through and 
eviscerated suburbanites’ claims of civic identity. Connor and his supporters narrowly 
defined citizenship in Birmingham through residence and whiteness. 
 Upon hearing the decision in the Reynolds case to hold a special election, Vann 
telephoned one of the most powerful men in Birmingham and asked, “How would you 
feel about getting up an election to throw ‘Bull’ Connor out of office?”
87
 On the other 
end of the line was Sidney W. Smyer, a suburban resident, former president of the 
Chamber of Commerce, and president of the Birmingham Realty Company that owned 
“basically the entire downtown.”
88
 A little over a year before, Smyer was in Japan 
promoting Birmingham to International Rotarians when news of the Freedom Rider riot 
spread. He was embarrassed, which was not a familiar feeling for him. White 
businessmen and reformers had discussed changing Birmingham’s form of government 
as early as 1953, and the state legislature passed the legislation to do so by 1955. 
Reformers dropped the issue because moderate Robert Lindburgh briefly replaced 
Connor as Commissioner of Public Safety from 1953 to 1957. The issue had become 
moribund over the years until increased civil rights activism and Klan violence forced the 
discussion among white elites.  
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 A few months before the Freedom Rider riot occurred, however, Smyer, acting as 
the president of the Chamber of Commerce, had commissioned the Birmingham Bar 
Association to study the possibility of changing the form of municipal government. The 
Bar recommended a strong mayor-council form because the commission, Vann 
summarized, “lack[ed] the wholesome system of checks and balances between co-equal 
and independent branches of government.”
89
 As the Bar committee worked on its 
findings, which were not released to the public until June 1962, William Engel notified 
his reform-minded colleagues of his brother’s role in successfully overturning the 
Tammany Hall machine in New York City in the fall of 1961.
90
 Engel implied that this 
feat could be accomplished in Birmingham, too. To the more conservative Engel and 
Smyer, the problem in Birmingham was not segregation but how Connor implemented it 
through state-sanctioned violence and his political machine that neglected their rights. 
With all of the defeats and abuses suffered by many under the commission form of 
government, white suburbanites took the initiative to overthrow it. 
 
Birmingham Citizens for Progress  
 During a special election held on August 28, 1962, volunteers for the 
“Birmingham Citizens for Progress” (BCP) campaign placed petitions in white sections 
of the city and gathered over 10,000 signatures to hold a referendum on municipal 
government.
91
 The campaign served as a vehicle for white suburbanites to claim their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89
 David J. Vann, speech, February 23, 1966, transcript, “Program for Progress,” Memphis, Tennessee, File 
25.31, Vann Papers. 
90
 William P. Engel to James A. Head, September 12, 1961, File 3.2, Head Papers.  
91
 Eskew and Thornton cite different numbers of petition signatories, either 11,000 or 10,000, respectively. 
Eskew, But for Birmingham, 182; Thornton, Dividing Lines, 272. 
 111!
rights to the city. Sidney W. Smyer envisioned a group led by twenty-five men (always 
men) “everyone would agree were first-class citizen leaders who everyone would follow, 
that had no blemishes, and were free from criticism” to lead the campaign.
92
 These men, 
most of whom who lived in the city’s suburban neighborhoods, refused to lend their 
names to the cause. One of Vann’s colleagues explained their refusal: “Some, having 
business now pending before the city, indicated their inability to be forward in the 
matter.”
93
 Lacking the participation of elites, 500 white “anybodies” who lived in the city 
led the committee. This change in composition allowed Vann to characterize the BCP as 
a grassroots citizen organization.
94
  
 Connor and his supporters called the BCP for what it was––a campaign by Over-
the-Mountain suburbanites to control the city. Indeed, white suburban men financed 
almost the entire campaign.
95
 The BCP’s Steering Committee, however, was led by a 
diverse array of white men employed in the professional services or union labor. All of 
them lived in the city rather than the suburbs, which would combat charges of the group 
being led by “outside agitators” from Over-the-Mountain. No administrator from the 
Medical Center joined the campaign, perhaps for fear of political risks to local and state 
budget allocations. Roy R. Kracke Jr., a dentist and son of the first dean of the Medical 
College, was the exception. He “nearly cut [him]self shaving” when Smyer personally 
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called him about joining the Steering Committee.
96
 The titular head of the entire 
campaign was William A. Jenkins, a housepainter and union leader who volunteered 
when no one else would. 
 It was no secret that the referendum to change the form of government also had 
implications on the maintenance of segregation, but not a single African American served 
on the committee or worked publicly on the campaign.
97
 As one consultant warned, “The 
race problem has relation to whatever we shall recommend and what the people will 
accept.”
98
 The public absence of African Americans in the BCP was a strategic decision 
by Vann and Smyer to smooth tensions over the issue of desegregation. Indeed, they had 
decided not to place the petition outside voting places used by African Americans.   
 Conner called the referendum “just another ‘nigger’ petition.”
99
 His charge 
referenced Frank Dukes’ appearance at a public meeting at City Hall to present a petition 
signed by 833 African Americans on the very same day as the special election. Dukes 
articulated two points that white suburbanites also used when he demanded the repeal of 
municipal ordinances enforcing segregation. During the spring 1962 boycott, merchants 
continually insisted they could not desegregate because of existing laws. Thus, Dukes 
asked Connor “to give freedom to our downtown merchants,” underscoring the fact that 
they did not have political power in the city.
100
 Connor, however, questioned Dukes on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96
 Roy Rachford Kracke Jr., interview by Virginia Fisher, March 2, 1990, File 2.49, transcript, UAB 
Archives Oral History Interview Collection, UAB Archives (hereafter cited as UAB Oral History). 
97
 Morgan, A Time to Speak, 152. 
98
 Abe Berkowitz, “Report to the Birmingham Bar Association City Government Committee,” ca. 1961, 
File 25.42, Vann Papers. 
99
 Vann, speech, “Program for Progress.” 
100
 Thornton, Dividing Lines, 274. 
 113!
his residency because Miles was located in the industrial suburb of Fairfield. Dukes 
asserted his civic identity: “I have a stake in Birmingham. I have family here. I love 
Birmingham just as you do.”
101
   
 Dukes’ actions were independent of the BCP, but they reflected the common 
ground that some blacks and suburban whites held regarding citizenship, segregation, and 
municipal reform at this time in Birmingham. Dukes had negotiated with Smyer during 
the student boycott a few months before, and Pitts had been talking with the realtor on a 
continuing basis since the Freedom Rider riot. Indeed, after that infamous event 
highlighted the loss of control and leadership in Birmingham, Smyer set up a committee 
of black and white civic elites. This new group, Smyer explained, “won’t be a group set 
up just to pass resolutions either….We intend to seek a solution to this problem and are 
prepared to back it up financially.”
102
 Since the spring of 1961, ongoing formal and 
informal talks had emerged between whites and blacks as they responded to various civil 
rights crises and discussed municipal reform.  
 Biracial communication, albeit from behind closed doors, was essential to the 
entire Birmingham Citizens for Progress campaign. Vann and Smyer relied on Lucius 
Pitts and entrepreneur A. G. Gaston to advance the cause of municipal reform among 
African Americans. A planned ACMHR-SCLC demonstration for late September 
threatened to disrupt the relative peace of the spring and summer of 1962. The resulting 
demonstrations and probable violence would do irreparable harm to the referendum 
election scheduled for November, which white suburban moderates and their black allies 
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hoped would shift political power in their favor. Pitts and Gaston insisted that white 
leaders such as Vann and Smyer meet with Shuttlesworth directly to delay the 
demonstration. “We’re just businessmen,” Gaston reportedly told Smyer, “and we don’t 
have no say. You got to talk to Fred….He’s the man with the folks.”
103
 Pitts also used his 
Atlanta connections to secure a delay in the demonstrations.
104
 Shuttlesworth, planning 
the protest from Cincinnati, agreed to the request.  
 Black elites organized a supportive campaign through the Jefferson County 
Progressive Democratic Council (JCPDC), a voting rights organization. By the 1960s, the 
JCPDC had become an effective minority power of 8,000 registered black voters. The 
Birmingham Citizens for Progress campaign could not be successful without them. 
ACMHR stalwarts, however, criticized the at-large seats in the mayor-council plan as a 
way to avoid black council members.
105
 This idea was neither the intent of the BCP nor 
the Birmingham Bar Association that made the recommendation. Initially, the Bar 
committee investigated changing state law to allow for district seats because they would 
be attractive to suburbanites who favored annexation. Smyer also told committee 
members that he would not “object to a negro councilman, if elected and serving his ward 
only.”
106
 The lack of time and immediacy of reform prevented those involved with the 
Bar committee or the BCP from lobbying the legislature to change the Mayor-Council 
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Act. The lack of district seats eventually would strengthen the formation of a moderate 
coalition between black and white civic elites for nearly twenty-five years.     
 Although municipal reform needed African American electoral support, the voters 
that could sway the election were ambivalent working-class and middle-class whites. 
While they may not have supported Connor, they most likely supported segregation.
107
 
The BCP committee worked to convince both urban and suburban white voters of the 
undemocratic nature of the commission and the representative promise of the mayor-
council system. The committee promoted the petition and forthcoming municipal 
referendum as “an historic demonstration of Democracy in Action” in which “a free 
people stood together in unity, demanding an opportunity to speak for themselves.”
108
 
The now “free” people of Birmingham “had won the right to vote.”
109
   
 The subsequent actions of the city commission further proved the democratic 
promise of municipal reform. Connor declared that he would fire municipal employees 
who signed the petition. One of them, “being not free,” asked to be removed from it, 
while another explained, “I signed feeling that I was exercising my rights in behalf of 
betterment for our city.”
110
 When Arthur Hanes, president of the city commission, 
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announced in late September that he would refuse to call the election, he bolstered 
reformers’ claims that the commission denied Birmingham citizens a voice in their 
government. One suburban insurance executive sent a donation and remarked that “the 
need and reason for the change became quite apparent” after Hanes “reneged on his 
promise to call an election so that the people of Birmingham could express their 
wishes.”
111
 By making the right to vote in a representative democracy a central feature of 
the campaign, Vann and others legitimized long-standing black and white demands that 
citizens had the right to vote regardless of race or residence in Birmingham. 
 In a thirty-minute special television broadcast, Vann reminded the people of 
Birmingham that the right to vote on their municipal government “has been denied [to] 
you by every trick in the book for over seven years.”
112
 He urged citizens “in the privacy 
of your voting booth” to “look through all the bitter smoke screen[s] that selfish interests 
have thrown around you.” Vann advised viewers, “If you want your city to grow, the 
secret of that growth and the first step to be taken in bringing about that growth is the 
revitalization of our city’s leadership and the establishment of more representative 
government.” Such representative government included “the outlying white 
communities.” In reference to the physical as well as imagined Red Mountain, Vann 
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informed viewers, “There seems to be a wall built around this city, a wall that has been 
built brick by brick by our Commission. Let’s tear down that wall that they have built.”
113
   
 On November 8, 1962, more than 37,000 voters went to the polls, and by a 
margin of 2,401 votes, the strong mayor-council form of government won. “That’s 
democracy,” Connor dismissively commented.
114
 The turnout was nearly the same as that 
which had elected the commissioner a year before. The Birmingham Citizens for 
Progress committee declared victory, noting without irony that the election was “one of 
the most dramatic demonstrations of democracy that any of us will ever witness.”
115
 The 
battle for control over municipal government would continue as citizens voted for their 
new mayor and city council over the next five months.  
 
Birmingham’s “Civil War”: Protests, Terrorism, and the Second Referendum 
 Citizens decisively elected the conservative Albert B. Boutwell over the extremist 
Eugene T. “Bull” Connor as their new mayor on April 2, 1963.
116
 On the very next day, 
Revs. Fred L. Shuttlesworth and Martin Luther King Jr. launched their delayed 
demonstrations against downtown department stores to end segregation in Birmingham. 
Miles College students, who had led the economic boycott the spring before, were shut 
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out of discussions among civil rights leaders, but President Lucius H. Pitts, entrepreneur 
A. G. Gaston, and Dr. James T. Montgomery, soon to be the first black faculty member 
of the Medical Center, worked with Shuttlesworth and King. Connor refused to leave his 
commission post even though Boutwell assumed his mayoral office on April 10. This 
situation created a political vacuum in Birmingham in which Shuttlesworth and King led 
protests to force change in a city without a clear or legitimate form of government. The 
Alabama Supreme Court would not rule in favor of the strong mayor-council form until 
May 17.  
 Those blacks and whites who worked with the Birmingham Citizens for Progress 
campaign negotiated with Shuttlesworth and King, the respective leaders of the Alabama 
Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR) and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC).
117
 Although scholars have often singled out Vann for his racial 
liberalism, they have shown less understanding for other white or black civic elites 
involved. Sidney W. Smyer’s interactions with King and Shuttlesworth violated his 
personal beliefs in the racial inferiority of African Americans and the natural order of 
segregation. Confiding to Mayor Boutwell over his new role as civil rights negotiator, 
Smyer wrote, “I take no pleasure in so doing, but I feel that I owe a duty to my 
community and to [my] company.”
118
 Smyer most likely believed municipal reform had 
the potential to lessen the occurrence of civil rights protests, white supremacist violence, 
and the need for his involvement in such affairs. The protests betrayed that belief. Rev. 
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Abraham L. Woods II, who would become the local president of the SCLC in the 1970s, 
remembered, “This old white man…broke down and cried” at one point during 
negotiations.
119
 For Smyer, as well as white department store owners S. Roper Dial, Emil 
Hess, and Louis Pizitz, their efforts to reform the government came at personal and 
financial costs.  
 Entrepreneur A. G. Gaston cited the lack of a legitimate government as his central 
reason for opposing the ACMHR-SCLC campaign, but he supported its goals. He 
financially contributed to the campaign, even bailing King out of jail before the civil 
rights leader was ready to leave. He also gave in-kind contributions, such as distributing 
paper fans bearing the likeness of Booker T. Washington to those who attended mass 
meetings at the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.
120
 Gaston corralled the traditional black 
civic elite behind the campaign after inviting King to talk with them about strategies, 
which would change throughout the campaign’s duration. Because of these changes and 
the power vacuum in Birmingham, Gaston and others pressured King and Shuttlesworth 
to end the demonstrations. Louis J. Willie, an executive at Gaston’s Citizens Federal 
Bank who worked with the leaders, explained, “We learned that this was the very kind of 
environment that the SCLC wanted, and the SCLC at that time was not really interested 
in Birmingham; they were interested in a mass movement for the whole South and the 
country.” He added further, “We had to live here, and we just thought it was stupid to 
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come in and start a mass movement when there was nobody that you could address your 
wrongs to and nobody who could redress the wrongs if they wanted to.”
121
    
 On May 11
 
after six weeks of protest, Birmingham’s black and white reformers 
reached an agreement with Shuttlesworth and King, but a night of violence undermined 
their peace. Within hours of announcing an accord to desegregate downtown stores and 
establish a biracial citizens committee, members of the Ku Klux Klan bombed the Gaston 
Hotel, the headquarters of the local movement, and the home of Rev. A. D. King, 
Martin’s brother and local pastor of the First Baptist Church of Ensley.
122
 An angry 
crowd developed outside the bombed King home. Meanwhile, poor and working-class 
black males who did not participate in the protests launched a full-scale riot and tore 
through a 28-block area in downtown. 
 This riot of protest from marginalized African Americans was the first urban riot 
of the decade and the first of several that summer in Birmingham in response to the 
terrorist actions of white extremists. Blacks attacked white police and firemen with 
bottles, rocks, and knives, stabbing one officer nearly to death. Unruly members of the 
police force led by Connor assaulted innocent black bystanders, further enraging the 
rioters. The mob blocked emergency response vehicles, looted and set fire to white-
owned businesses, and harassed people, particularly whites, passing through the area. 
Rioters threw stones and shouted slurs at civil rights leaders who pleaded with them to 
return to their homes. Willie, who witnessed the riot from the bombed-out motel, feared 
for his wife’s safety as they tried to make their way home around three o’clock in the 
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morning. “Take that scarf and cover your hair….lie down on the seat” he recalled 
instructing her; “You look too white.”
123
 By Sunday dawn, the eight-hour riot finally 
fizzled out. 
 After Boutwell legally assumed office and Connor left his in mid-May, white 
segregationists launched a wave of terrorist actions that continually threatened the 
tenuous peace stitched together in the immediate aftermath of the civil rights protests and 
riot. Operating under the newly formed National States’ Rights Party (NSRP), white 
segregationists organized a boycott of downtown department stores that had desegregated 
in compliance with new municipal ordinances passed on July 23. The NSRP flooded 
downtown with leaflets proclaiming “Birmingham Betrayed!” that reminded shoppers to 
“never forget these stores which joined hands with Martin Luther King to destroy our 
way of life.”
124
 The writers for the Birmingham Daily Bulletin, the NSRP newssheet, 
directly tied desegregation to the change in government. “Remember,” they advised 
readers, “white people can regain control of this city. The next election is two years 
away.”
125
   
 The NSRP and its various supporters, however, had little patience with the 
democratic process. On August 15, NSRP members threw a tear bomb into Loveman’s 
department store, compelling black and white shoppers to stumble blindly out of the store 
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and downtown.
126
 Five days later, in response to the US District Court order to 
desegregate Birmingham city schools, the Klan bombed the home of civil rights attorney 
Arthur S. Shores. Rioting by several thousand African Americans followed. Two weeks 
later at the beginning of the school year, white groups protested the new racial order. 
Mobs of angry white parents lined up outside Graymont Elementary School in the long-
contested Smithfield neighborhood and downtown’s Ramsey High School near the 
Medical Center. The clashes between protestors, police, and African Americans turned 
violent on September 4. Later that night, the Klan bombed Shores’ home for the second 
time and also took aim at Gaston’s residence. A far more dangerous riot broke out among 
frustrated African Americans. Gov. George C. Wallace sent state troopers to enforce 
martial law.
127
 This deadly pattern––white protest followed by Klan violence and black 
rioting over the issues of desegregation and the change in government––culminated in the 
bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church on September 15, 1963.    
 The severity of the church bombing forced Boutwell to call his Community 
Affairs Committee (CAC), a group of 185 white and 27 black civic leaders established as 
a concession to King and Shuttlesworth. One of its primary tasks was to set up a 
desegregation plan for the city. This group last convened at their organizing meeting on 
July 16 when Klan and NSRP members had harassed them upon entering the Municipal 
Auditorium. Boutwell appointed an executive committee among civic elites later that 
summer, but no African American, including Gaston, served on it. The subcommittees on 
school desegregation, economic development, public welfare, and suburban annexation, 
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among other issues, remained dormant without a mayoral order to meet until that fall. 
National disgrace finally moved Boutwell and other white civic elites to act. When the 
unwieldy CAC finally submitted its expansive recommendations to desegregate 
Birmingham in April 1964, Boutwell flatly rejected them in a twelve-page speech. The 
role of municipal government, he scolded black and white business leaders, “is to provide 
the public services of this city and to protect its security of person and property…not to 
prescribe its morals or prompt its conscience.”
128
 
 Despite Boutwell’s rejection of racial reform, white segregationists attempted to 
bring back the commission form of government in the summer and fall of 1964. Led by 
Raymond Rowell, a member of the Birmingham Planning Commission, white 
segregationists charged that the new city government followed the orders of Over-the-
Mountain civic elites. Rowell declared that the “spare time” Birmingham City Council 
placed “an oppressive city sales tax on the working class…to save the over the mountain 
rich from the Occupational Tax.”
129
 The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also 
angered Rowell and his followers. By October, over 21,000 urban white voters signed a 
petition to hold another referendum, more than twice the number needed and 2,000 more 
than the number of votes for the commission in the referendum two years before.
130
 The 
potential of returning Birmingham to the very recent past prompted various downtown 
civic associations to launch the “Citizens to Keep Progress” campaign.  
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 On December 1, 1964, nearly 47 percent of an estimated 90,000 registered voters 
went to the polls a second time to choose their form of government in two years. The 
strong mayor-council system won in a landslide, receiving 63 percent of the vote.
131
 
Boutwell understood it as “an expression of public approval of our administration,” but 
one writer to the Birmingham News dismissed his claim.
132
 Although Paul Vizzino voted 
for the mayor-council system, he was “far from pleased” with elected officials but 
believed the time to give his “stamp of approval” was the upcoming 1965 city council 
election.
133
 The defeat of the Rowell referendum ultimately was the result of the huge 
increase in the urban black electorate, rising from 8,000 in the early 1960s to over 14,000 
by the end of 1964.
134
 The substantial increase in black voters resulted from federal 
registrars sent to Birmingham after the 1963 demonstrations. These African Americans 
most certainly did not support Boutwell, and their electoral numbers could have 
accounted for more than half of the mayor-council vote.  
 The lingering illegitimacy of the mayor-council form of government also hurt 
annexation advocates who wanted to unite the city and its suburbs. Political leaders in the 
city, Homewood, and Mountain Brook discussed the possibility of merger in which the 
smaller suburbs would have a voice in the newly expanded Birmingham.
135
 They signed a 
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contract that stipulated the Jefferson County legislative delegation, which had ten more 
members after Reynolds v. Sims, would lobby the state legislature to amend annexation 
and consolidation laws in favor of suburbanites. The delegation would push for district 
seats in the mayor-council form of government and revise laws that made school districts 
coterminous with municipal boundaries. With this agreement, the two premier Over-the-
Mountain suburbs would have a direct say in municipal government and maintain their 
recently-developed independent school systems if annexation was successful.
136
 
Continuing violence in the city and Rowell’s protests of city government, however, made 
many Over-the-Mountain suburbanites wary of becoming a part of Birmingham. In the 
summer of 1964, Homewood voters decided to join the city, only to have their decision 
overruled by the Alabama Supreme Court based on a technicality, while Mountain Brook 
voters narrowly rejected merger.
137
   
 
Conclusion 
 Although the goals of the Birmingham Citizens for Progress committee remained 
unfinished by the end of 1964, political power to shape the city transferred from the white 
working class to the middle class through municipal reform. Throughout the long 
campaign, white suburbanites used the rhetoric of democracy to assert their rights to the 
city, and in the process, legitimized others’ rights. They used their civic engagement and 
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interest in social welfare issues and economic growth as evidence of their citizenship in 
Birmingham. In doing so, they formed new alliances bounded by a pro-growth and 
inclusive vision of progress that hinged on biracial communication and moderate politics. 
By orchestrating the change in municipal government, white suburbanites ensured that 
their rights to the city would reign supreme in a new political order.  
 Although elite biracial communication began in crisis and remained uneven, it 
symbolically announced the beginning of a “new” Birmingham. Through their 
communication with white suburbanites, black elites solidified their positions as civic 
leaders of a black and white Birmingham. Even though the biracial committee organized 
by Mayor Albert Boutwell was ineffective, Miles College President Lucius H. Pitts and 
entrepreneur A. G. Gaston continued to talk with whites in various settings. The more 
militant Shuttlesworth and his ACMHR supporters consistently contested the leadership 
of black and white men of good will. The demonstrations in the spring of 1963, however, 
did not have the local impact Shuttlesworth envisioned. Historian J. Mills Thornton III 
noted, “The share of power that Birmingham blacks did eventually achieve flowed in the 
end, therefore, not to the heirs of Shuttlesworth, but largely to the heirs of…Lucius 
Pitts.”
138
 Middle-class and affluent blacks who collaborated with their white counterparts 
in municipal reform won their rights to the city. 
 Indeed, moderate African American leaders who worked in the shadows of 
municipal reform would become central players in constructing the white suburban vision 
of a “new” Birmingham. With annexation unsuccessful, suburban whites needed black 
allies who lived in the city. The long process of reform, which would continue under the 
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leadership of Operation New Birmingham (formerly the Birmingham Downtown 
Improvement Association), also personally changed these white suburban businessmen. 
For older men like Sidney W. Smyer and William P. Engel, both of whom would retire 
from civic affairs by the late 1960s, municipal reform forced them to accept the end of a 
social order they always had known. Unlike James A. Head, David J. Vann, or Charles A. 
Morgan Jr., these older white civic leaders did not believe in racial equality, but the civil 
rights crises and municipal reform campaigns led them to acknowledge the political 
power and rights of African Americans. White suburbanites recognized that their right to 
shape the city of Birmingham could not be accomplished in any other way. By casting off 
segregation and realigning the city with American conceptions of democracy and 
progress, Birmingham’s men of good will began to fashion a post-industrial, post-civil 
rights political culture.  
 This process would continue as it started, behind closed doors and among private 
citizens of Birmingham. When Boutwell abdicated the municipal government from the 
moral responsibility to lead Birmingham, he forced the decisions over the city’s future 
into the hands of the biracial civic elite. The avenues of political representation and 
biracial communication expanded through the informal networks connecting white 
suburban businessmen, white racial liberals, and black elites. Civic leaders working 
through Operation New Birmingham as well as the University of Alabama Medical 
Center would lobby for an activist local government to accomplish economic growth, 
racial progress, and the long-held desire to consolidate the city with its suburbs. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
“DESIGN FOR PROGRESS”: URBAN RENEWAL AND THE POLITICS OF 
REPRESENTATION, 1963-1970 
 
  In late June 1966, fifty white and black civic leaders flew to New York City to tell 
the “Birmingham story” to a group of journalists and media representatives at the Plaza 
Hotel. Organized as Operation New Birmingham (ONB), participants included Mayor 
Albert B. Boutwell and nine city council members, Birmingham News editor Vincent S. 
Townsend, and entrepreneur A. G. Gaston. ONB represented a privileged white and black 
middle class across metropolitan Birmingham who worked in government, business, 
education, healthcare, and the media. Some of the white men, standing among few 
women and black men, were behind the recent change in government and the civil rights 
negotiations. Speaking first, Boutwell loftily began, “The story you are about to 
hear…includes a story of change––change in government––change in public attitudes––
change in people’s attitudes toward their responsibilities…. We regard this as a solid 
expression of the sentiment of Birmians [sic] to build a better city for a better urban 
life.”
1
 
 Beginning in the summer of 1962, the key leaders of this biracial coalition 
promised area citizens a more representative government, economic growth, and better 
race relations. This agenda was a lot to deliver. Described by Townsend as the “new 
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hands, brains, and hearts in civic enterprise,” the founders of ONB were in New York 
City to promote their public-private partnership to build a new Birmingham. A “spirit of 
cooperation,” Townsend claimed, prevailed between private citizens and public officials.
2
 
Through implementing biracial communication, economic development strategies, and 
urban renewal programs, these civic elites redesigned the spaces of downtown around 
their collective vision of a new Birmingham. Federal laws and funding policies also 
pushed these elites to adopt new modes of action and behavior. Non-discrimination 
mandates and representative citizens committees pushed open the doors of public 
institutions and political power, providing both black and white civic elites with the 
progress they claimed existed in Birmingham. “We haven’t created Utopia since 1963,” 
Townsend bluntly confessed, but he believed his team had a lot to brag about to national 
media outlets that had shamed and continued to misunderstand Birmingham.
3
   
 Through their designs for progress, key players in the metropolitan coalition 
combated contemporary problems of urban America with an awareness of the shifting 
economic and political terrain of Birmingham. Public disorder, decaying downtowns, 
financial instability, population decline, suburban growth, and political challenges by 
conservative whites and militant blacks ruptured the economic, political, and social 
systems of urban life in major industrial cities.
4
 The bloody events of Birmingham’s 
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summer of terror in 1963 had pointed a glaring spotlight on these various symptoms of an 
urban crisis, but the media and the nation at the time saw them only through the lens of 
civil rights. “It’s no fun to be a sociological test case city,” Townsend confessed to media 
representatives, but “what happened in Birmingham can happen in any community. It just 
happened to us in 1963.”
5
 The civil rights demonstrations and violent acts of white 
resistance, however, were not the major events that prompted change for this biracial 
metropolitan coalition. The municipal reform campaign that culminated in the spring of 
1963 ushered black and white civic elites to political power, gave them hope that they 
could unite the city with its suburbs, and signaled the emergence of a professional service 
economy.  
In late 1964, Boutwell declared Birmingham’s commitment to “eradicat[e] those 
conditions of poverty” that “chain this great city and its people to an economy based 
largely on heavy industry and common labor.”
6
 The institution most responsible for 
achieving Boutwell’s goal was the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB). UAB 
was not yet a university when ONB leaders visited New York, but it was metropolitan 
Birmingham’s third largest employer. Its expansion by forty-five blocks, which speakers 
frequently mentioned during the press conference, promised a new healthcare and 
knowledge economy in which to secure the development of a post-1965 Birmingham. 
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Top administrator Dr. Joseph F. Volker challenged the economic, social, and political 
order of Birmingham in his crusade to build a full-fledged urban university, but he was 
notably absent from ONB’s New York City press conference announcing such 
transformations. Volker disdained the “publicity of announcement” and preferred to work 
behind-the-scenes in accomplishing substantial change.
7
 Although he strategically 
delayed the total desegregation of UAB, his reputation as a racial liberal as well as his 
past measures of inclusion helped him win the support of black civic elites in building his 
urban university.  
Although initially limited in their power, black civic elites used the symbolic 
politics of representation to make Birmingham more open and responsive to African 
Americans. Biracial communication transformed from a public relations stunt, as 
evidenced by the New York press conference, to meaningful dialogues over urban 
problems that primarily affected black Birminghamians. The establishment of ONB’s 
Community Affairs Committee in 1969 was in direct response to black elite demands for 
the presence of African Americans in high-profile positions in municipal and county 
government. This committee provided black civic elites and white suburbanites with an 
informal mechanism to shape local public policy. Entrepreneur A. G. Gaston and Miles 
College President Lucius H. Pitts also worked to sustain the strength of community-
building institutions among African Americans during an era of desegregation and urban 
renewal. 
Birmingham’s civic leaders worked privately to build new structures of economic 
and political power in an era “in which the legal foundations of racism in America were 
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destroyed.” In 1965 social activist Bayard Rustin commented that the classical phase of 
the civil rights movement “hit Jim Crow where it was most anachronistic, dispensable, 
and vulnerable”––in the realms of consumerism and public services. It was now time to 
turn from “race relations to economic relations” and “from protest to politics” to address 
systematic inequality. Progressive coalitions based on “common political objectives” 
must be formed, Rustin advised, and compromises must be made. “The difference 
between expediency and morality in politics is the difference between selling out a 
principle and making smaller concessions to win larger ones,” he wrote.
8
 In Birmingham, 
the power to exact those concessions to build progress continually shifted among public 
officials, white suburbanites, and black civic elites. Seeking compromise and negotiation 
as winning strategies, their moderate approach to economic, political, and social change 
resulted from their personal beliefs, federal policy, and the ongoing transformation of 
metropolitan Birmingham.
9
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An Urban University: Joseph F. Volker and the Remaking of Southside 1963-1966 
 
 Three days after Mayor Albert B. Boutwell took office on April 10, 1963, Dr. 
Joseph F. Volker wrote to the new mayor, “The destiny of Birmingham and the 
University of Alabama Medical Center is intimately related and…we cannot hope to 
achieve our major objectives unless the government of the community understands our 
aspirations and limitations.”
10
 As the executive vice-president of the University of 
Alabama, Birmingham Affairs, Volker wanted to transform the city by turning the 
Southside neighborhood into the site of Birmingham’s only four-year public university 
with world-class healthcare services. An amateur historian interested in the intertwined 
development of higher education and cities, Volker was convinced that urban universities 
could be instruments of economic, social, and political change.
11
 His vision called for an 
active partnership with the city of Birmingham in determining the expanded campus’ 
needs such as engineering, waste management, and zoning. In return, the university could 
provide academic policy studies on housing, police-community relations, political 
governance, and other urban issues. A growing university also provided education, 
employment opportunities, and public services to many different sectors of the 
Birmingham community such as working-class white adults, African Americans, and 
suburban white youth. Volker’s urban university could tie all the elements of a divided 
Birmingham community together to a specific place and institution within the city.  
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 Volker first needed to create momentum in the University of Alabama, 
Birmingham Affairs to force the creation of an autonomous university. His vision of an 
urban university, however, was hard to reconcile with the look of a ramshackle campus 
sitting in the middle of a black slum. Poor African Americans, vacant lots, and decaying 
warehouses surrounded the campus, which flooded with drain water on rainy days. Some 
parts of the Medical Center were falling apart, such as Hillman Hospital’s emergency 
clinic described as a “facility literally built for the horse and buggy traffic of 1904.”
12
 
Crimes, especially personal assaults and robberies, around the Medical Center were 
increasing; “a nurse or anyone else would be in danger of being molested,” a concerned 
councilman wrote.
13
 University lobbyist Jefferson Bennett thought Volker “sounded just 
as crazy as hell” when he spoke about an urban university. Volker used his public office 
to remove some of the key obstacles preventing the fulfillment of his vision.
14
 His three 
main concerns were solving the indigent care fiscal crisis, acquiring more land, and 
desegregating the University of Alabama, Birmingham Affairs without risking funding. 
 White Birminghamians largely regarded the Medical Center with disfavor 
because of its twenty-year association with serving overwhelmingly black indigent 
patients. Councilman George S. Seibels summarized the attitudes of some whites when 
he described indigent care as a service for “so many thousands of good-for-nothings.”
15
 
For nearly twenty years, Medical Center physicians and dentists contractually provided 
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in-patient indigent care for residents of Jefferson County, including the city of 
Birmingham. They continually lobbied local officials for increases in the per-diem rate, 
coverage for out-patient care, or other in-kind support. Indigent care was a financial black 
hole, siphoning off an estimated $5 million in Medical Center operating revenue from 
1952 to 1962.16 By 1963, all out-patient clinics operated on a four-day week schedule 
because of deficient funds.17 Even though 75 percent of indigents lived in Birmingham, 
the city had never contributed to this vital public service.18 As one administrator wrote, 
“It is not fair for the Medical Center to finance the operation of the emergency clinic and 
outpatient care out of teaching funds when the City of Birmingham pays nothing.”19 
Duard LeGrand, editor of the Birmingham Post Herald, believed that Volker and other 
Medical Center administrators always “complain[ed] about not getting enough money.”20 
 Volker believed that the emergency clinic, which was where indigents usually 
sought treatment first, was a public service akin to the police or fire departments.21 
Working with both the Birmingham Police Department and Jefferson County Sheriff’s 
Office, the clinic served as first-response to any life-threatening illness or accident.22 
During Birmingham’s summer of terror in 1963, healthcare workers tended to riot 
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victims, shoppers fleeing from tear gas, and those who were maimed or killed in the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing. African Americans also routinely sought 
treatment from the wounds and lacerations inflicted on them by white police officers.
23
 
Volker lobbied Mayor Boutwell in July 1963 to secure funds for a new facility. “If and 
when new sources of revenue become available,” Volker proposed to the mayor, 
“consideration should be given to allocating funds for” the emergency clinic.
24
   
 At the beginning of 1964, members of the Birmingham City Council debated the 
merits of a sales or occupational tax to raise revenues for public services and 
infrastructure projects. The former hit consumers and merchants while the latter affected 
everyone who worked within the city limits. As a suburban citizen of Birmingham, 
Volker wrote to the council in favor of the occupational tax. He cited the “major 
contribution” Medical Center “faculty and staff would make” to the city’s tax rolls. It 
would “relieve the present fiscal crisis of the community” and meet “pressing community 
problems” such as indigent care.
25
 Volker privately confided to a friend, “As a citizen of 
the Birmingham area I am hopeful that a program of taxation can be developed that will 
permit the city-county community to meet this civic responsibility.”
26
 Volker favored the 
occupational tax because it would raise more money than a sales tax and would force 
suburban citizens to contribute to city services such as his beloved university. 
 Volker, who led the city’s third largest employer in the early 1960s, stood alone 
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among Birmingham’s top business leaders in supporting the occupational tax. A group of 
thirty employers, including the presidents of the two largest banks, insurance companies, 
and industrial plants, favored the sales tax. They called the city council to the Relay 
House, a private downtown club, to browbeat them into submission. With few 
exceptions, these men had sat out of the reform campaigns. The majority were invested in 
the industrial economy, employed tens of thousands of workers, and collectively shared 
in the profits of $2 billion in industrial resources. The occupational tax, they argued, 
would hinder merger with Over-the-Mountain suburbs by forcing companies to relocate 
from the city to the suburbs. Their argument, however, neglected the fact that 
Birmingham’s biggest industrial employers were already outside its city limits.27 
 Nina Miglionico, the only woman on the council, believed an occupational tax 
would alleviate the problem Birmingham “faced with fewer and fewer residents paying 
for necessary municipal and metropolitan services enjoyed by all area citizens” due to the 
“continuing trend” of “suburban living.” A sales tax, she countered to the Relay House 
businessmen, “would isolate the city and make merger an absolute impossibility.” No 
other municipality in Jefferson County had one. Retail sales in downtown had been in 
decline for over a decade and showed no signs of reversing, which made the sales tax a 
losing proposition. Moreover, the tax would pay for public improvements sponsored by 
ONB for white suburbanites, but the financial burden to pay for those projects would fall 
on urban residents. If the council reversed its decision, Miglionico wrote, it would “return 
the Commission form of government to power.”28 Miglionico, however, was outvoted. 
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The council reversed its decision in favor of Birmingham’s top employers. 
 After the debate over taxation, the council allocated $300,000 annually to cover 
emergency clinic expenses at the Medical Center. Volker and others also convinced the 
Jefferson County commission to increase its per diem rate for indigent care, which it 
financed through a new tobacco and liquor tax. Matthew McNulty, director of University 
of Alabama Hospitals and Clinics, explained the tax’s approval as the result of 
disenfranchisement: “The indigent patients didn’t vote, so you don’t put the tax on the 
people who voted.”29 The passage of the Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 
also provided Volker with fiscal relief. Medicaid and Medicare would serve low-income 
persons and the elderly, the two populations that typically qualified as indigent. Jefferson 
County quickly announced plans to build a new charity hospital to use these new federal 
funding sources for healthcare and end its contract with the Medical Center upon 
completion. Although new funding policies eased the financial burden of providing 
indigent care, the Medical Center continued this service and incurred subsequent losses 
until October 1972.      
 The removal of indigent care from the Medical Center simultaneously occurred 
with its expansion by forty-five blocks into Southside, a black residential neighborhood. 
Almost all of the previously acquired land was developed, mostly with parking lots, and 
there was no remaining land available for a growing Extension Center or new facilities 
for medical research. Land was absolutely necessary to Volker’s vision of an urban 
university. When Volker and other administrators finalized their expansion plans, 
Boutwell announced their project to Birmingham citizens by proclaiming the Medical 
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Center as “our gift not only to the human needs and aspirations…but equally to our city 
and nation and all the free world.”
30
   
 
Figure 4.1 The campus of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1966. (Courtesy of UAB Archives.) 
According to federal policy, the city needed a representative citizens committee to 
approve urban renewal projects. Boutwell agonized over the selection of his committee.  
He wanted to “make other appointments which would increase the effectiveness of it.”
31
 
In December 1964, Boutwell appointed a group of 134 citizens to serve on the Mayor’s 
Committee for the Medical Center. Twenty-nine citizens lived in Mountain Brook, which 
spoke to some civic elites’ ongoing quest to bring the suburbs into the city. Industrialists, 
who still exerted powerful influence in the city, represented the largest group on the 
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committee. Boutwell, however, only selected four black men and nine white women.
32
 
Wilbur Hollins, a black real estate executive Boutwell recently appointed to the 
Birmingham Planning Board, was a strategic choice. Hollins, the New York Times 
reported, “would be valuable” because of “proposed urban renewal projects involving 
hundreds of acres owned by Negroes.”
33
   
 The Mayor’s Committee was an example of the new public-private partnership 
governing Birmingham. Jack D. McSpadden, a debonair executive vice-president at 
Liberty National Life Insurance, chaired the committee. A native of Birmingham, 
McSpadden had married into one of the city’s founding industrial families. McSpadden’s 
job was to “tell the story” of how an expanded Medical Center was the future of 
Birmingham. He recruited “people who really know the true potential” of the Medical 
Center to speak at a planned public meeting on February 23, 1965, at the newly 
constructed Rust Engineering Building.
34
 Former Commission President James Morgan 
and attorney Frank E. Spain reprised their speaking roles from the last public meeting on 
Medical Center expansion in October 1953. An introductory slideshow revealed the 
remarkable growth of the Medical Center from one-and-a-half blocks in 1945 to the 
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current twelve-block campus. After the visual aid set up the story, McSpadden excitedly 
announced, “I think that all of us have had the feeling that something big is about to 
happen.” He then introduced the man “hiding behind the screen.”
35
          
Although Volker had been involved with the development of the Medical Center 
for fifteen years, he was not the face of the institution. In some elite circles, Volker had 
been dismissed as a northern communist—“Pink Joe”—and civil rights sympathizer. The 
announcement of the Medical Center’s expansion was also his as its leader. Volker 
announced to the audience, “Community potentials cannot be realized unless substantial 
amounts of new land is acquired” for the Medical Center. The project called for an 
additional forty-five blocks, three times the campus’ current size. The 1964 Long-Range 
Plan “highlighted Birmingham’s great opportunity to become a health center of national 
and international prominence.” The expansion of the Medical Center would bring 
progress and positive attention to the city as its faculty continued to make breakthroughs 
in research and service. “We can anticipate growth, continuous growth, unending 
growth” for Birmingham, Volker argued, but only if the Medical Center grew. “We 
would do this community a great injustice,” he concluded, “to dream too little dreams.”
36
  
 Volker’s “good salesman[ship]” set the stage for the Medical Center’s economic 
impact on Birmingham.
37
 “Since Birmingham is a manufacturing town,” former City 
Commission President Morgan related to his audience, “we know a little more about 
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manufacturing plants than we know about the Medical Center.” Morgan equated the 
Medical Center’s current $18 million in payroll with 5,000 employees as “49 
manufacturing plants.”38 Expansion would turn that number into the equivalent of 104 
plants, or “three miles of solid plants” stretching across the city of Birmingham, and a 
corresponding doubling or tripling in jobs, payroll, construction, and outside investment. 
“If we should lose the Medical Center” for failure to pass a favorable resolution, Morgan 
warned, “the Chamber of Commerce would have quite a job” in replacing it.39  
 
Figure 4.2 The planned campus expansion for the University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1966. (Courtesy 
of UAB Archives.) 
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 Former lawyer of the Housing Authority of the Birmingham District (HABD) 
Frank E. Spain explained a watered-down version of urban renewal laws. “The whole 
chapter in this book which deals with hospitals and universities,” he boasted about the 
laws, “was a chapter that was written by the Housing Authority of the Birmingham 
District.” In 1959, Alabama Senator John Sparkman pushed through two beneficial 
amendments to the Housing Act of 1949. One allowed educational institutions to use 
their future building needs as credits toward the purchase, and the other relieved cities 
from constructing replacement housing for projects involving universities. The expansion 
called for the removal of 994 families and 714 individuals within the forty-five block site 
in the Southside neighborhood. Eighty percent of all those displaced qualified for public 
assistance.40 Spain assured his listening audience that he had “yet to hear of anyone who 
suffered any hardship” upon relocation.41 Thus, Spain promised, the city of Birmingham 
could purchase the forty-five blocks at almost no fiscal or social cost.42 
 In the public meeting, Volker briefly mentioned the University of Alabama 
Extension Center that offered continuing and professional education. The architectural 
blueprints were drawn precisely to plan for a full-fledged university, but the idea of 
Birmingham gaining its only four-year public institution was inconsequential compared 
to the promise of unbridled economic growth. A university was a side benefit for those in 
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the audience. The Medical Center trained the healthcare workforce needed for its own 
growth. It was a self-sustaining economic engine located in the city close to downtown. 
In a time of deep transition in Birmingham, an expanded Medical Center promised 
economic stability and urban growth without requiring significant efforts on the part of 
white civic elites.  
 The emphasis on economic growth––at almost no cost to those in attendance––
was a political necessity to accomplish Volker’s vision of an urban university at that time 
in Alabama. Volker oversaw the biggest budget of higher education in the state, but he 
remained hamstrung by the administrative structure of the University of Alabama (UA) 
that contained the academic growth of its Birmingham Affairs.
43
 Powerful alumni sat in 
the audience that day, and McSpadden and Volker hoped they would place pressure on 
the Board of Trustees to create either a branch campus or an autonomous university. 
Volker and UA President Frank A. Rose also lobbied state officials in Montgomery, a hot 
house of segregationist politics. Gov. George C. Wallace needed new industries and more 
universities to train the state’s workforce, but he held on to white supremacist beliefs and 
viewed reformers in Birmingham with suspicion.
44
 The promise of economic growth, 
however, could help win university designation for Volker’s campus.
45
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 The Medical Center’s second expansion campaign was an example of how Volker 
navigated the emerging politics of a post-civil rights Birmingham. It was decidedly 
different from the one in October 1953 in which black civic leaders used the public forum 
to criticize their white counterparts for their failure to recognize the housing needs of 
black residents. The lack of public or private housing remained a critical issue in the mid-
1960s, and Volker proposed a project nearly five times the size of the first one. Black 
response was limited to Wilbur Hollins, who seconded a supportive resolution in favor of 
the urban renewal project. The meeting represented Boutwell’s version of moderate 
biracialism, or tokenism, but it also showcased Volker’s political savvy in winning 
support for his urban university, a socially liberal vision, among elites who still favored 
the status quo.  
 Volker was unwilling to risk controversy over racial matters if it threatened 
needed economic and political support both at the federal and local levels. “Our dilemma 
is a simple one,” Volker explained to an old ally in late 1963. “On the one hand, we are 
increasingly dependent upon federal support for construction, and the financing of 
research and instruction. On the other hand, the elected officials have what they believe 
to be a mandate from the population to maintain the local custom of segregation of the 
races.”
46
 By the mid-1960s, over a fourth of UAB’s operating budget derived from 
federals sources, making compliance with federal non-discrimination requirements in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 mandatory.
47
 Volker still needed state funding, especially for 
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the Extension Center, but Montgomery politicians continued to fight desegregated 
education. When Frederick Kraus and Roger Hanson, two dental faculty members, 
marched in support of voting rights in Selma in the spring of 1965, Volker berated them. 
Kraus recalled him angrily asking, “Didn’t you think of the fact…that we had 
applications in for increasing monies from the state? How could you do such a thing?”
48
 
Volker had to minimize the appearance of any racial or social change in the Medical 
Center while negotiating with white officials in Montgomery and Birmingham who 
resisted it.   
 Volker unofficially encouraged desegregation of the Medical Center. Some 
faculty members had protested the continuation of Jim Crow in the Medical Center by 
individually taking down “white” and “colored” signs during the fall of 1963. Black 
service workers in the Basic Sciences building prompted a faculty discussion of 
desegregating the main cafeteria.
49
 Two of the seven members of the Medical Center’s 
faculty council voted to maintain segregation and eventually convinced two more to 
agree that “the educational mission of the institution have priority as far as the use of the 
lunch room facilities are concerned.”
50
 As these men saw the issue, educated whites 
should be the first ones in the lunch line.  
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Even after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Volker did not act to end 
segregation until he secured local approval for his urban renewal project. In April 1965, 
Volker called lawyer Oscar A. Adams Jr. to discuss his plans for desegregating the 
Medical Center. The year before, Adams had filed a racial discrimination lawsuit against 
the Medical Center similar to the one he led during the institution’s first urban renewal 
project in the 1950s. Adams established a friendship with Volker through that case. The 
executive vice-president also included UAB faculty member Dr. James T. Montgomery, 
private practice dentist Dr. John Nixon, Rev. John Porter of the Sixth Street Baptist 
Church, and businessman Louis J. Willie of A. G. Gaston Enterprises in his discussions 
to desegregate the Medical Center.
51
 These black civic elites became known as Volker’s 
“Kitchen Cabinet” among faculty and administrators, although the group was officially 
called the “Negro Advisory Committee.” Volker had established relationships with all 
men except for Willie that extended as far back as the early 1950s. “It was important, not 
only for moral and ethical reasons” to consult these men, one of Volker’s protégés 
explained, but “it was important politically to be in tune with the blacks.”
52
      
 Unlike other public institutions in Birmingham, parts of the UAB campus were 
interracial spaces of service and employment before 1965. Nearly 60 percent of the 
Medical Center’s patients in the mid-1960s were African American.
53
 Black and white 
healthcare workers (but not black doctors) served both races without regard to state law 
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before Montgomery began practicing there in the fall of 1963.
54
 The Medical Center had 
provided space for African Americans to earn a living and receive healthcare, and its 
sister institution the Extension Center offered education by the spring of 1964. In 
preparation for the desegregation of general academics, Volker worked with the Mayor’s 
Office and the Birmingham Police Department to avoid the ongoing white protests. The 
group agreed: “No public announcement of the acceptance of the [black] students should 
be made before registration.”
55
 The desegregation process went smoothly. 
 In April 1965 Volker and his administrative team created the appearance of 
desegregation by opening up existing spaces in the university previously ordered by Jim 
Crow. University Hospital maintenance staff removed water fountains, closed admitting 
lines previously used singularly by whites or blacks, and posted black placards with white 
letters stipulating compliance with desegregation. Federal investigators found the signs “a 
very permanent, attractive notice to the public.”
56
 Federally funded hospital renovations 
demolished dual elevators, entrances, and clinic waiting rooms that ordered how blacks 
and whites moved within the facilities. Nurses and technicians opened up curtains that 
separated blacks and whites in large patient wards and also moved patients around the 
hospital, disregarding their medical conditions, to present the appearance of desegregated 
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healthcare.
57
 Officials at the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare saw these 
material changes as evidence of “total integration” at University Hospital in May 1965.
58
   
 Volker’s actions prompted resistance among whites unwilling to let go of the Jim 
Crow order. Vocal and physical altercations between blacks and whites ensued in the 
elevators, halls, and clinics.
59
 Former UA Trustee Hill Ferguson expressed his dislike of 
the newly desegregated surgical recovery wards, but Volker supposedly quipped about 
the patients, “Mr. Hill, they don't know where the hell they are.”
60
 Because of this 
opposition, Volker and Matthew McNulty organized a “Committee on Community 
Sociological Factors.” Committee members observed blacks and whites to address and 
rectify the psychological remnants of Jim Crow that perpetuated self-segregation and 
discrimination among patients and employees.
61
 McNulty ordered “the permanent 
assignment of several key Hospital individuals to the cafeteria area to serve as arbiter, 
race relations leader, persuader and policeman.”
62
 Volker’s Kitchen Cabinet found these 
efforts commendable. Adams recalled that checking the status of desegregation “was one 
of the hardest jobs I’ve had in the world, going from one hospital to another” and asking 
people “were they satisfied.”
63
 Willie praised McNulty for his “boldness” and “good 
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faith” as they worked together to “advance the ministry of reconciliation.”
64
 Gov. 
Wallace, however, still inquired about UAB’s desegregated practices into the late 
1960s.
65
  
 Volker’s “Kitchen Cabinet” also helped him to preserve some elements of the 
black Southside neighborhood within the desegregated campus. Ullman High School was 
one of the three such schools for black Birminghamians before 1964, and it was in the 
project area for the Medical Center’s expansion. Rather than destroy the building, Volker 
spent money on improving its facilities for classroom use. In 1971, he lobbied the state 
legislature and UA Board of Trustees to rename it the Ullman-Bell Building as a way to 
honor its long-serving yet deceased African American principal George C. Bell.
66
 The 
building was the first of its kind named for an African American in any Alabama college 
or university, a meaningfully symbolic gesture in an era of black school closings, 
demotions of principles, or transfers of teachers and students. Volker’s advisory group 
also helped him to promote the new university to potential black students and employees. 
All of these efforts sought to build a representative black presence within UAB as it 
erased another form in Southside.
67
 
 By 1966, Volker challenged the political, economic, and racial order of the city in 
his quest to solve key problems preventing the formation of a full-fledged urban 
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university. He demanded that the city and county fund public welfare services and adopt 
a new tax on white suburbanites, a position few business leaders adopted at that time. The 
promise of the Medical Center’s economic growth became the key selling point to unite 
white civic elites behind its expansion. Yet, Volker never publicly stepped forward as an 
advocate of racial inclusion, although that precisely was his reputation. Volker’s spiritual 
approach to the matter promoted individual rather than group action: “The former 
requires continued and conscious personal effort; the latter all too often becomes a matter 
of words, slogans, and meeting[s].”
68
 He subverted his beliefs to build political power 
and autonomy around the public institution he oversaw, part of his long-term strategy to 
build an urban university. Because of the massive growth Volker initiated through the 
urban renewal campaign, the UA Board of Trustees created the University of Alabama at 
Birmingham (UAB), a branch campus, in 1966.
69
 Within three years, it became an 
autonomous university with Volker as its president.  
 
Suburban Visions of Progress: Vincent S. Townsend, Operation New Birmingham, 
and Public Relations, 1965-1969  
 
 Originally organized as a subcommittee of the Birmingham Downtown 
Improvement Association (BDIA), Operation New Birmingham (ONB) became the city’s 
unofficial government in the mid-1960s. In 1965, ONB unveiled its urban redevelopment 
plan called “Design for Progress.” Nominally a civic organization of around 350 
members, ONB had about 170 members working in 13 subcommittees, with one or two 
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African Americans on almost each one.
70
 By the fall of 1965, ONB superseded its parent 
organization.
71
 About a dozen ONB staff members moved into new offices at City Hall to 
facilitate interaction between them and municipal officials. Whites publicly promoted the 
involvement of key African American leaders in ONB. 
Led by S. Vincent Townsend, editor of the Birmingham News, ONB focused on 
manufacturing a new image of Birmingham as much as a new cityscape. While he was an 
undergraduate at Birmingham Southern College in the early 1920s, Townsend began his 
career at the Birmingham News as a sports writer. He rose through the News’ ranks, 
eventually becoming city editor and then managing editor by the mid-1950s. He spent 
over forty years pounding the streets of Birmingham in search of news and sources, 
which he used to great effect during the spring of 1963. Townsend negotiated with the 
Revs. Martin Luther King Jr. and Fred L. Shuttlesworth, yet he buried his reporters’ 
stories of the demonstrations in the back pages and highlighted the change in government 
on the front page of the News.
72
 In reflecting on his participation during the civil rights 
movement, Townsend boasted, “I’ve taken great pride in making news as well as 
covering news.”
73
 Urged on by News publisher Clarence Hanson II, Townsend became 
ONB’s permanent chairman of the board while at the editor’s desk, using both roles to 
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focus on “renewing the city’s self-confidence and rebuilding the badly-damaged central 
business district.”
74
 
 Townsend had a simple philosophy in directing ONB: “Settle on some first-
priority causes. Depend on a network of civic-minded friends, a group of ‘team players’ 
to motivate in behalf of worthy projects. Know things. And work hard.”
75
 Townsend, as a 
colleague described him, was “single-minded, untiring, persuasive, [and] a genius at 
developing a network of people who tell him things.”
76
 He tapped his wide networks 
throughout the city to find “team players.” “Only those persons,” Townsend remarked to 
a group of ten white businessmen and public officials, “who could expedite and bring to 
completion the projects outlined for ONB” would be asked to join.
77
 Finding white men 
with the necessary power to get things done in Birmingham was easy, but Townsend 
reached out to entrepreneur A. G. Gaston and realtor John Drew to find black civic elites 
for ONB membership.
78
  
Black ONB members did not come from the ranks of the ministry or labor unions 
but from boardrooms, courtrooms, and academic halls. The exclusion of civil rights 
activists from the new power structure invited outside criticism, but white civic elites 
needed African American participation to enact their designs for progress. The municipal 
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referendum and civil rights campaigns had given black civic elites new access to their 
white counterparts, who were not yet official citizens of Birmingham. The near doubling 
of the black electorate from 1963 to 1965 forced white civic elites to cultivate their 
support.
79
 ONB also depended on federal funding for its brick-and-mortar projects. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 required contractors such as ONB to follow non-discrimination 
mandates. Token black membership in ONB qualified the organization as the city’s 
official representative citizens committee for workable programs like urban renewal. 
Federal officials accepted this designation of ONB without question in 1965, allowing 
affluent white and black men to bypass a broader and more representative public 
discussion of their plans.  
 The cornerstone of ONB’s plans for a new Birmingham was “Design for 
Progress,” a twelve-step urban revitalization program announced in the spring of 1965 
after the Medical Center expansion project. Rather than commission an outside firm to 
design a new master plan, ONB asked local architects who had intimate knowledge of the 
city to volunteer their time. These architects gave over 5,000 hours––nearly seven 
months––to imagine a new Birmingham.
80
 “Design for Progress” held the premise that 
Birmingham was the capital of the New South, if not the “Football Capital of the South.” 
Its plan to refurbish Legion Field Stadium, capture a regional postal facility, expand the 
municipal airport, and build a civic center spoke to ONB’s ambitions to place 
Birmingham strategically on the southern and national markets for industries and services 
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dependent on rapid distribution and ease of transportation. Promotional materials 
highlighted the city’s central location within the southeast.81 With this twelve-step 
program, ONB sought to change outside and local opinion that the city was not one of 
“perpetual promise” as critics had described but the realized promise of the “Magic City.”  
 Park West, a public housing and commercial redevelopment project, was one of 
the lesser publicized twelve steps in ONB’s “Design for Progress.” Gaston and other 
businessmen such as realtors John Drew, Wilbur Hollins, and insurance executive Leroy 
S. Gaillard all sat on public housing committees either through the Mayor’s biracial 
citizens committee or ONB by the fall of 1963.82 Planned for fourteen blocks northwest 
of the black business district, Park West would erase the violence inflicted by the rioters, 
police, and bombers around the immediate area during the long summer of 1963. As 
homeowners, business owners, or workers, African Americans felt the impact of urban 
decay that Park West promised to reverse. By the fall of 1967, Gaston was in talks with 
Hugh Denman, director of the Housing Authority of the Birmingham District (HABD), to 
begin the project. Two years later, ONB won a $190,000 federal grant to survey the 
area.83 Public housing, however, was the selling point of Park West. The city needed to 
construct a sufficient number of units to house residents displaced by urban renewal 
programs. All such projects slated for the late 1960s would displace over 11,000 
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individuals, yet the HABD only planned to build 1,900 units of public housing. New 
housing construction was left to the private market.84   
 “Design for Progress” was the raw promotion of a new and better Birmingham 
free of the constraints placed on it by civil rights protests and violent adherence to Jim 
Crow. It also was based on an imagined and highly privileged suburban conception of the 
city. William M. Silsbee, ONB’s first executive director, believed “the image of our cities 
is the image of ourselves.”85 Aside from plans for a new downtown public library (which 
would not be built until 1986) and postal facility, the main components for “Design for 
Progress” were cultural amenities targeted to middle-class suburban citizens or affluent 
out-of-town guests. Red Mountain Expressway, which members of the BDIA 
championed since the 1950s, would connect the Over-the-Mountain suburbs to 
downtown so that suburbanites could readily access the planned cultural and commercial 
centers. Birmingham’s new master plan reflected the civic ambitions of suburban white 
men who claimed the city as theirs. 
 Silsbee and Townsend worked to convince others of their vision of a new 
Birmingham through a media blitz that was as important to them as netting federal 
financing for their urban renewal projects. Townsend often referred to it as “the 
Birmingham story.” “Design for Progress” was the reason why key ONB leaders flew to 
New York City in the summer of 1966. It provided material evidence of change. After 
two failed bond initiatives to support similar projects in the 1960s under the city 
commission, Boutwell applauded urban voters for recently passing a $60 million bond 
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issue. It provided local matching money to finance “Design for Progress” and the second 
Medical Center expansion project, which speakers also referenced.86 The Civic Center 
alone cost $35 million and spanned four blocks to the north of Birmingham’s civic 
square, Woodrow Wilson Park. Alex Lacy, chairman of ONB’s Civic Center committee, 
also bragged about a recent sales tax increase passed by the state legislature for Jefferson 
County only. “Taxing is no more popular in Birmingham than it is in New York,” but 
Lacy guessed that doing so suggested “overwhelming” support from the metropolitan 
taxpayers, “the people who must pay the bills.”87   
 Birmingham’s public officials and preeminent private citizens stood together in 
New York City to challenge national media outlets to see the change for themselves. 
They announced a worldwide architectural competition to design the Civic Center. It was 
an ambitious project that included a coliseum, concert hall, theater, exhibition halls, 
parking, and retail spaces. Over 250 architectural firms traveled to Birmingham in search 
of $50,000 in prize money and a $3 million contract. The selective judging panel, filled 
with world-renowned architects and noted cultural curators, were also introduced to 
Birmingham as top civic leaders knew it from the “vantage point” of Red Mountain.88 
The media also came. The New York Times published a half-page spread of the eventual 
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winning design, described by the lead architect as “an inviting but sequestered part of the 
city.”89 
 In preparation for the winning announcement at home, Townsend corralled 
editors, station managers, and public relations executives to promote civic pride, pro 
bono, among Birmingham area residents in the summer of 1967. Centered around a 
write-in contest with nearly $2,500 in total prize money, 1,000 citizens wrote short essays 
explaining why “Birmingham is A-Number-One-derful!” “place to live and work.”90 The 
clumsily crafted contest name aside, winners clearly expressed what ONB wanted to 
promote. Lola Waters, second place in the junior division, cited the “many opportunities” 
in “better learning, recreation and good government,” while the teenage girl who bested 
her and won $500 wrote Birmingham “has a purpose that allows men of all races and 
faiths to work together and face the future without fear.”91 Emily White’s winning entry 
was her personal belief about Birmingham, but it also expressed what white ONB leaders 
wanted to believe about the city, too.  
 By 1969, ONB’s civic investment in building a new Birmingham through urban 
renewal programs and aggressive publicity developed a wave of economic activity. Over 
$400 million of construction, including the Civic Center and Medical Center, transformed 
the downtown area. Ground also had broken or money had been obtained for airport 
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expansion, the regional postal facility, and Red Mountain Expressway.
92
 More buildings 
went up in downtown after 1963 than the forty years before that singular year. Central 
Bank & Trust Company, established in 1964, saw its deposits grow twenty-fold thanks to 
new construction and investment. South Central Bell Telephone Company chose 
downtown Birmingham for its headquarters in 1968. The metropolitan area swelled by 
over 100,000 people in the decade, pushing it toward a population of 735,000. Reflecting 
on the work ONB had accomplished in a relatively short amount of time, Ferd Weil Sr., 
director of the Downtown Action Committee, proudly boasted, “Birmingham has come 
25 years in the last five.”
93
  
 Despite these aggressive promotional pushes trumpeting a new Birmingham, white 
ONB leaders failed to convince some media outlets and the broader American public. 
Birmingham’s recent past was the barometer for which any progress would be measured. 
Exiled local critic Charles A. Morgan Jr. agreed Birmingham had changed since 1963, 
but “compared with the civilized world, it has not kept pace.”
94
 In January 1968, the New 
York Times sarcastically remarked, “Negro business and professional men are cast in the 
role of good pals of their white counterparts.” It compared Birmingham unfavorably to 
Atlanta, GA, Charleston, SC, Dallas, TX, and Jacksonville, FL, other southern cities that 
also trumpeted biracial communication.
95
 As one top Reuters chief confidentially told an 
ONB staff member, he had “rather unpleasant memories and misgivings about” 
Birmingham and very much doubted “the notable progress and the motives and sincerity 
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of some of our leaders.”
96
 ONB leaders chafed at such criticisms and negative press 
coverage. In response to LOOK Magazine’s photojournalism piece of black poverty in 
Birmingham’s neighborhoods, one ONB director wrote its editors, “I realize that the 
national news media has gone out of its way to keep this image before the world.…I 
cannot allow it to go by without expressing the feeling that you have not been at all 
fair.”
97
 
Overcoming 1963 was the larger urban renewal project white ONB leaders 
implemented in their designs for progress from the mid- to late 1960s. Brick-and-mortar 
projects such as the Civic Center and Red Mountain Expressway were concrete examples 
of change they could see. Working and socializing with elite black leaders, though few, 
was something they experienced. Equally important, changing the image of Birmingham 
in the local and national imagination validated their sense of self and citizenship to a 
broader public. In 1970, they won a major victory when the glossy LOOK magazine and 
the National League of Municipalities named Birmingham an “All-America City” for its 
commitment to racial progress, economic growth, and urban development. Orchestrated 
by Townsend, ONB used urban renewal programs, biracial communication, and public 
relations to create the image of a new cityscape for Birmingham’s white suburban middle 
class.  
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Building Political Power: Black Civic Elites and the Politics of Representation, 1963-
1969 
  
 In naming the executive members of the mayor’s biracial citizens committee in 
the summer of 1963, Albert B. Boutwell refused to recognize the civic influence of any 
African American, including entrepreneur A. G. Gaston. The multimillionaire’s absence 
from that committee signaled a downright rejection of black involvement in a more 
representative government that municipal reformers had promised. The doors to the new 
economic and political power structures of Birmingham, however, remained relatively 
open to them. Working behind the scenes with white men in the University of Alabama at 
Birmingham (UAB) and Operation New Birmingham (ONB), black civic elites fashioned 
responses to the various problems that making a new Birmingham caused, including the 
loss of traditional black spaces due to desegregation and urban renewal.   
Black elites used their civic influence to implement their vision of civil rights in 
post-1965 Birmingham. Their middle-class respectability, expressed through their 
language, decorum, and commitment to biracialism, connected them to their white peers. 
Indeed, their professions read as near carbon copies of those white men involved with 
ONB: accountants, bankers, doctors, educators, insurance executives, lawyers, and 
realtors. The color of their skin, however, denied them the respect they coveted. They 
secretly boiled when white men refused to address them as “mister,” something Wilbur 
Hollins surely must have experienced during his participation at the meeting to sell the 
Medical Center. Hollins and other black elites, however, were privy to discussions about 
building a new Birmingham that affected black citizens. In theory, their representation on 
powerful committees and municipal government would benefit all black 
Birminghamians. This emphasis on black elite participation in civic affairs as the 
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definition of racial progress transformed biracial communication as an image promoted 
by both races into a concrete mechanism to implement civil rights. By demanding the 
right to participate in the building of a new Birmingham, black civic elites manipulated 
the politics of representation promoted by white elites to gain the respect they desired and 
strengthen their positions of power. 
Black leaders in the professional service economy shared with their white 
counterparts the threat of losing business due to desegregation, but they alone faced the 
loss of their economic and institutional power in a new Birmingham.
98
 Gaston’s business 
enterprises had launched markets on banking, housing, and dying for blacks, but he never 
enjoyed white clientele in any significant number. John Drew, president of Acamar 
Realty, catered to black middle-class families in Enon Ridge, Smithfield, Titusville, and a 
few areas outside the city lines, while Lucius H. Pitts provided higher education to black 
youth. Equal access laws would undermine the segregated markets black businessmen 
and educational leaders had used to develop economic and institutional power but do 
nothing to help them expand the color or residential lines of their services. The market of 
black professional services––education, business, and home buying––was in crisis. Black 
elites worked to protect their sources of power and preserve traditional institutions of 
black mobility in metropolitan Birmingham. 
After 1964, Lucius H. Pitts turned his mission to win accreditation for Miles 
College into a crusade to preserve historically black institutions of higher education. At 
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the beginning of his Miles career in the fall of 1960, the college had no accreditation, was 
heavily in debt, and lost all but one of its local white donors in response to student civil 
rights activism.99 But media attention on Birmingham during its civil rights crises turned 
out to be an overwhelming financial and publicity victory for Miles. Pitts used this 
windfall as a way to corral local white and black leaders into a charitable group known as 
the “Friends of Miles.” This group, which included white racial liberals such as 
businessman James A. Head, Dr. Joseph F. Volker, and retired banker Charles F. Zukoski 
Jr. acted as a biracial advisory board to help Pitts raise money and the college’s local 
profile. Through numerous campaign drives in Birmingham and across the nation, Miles’ 
operating budget eventually reached $3.1 million by 1969.100   
 As part of the reaccreditation process, Pitts worked to strengthen the academic 
rigor and attract highly qualified faculty members for Miles. In the summer of 1964, Pitts 
convinced Harvard University’s Dean of Undergraduate Studies John U. Munro to teach 
on a volunteer basis in Miles’ basic skills program for entering freshman. Most Miles 
students read and wrote at a ninth-grade level. Munro instructed his students to write an 
essay entitled “My Hometown” that revealed to him the systems of oppression blacks 
experienced in Birmingham as well as their commitment to “change things.” Pitts later 
said, “Those students pulled a chunk out of his heart.” They also transformed Munro’s 
life. He later remarked, “I live in a black world now.…I am uneasy now in the white 
community. White people simply fail to see black people as people. It’s a tiresome 
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failure, and I’m utterly bored by it.”
101
 For Munro, significant racial progress took place 
in Miles College, not in ONB or downtown Birmingham.  
After three summers of volunteering in the program, Munro left Harvard and 
joined Miles full-time as director of Freshman Studies in the fall of 1967. His decision 
was an easy one. “I cared about education for underprivileged kids, not whether well-
endowed, well-educated kids wanted to use drugs,” he told the New York Times. “I 
wanted to find out what curricula are fundamentally relevant to getting kids on with 
higher education. Somebody else could always take care of the job at Harvard, but no one 
was about to do” that at Miles.
102
 The remedial education programs he implemented 
helped black students, most of whom had matriculated from academically substandard 
and physically deteriorating high schools, prepare for college. The academic rigor Munro 
demanded of his students attracted the attention of investors and national media as well as 
brought new faculty members to Miles. By the end of the decade, 35 percent of the 
faculty was white.
103
   
 Although Pitts finally secured reaccreditation for Miles in 1969, the future of 
black education in Birmingham and elsewhere remained uncertain. After 1964, 
desegregation and affirmative action policies threatened the viability of universities and 
colleges that historically served African Americans. The New York Times described these 
colleges as “victims of progress” as white universities attracted black middle-class 
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students, recruited black instructors, and created black studies programs.
104
 Private 
colleges such as Miles also lacked state appropriation, which helped to buttress about a 
third of the South’s black public colleges.
105
 Although Pitts raised a substantial amount of 
money for Miles, the bulk of it went to replenish supplies for its libraries and laboratories 
or construct new academic halls and dormitories. Pitts could not afford faculty salaries 
commensurate to those of UAB or the two white private colleges in the city.
106
 Raising 
student tuition to cover these costs was not an option for Pitts, who believed an increase 
would make a Miles education too expensive for some. 
 During the late 1960s, another historically black college in Birmingham saw its 
fate sealed by a different form of progress. A.M.E.-affiliated Daniel Payne College in the 
Airport Hills neighborhood was in a tract of land targeted by the city for municipal 
airport expansion. President Howard Greggs could do little to stop its destruction. 
Gaston, himself a member of an A.M.E. church, confidentially informed Boutwell that 
although he and other black leaders expressed concerns about the “hazard[ous]” location 
of the College, “a move would not receive any serious adverse reaction” from them. 
Gaston, who also owned a business college that his wife oversaw, proposed to Boutwell 
that the city help relocate the College by trading land with it.
107
 Boutwell and the city 
council accepted Gaston’s offer, and ONB worked to obtain federal financing for 
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building construction grants and student loans to keep the college viable.
108
 The 
relocation, however, was too disruptive for the underfunded and uncelebrated college to 
survive. After limping along throughout the 1970s, Daniel Payne closed its doors in 1979, 
one of the many hidden costs of “Design for Progress.” 
Pitts and other leaders of black colleges and universities appealed to the federal 
government to help them preserve their institutions. Pitts proclaimed, “Black colleges 
face the greatest challenge of their lives, and this country can’t afford to let them fail.”
109
 
In 1968, Pitts lobbied the US Department of Education to provide desperately needed 
funding for black colleges and universities.
110
 A few years earlier, Minnie Gaston, 
president of the Booker T. Washington Business College, pleaded with members of 
Congress to consider providing loans to students attending black schools of vocational or 
higher education.
111
 Safeguarding these colleges was a critical endeavor in the mid- to 
late 1960s. “The black community needs an intellectual focus, a channel for rage and 
frustration and for building institutional strength,” Munro explained. “These colleges are 
that place. If that’s black separatism or black power, so be it.”
112
     
The destruction of black cultural institutions and communities through urban 
renewal prompted some youth to develop a new political consciousness. The Southside 
neighborhood, which the Medical Center expansion project transformed from a black 
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space into a predominately white one, was a breeding place for it. Since the 1890s, 
Southside had been a black neighborhood between Fourth to Eighth Avenues South. It 
was home to the third largest black church, Sixth Street Baptist Church, and one of the 
three black high schools in Birmingham. By midcentury, most residents in the 
neighborhood lived in poverty. One Southside resident who was evicted from her home 
two times by the Medical Center nicknamed the institution “the cancer because it was 
eating everything in its path.”
113
 In the summer of 1968, a group of young artists, poets, 
and essayists published The Southside Voice to express their thoughts about Southside. 
“Life on 8
th
 Court may be very hard and depressing, but there is something here that is 
not up on the mountain,” a young Mark Davis wrote. “Here, people associate with their 
neighbors, people talk on the streets, and sit on their porches. Up on the mountain, 
everyone sits all day behind closed doors and window[s] and never comes out.”
114
 Others 
used the Voice to express their opinions about the “huge government redevelopment 
project.”
115
 Tommy McCaskey urged his readers into action: “It’s time for the black men 
to get up off their asses and fight for their people. The white men is going to take from us 
as long as we let them––it’s time to stop them now!”
116
 
In 1966 Gaston attempted to address the growing political radicalism among some 
black youth living in neighborhoods targeted for urban renewal projects. He launched the 
A. G. Gaston Boys Club in a neighborhood located near the future site of the Civic 
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Center. Gaston hoped the club would make the youth “in a section of Birmingham which 
now seethes with frustration-borne restlessness” into “doers instead of drifters.”117 Quite 
a few future black political leaders, such as former Acting Mayor Roderick Royal, passed 
through the Boys Club as teenagers. Gaston conceived of it as a way to “help build 
boys...not mend men.”118 The increasing rate of juvenile delinquency and movement 
toward Black Power among youth was of grave concern to him and white elites. The 
mayor, police chief of Birmingham, and acting superintendent of the Jefferson County 
Board of Education wrote glowing letters of recommendation and solicitation for the 
Boy’s Club.119 White elites generously donated money to Gaston’s cause, raising over 
$300,000 in a few months’ time.120  
 In 1967 Gaston published his autobiography Green Power: The Successful Way of 
A. G. Gaston to encourage economic self-determination, autonomous community 
formation, and race pride among black youth. These tenets formed the core of Gaston’s 
green power, yet maintaining his relationships with white elites was equally important. 
Although Gaston did not confess as such, whites still controlled the economy and 
determined the limits of black economic power. He accepted Vincent Townsend’s offer 
to help publicize Green Power. The news editor believed “Dr. Gaston’s inspiring 
autobiography…is constructive, timely, and must-reading for everyone.” He wrote a 
glowing cover letter to over 150 national media outlets lauding Gaston’s phenomenal up-
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from-bootstraps success story of a “farm boy of Alabama’s rural ‘black belt’ to [a] multi-
millionaire Birmingham philanthropist-businessman.”
121
 NBC’s Today show offered 
Gaston an opportunity to explain how his philosophy was an alternative to Black 
Power.
122
     
The “Successful Way of A. G. Gaston” depended on a give-and-take relationship 
between whites and blacks. Whites in ONB used Gaston for their image of racial progress 
as much as he used them to advance his goals of creating a self-sustaining and self-
respecting black community. Gaston also pushed City Hall to recognize black leaders 
who did not typically follow the politics of respectability or engage in biracial 
communication. In order to “strengthen the pipeline of communication between the 
Mayor’s office” and African Americans, he urged the Boutwell administration to “take 
the initiative in making your office available to a cross section of the Negro community.” 
Such an action, he believed, would help City Hall “possibl[y] keep a step ahead of any 
unreasonable demand or pressure that might embarrass or adversely affect the improved 
relationship which presently exists” among blacks and whites. “Without my name 
attached,” Gaston sent a list of black leaders who included Emory O. Jackson, the 
outspoken editor of the Birmingham World, Rev. Abraham L Woods II, leader of the 
local branch of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and James X, leader of the 
local Nation of Islam group.
123
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 Gaston’s actions to raise white awareness of black urban problems and the 
diversity of black leadership were part of his efforts to transform the politics of 
representation into a viable tool of political power. This became a central strategy of 
black civic elites to advance racial progress in Birmingham. They believed that if more 
African Americans participated in the governance of Birmingham, all blacks would 
benefit.  
Townsend and Volker had welcomed black civic elites to varying degrees in the 
decision-making process of designing a new Birmingham, but African Americans saw 
appointed positions in municipal and county government as their greatest chance to make 
a difference. These seats, however, were hard to obtain. Alabama state law barred new 
municipal administrations from appointing anyone to an independent board or 
department-head position until a vacancy occurred, which kept many of the old city 
commission’s appointments in place. When openings did occur, Boutwell and his 
successor George S. Seibels named black civic elites such as Wilbur Hollins. A vacancy 
on the city council in 1967 led Seibels to appoint civil rights attorney Arthur S. Shores. 
“Finally,” ONB’s executive secretary Jane House exclaimed, “after two years of waiting 
for a first-class news break in this area,” Shores’ seat prompted her to write press releases 
announcing the presence of progress in Birmingham to national and international media 
outlets.
124
   
 Breaking the color barrier in the Birmingham Police Department (BPD) was a 
particularly high-profile goal of black activists and civic elites. Birmingham was the only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124
 Jane House, “ONB Accomplishments of the First Two Years, Part III: Growing Communication-A New 
Spirit in City Hall, Increasing Inter-Racial Communication and Cooperation,” n.d., File 33.28, Seibels 
Papers. 
 171!
major southern city that did not have a black police officer until 1968.
125
 As early as the 
fall of 1963, black and white civic elites had demanded the hiring of black policemen and 
the revision of the civil service system. The Birmingham Fraternal Order of Police, which 
acted as a union for white officers, rebelled against these calls. The proposed reforms in 
the civil service system, overseen by segregationists appointed by the Jefferson County 
Commission, in order to hire black officers was “absolute blackmail” that would only 
“satisfy the demands of outside Negro leaders.”
126
 In 1965 Emory O. Jackson noted in the 
Birmingham World the inexplicable coincidence of the Over-the-Mountain suburb of 
Homewood employing two blacks on its force while the city of Birmingham, which had a 
bigger African American population, could not even find one. “If City Hall desired Negro 
policemen,” Jackson wrote, “it would find a way to get them.”
127
  
The lack of black officers symbolized the continuing influence of former 
commissioner T. Eugene “Bull” Connor in the Birmingham Police Department and 
municipal government. From 1963 to 1967, over twenty African Americans died or were 
wounded by white officers who did not receive reprimands from the BPD.
128
 In early 
April 1969, white policemen shot three African Americans in the Ensley neighborhood, 
sparking a small riot. Long left out of Birmingham, these working-class and poor blacks 
used rioting to protest police brutality, perpetual discrimination, and the lack of a 
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representative government. In response, Gaston, Pitts, and other black civic elites 
convinced their white counterparts to implement a more substantial version of the politics 
of representation.        
In a public letter to the Mayor and ONB released on April 2, 1969, black civic 
elites issued the “Fourteen Points” to call for the appointment of African Americans in all 
areas of municipal and county government. They asserted their desire for a “progressive 
community” by invoking civic identity and middle-class values. Black elites expressed 
concern over Birmingham’s 
growth and its image. We all have a definite stake in this community. We are, 
therefore, asking you to join hands with us to assure the continued growth of this 
community and to enhance its image as a place where all men may expect justice. 
As men of goodwill, we trust that you, like us, sense the urgency of taking 
positive steps to alleviate the fears and frustrations which are very real and critical 
in the black community. 
 
One of the main issues elites focused on was the charge of police brutality. Stories about 
it “are heard too often to be all imagined and to continue to be ignored by responsible 
officials or by those of us in the black community.”
129
 The “Fourteen Points” sought to 
grant justice to black Birminghamians. The majority of the points focused on police 
brutality, the judicial system, and the civil service system. Judgeships, appointments, and 
racial sensitivity trainers were positions best suited for the authors, men engaged in the 
professional service economy. Through the “Fourteen Points,” black civic elites 
consolidated their power to open the formal and informal structures of political power in 
Birmingham.
130
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 Within two weeks after black civic elites issued their demands, ONB established 
its Community Affairs Committee (CAC) to foster biracial communication in municipal 
governance. The “Fourteen Points” did not call for such a group, but it was warmly 
embraced by its authors who self-selected their participation. Nine blacks, nine whites, 
and nine municipal and county representatives (all white) served in CAC. Within a year 
that membership grew to forty-eight but retained the same black-white, public-private 
ratio. Only Birmingham’s most influential men (and few women) served, but the 
smallness of CAC made it an effective form of representational politics. CAC formally 
connected the three elements of the biracial coalition––the mayor-council system, white 
suburbanites, and black civic elites––and gave two of these groups the representation 
they lacked in formal municipal politics. 
 Lucius Pitts co-chaired CAC with newcomer W. Cecil Bauer, president of South 
Central Bell. Their statement of purpose reasserted the need for CAC as “a direct answer 
to…bridge the understanding gap between ethnic groups within the community and 
between the private citizen and public officials.”
131
 The first objective of CAC was “to 
look at the problems in our community that hold back progress and attempt to find 
solutions.” The other ten ranged from adopting the Fourteen Points to using measured 
rhetoric. The group encouraged media, public officials, and businessmen to use “purr” 
instead of “snarl” words in discussing racially sensitive matters.
132
 Unthinkable in 
Birmingham just six years before, black and white men in CAC ate breakfast with each 
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other every Monday morning and talked for nearly two hours about specific urban issues 
such as police brutality, poverty, housing, education, and unemployment with an acute 
focus on how they affected African Americans.
133
 These meetings were held outside the 
prying eyes of the media, excluding Townsend’s omniscient presence. “We’ve finished 
the little niceties like sitting down at the same table for breakfast,” dentist John Nixon 
noted, but “now, we’re getting down to the nitty-gritty.”
134
   
 Gaston, Pitts, and other black civic elites formalized their networks of biracial 
communication and the politics of representation through CAC. They did it at a fortuitous 
time. Most whites feared black political militancy, and its public presence, such as 
rioting, moved ONB to counter it by including black leaders within an informal yet 
powerful new system of metropolitan governance that invoked the rhetoric of citizen 
participation. Black civic elites needed CAC as much as white suburbanites. The 
professional, personal, and political relationships among Birmingham’s biracial civic 
elite secured the political power of black elites with white suburban economic power. 
CAC was the consolidation of a black-white, urban-suburban, and public-private 
coalition composed primarily of elite “men of good will.”  
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“One Great City”: The Failure of a Metropolitan Vision of Progress, 1969-1970 
 
 In 1970, Birmingham won the “All-America City” award from LOOK magazine 
and the National League of Municipalities because of its civic leaders’ commitment to 
biracial communication, democratic reform, and economic diversification. ONB’s 
application emphasized the city’s break with its past image as “America’s Most 
Segregated City.” In the last five years, the organization noted, “Citizen initiative and 
involvement have revolutionized Birmingham—politically, socially, and economically. It 
has created a new civic pride, and a period of progress and inter-racial cooperation 
considered impossible five years before.”
135
 The organization used the award ceremony 
to challenge the dominant media conception of the city that still saw Birmingham through 
the lens of 1963. Mayor George S. Seibels invited Chris McNair, father of one of the girls 
killed in the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing, to join him on the stage to accept 
the award. With McNair standing beside him, Seibels tearfully admitted, “There were 
times, many times, when I wondered if the very fabric of this city would survive the 
dishonor, the pressure, the tears, the bitterness of those dark days.”
136
 The award 
validated civic leaders’ commitment to change Birmingham, a process that continually 
shifted to meet new demands. UAB and ONB provided the new structures of economic 
and political power for civic elites to rebuild downtown as a post-industrial, post-civil 
rights Birmingham. 
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On the heels of this award, advocates of metropolitan consolidation moved 
forward with their plans to unite the city of Birmingham with its suburbs. “LOOK 
Magazine and the National League of Municipalities could see us as we truly are,” 
reformer David J. Vann boasted to area citizens, but he asked, “The question is, ‘Can 
we?’”
137
 Vann had retreated into private law practice after his failed 1964 bid for a US 
congressional seat when a group of suburban white men asked him to become involved in 
the metropolitan consolidation campaign in 1969. The lawyer had the legal expertise 
needed to craft enabling legislation.
138
 “One Great City,” as the plan was called, sought to 
unite Birmingham with the 23 major suburban cities surrounding it in Jefferson 
County.
139
 All governing and service functions of the cities would collapse into one 
political body, but each would retain some form of autonomy. “The real Birmingham,” 
Vann argued in one of his many speeches for consolidation, “is not the area within its city 
limits––the real Birmingham is the urbanized area which include the city proper and the 
suburbanized areas which surround and imminate [sic] from it.”
140
 “One Great City” 
would make citizens out of all those “who really consider themselves 
Birminghamians.”
141
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Metropolitan consolidation would reverse the city’s declining population and 
push it toward 555,000, carrying forth the myth of a “Magic City” that seemingly grew 
overnight.
142
 The metropolitan area gained over 100,000 people in the 1960s, while the 
city of Birmingham’s population slipped almost to 300,000 (See Appendix, Tables 1 and 
3).
143
 Most of the new suburban residents were white. Vestavia Hills, home to Joseph 
Volker, rivaled Homewood and Mountain Brook as an Over-the-Mountain suburban 
haven for an affluent white professional class. The African American population 
decreased in the Over-the-Mountain suburbs, most likely due to the decline of live-in 
domestic service work or, in Homewood’s case, the destruction of their neighborhood for 
Red Mountain Expressway. Whites and blacks also left the industrial suburbs of Fairfield, 
Irondale, and Tarrant City, but the immediately adjacent suburbs of Fultondale, Midfield, 
and Pleasant Grove grew in population. By 1970, the city of Birmingham lost 40,000 
residents, and a fourth of those were African American. Blacks, who represented 40 
percent of the city’s population, began a forced migration when urban renewal programs 
for UAB, multiple “Design for Progress” elements, and interstate construction 
demolished their homes. 
Population decline in the city worried civic leaders because their projects 
depended on a healthy tax base.
144
 Federal programs also considered per capita in 
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allocating resources, as did companies in deciding where to invest and build plants. UAB, 
ONB, and City Hall depended on federal funding to stimulate economic development and 
subsidize education, public health, and neighborhood improvements. The city matched 
those funds with sales tax revenue and bond initiatives. Suburban municipalities 
surrounding Birmingham increasingly offered public services of their own rather than 
contract with the city or county. Consolidation would combine these resources into a 
more efficient system of service. David Herring, who was the new chairman of the 
Jefferson County Democratic Party, believed, “It’s kind of foolish that we have so many 
city governments.…It’s a waste of energy, efforts, dollars.”
145
 In speeches throughout the 
metropolitan area, Vann claimed county, city, and suburban city officials would let a fire 
rage while they argued over jurisdiction. Businesses with branches located throughout the 
metropolitan area could pay one license, pay roll, and sales tax rather than the numerous 
ones they paid to the city of Birmingham and its suburbs.
146
 
Since the end of World War II, civic leaders believed Birmingham’s future 
depended on uniting the city with its suburbs, especially the affluent Over-the-Mountain 
ones. Two annexation campaigns in 1949 and 1959 and one merger attempt in 1964 had 
failed, but the last one yielded a partial victory. Residents in the industrial suburbs of 
Fairfield, Irondale, and Tarrant City overwhelmingly defeated the 1964 initiative, but 
Over-the-Mountain suburbanites were more favorable toward it. By a margin of less than 
50 voters, Homewood residents opted to merge with the city of Birmingham, but 
opponents filed a lawsuit to overturn that decision based on improper notification of the 
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election. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and Homewood 
remained an independent suburb. Mountain Brook narrowly defeated merger by a 4 
percent margin, or roughly 250 votes, but 10 percent of its residents had switched their 
votes in favor of uniting with the city between 1959 and 1964.
147
 This turnaround 
indicated that the 1962 change in municipal government was a positive factor in their 
decision. After the merger defeat, citizens of Homewood and Mountain Brook continued 
to talk with the Birmingham City Council about how to design a more successful plan, 
which included safeguarding the suburbs’ independent school systems.
148
 Indeed, these 
dialogues provided the “theoretical thought” behind the “One Great City” legislative 
package to ensure some autonomy for suburban municipalities.
149
 
 In the “One Great City” enabling legislation, Vann hoped to fix one of the core 
problems in the mayor-council system. Due to issues of time, municipal reformers in 
1962 proceeded with at-large rather than district seats for the city council. A consolidated 
Birmingham would have nine districts, guaranteeing suburbanites representation. The 
wealth behind Red Mountain also would be shared across the entire metropolitan area 
through taxation (See Appendix, Table 4). The restructuring of Birmingham and 
Jefferson County governments, however, threatened to limit black political power. A 
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consolidated Birmingham would keep urban and black representation in check in relation 
to the growth of the white suburbs. Two-thirds of Jefferson County residents were white, 
whereas blacks accounted for two of every five citizens in the city in 1970 (See 
Appendix, Table 2).
150
 As whites continued to flee the city for the suburbs, urban African 
Americans stood to gain politically from their departure. People who sat on the at-large 
city council responded to an electoral majority, and the continuing increase in the number 
of black voters indicated that they would have more influence in the coming years.
151
 
According to James White III, one of the principal architects of “One Great City,” 
however, African Americans supported the campaign.
152
  
 Despite its potential limits to black political power, “One Great City” attempted to 
overcome the substantial divisions in metropolitan Birmingham by uniting area citizens 
around the designs of progress fashioned by businessmen, doctors, educators, journalists, 
and lawyers. An early poll conducted by the Birmingham News revealed that 65 percent 
of Over-the-Mountain suburbanites favored “One Great City.”
153
 Every major civic 
organization controlled by these suburbanites, including Operation New Birmingham, the 
Birmingham Rotary Club, and the Downtown Action Committee, supported 
consolidation.
154
 The Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce and the Birmingham 
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News did as well. University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) President Joseph F. 
Volker, who by 1970 controlled the second largest employer in the metropolitan area, 
was an advocate of consolidation. He corralled a group of thirty white business leaders to 
the UAB campus and asked them “to assist the consolidation effort by individually 
contacting two or three people” in the county delegation and state legislature to support 
enabling legislation.
155
 One opponent recalled, “The power structure of downtown 
Birmingham was…really pushing” the campaign. The overwhelming influence of 
Birmingham’s business community resulted in the opposition’s inability to “get any local 
public relations firm to handle our advertising.”
156
 
Despite the power behind “One Great City,” the opposition successfully killed 
metropolitan consolidation by claiming it was undemocratic. Lawyer Charles Speir, who 
once shared offices with municipal reformer H. Erskine Smith, became one the key 
organizers of the Jefferson County Citizens Committee for Local Self-Government. Speir 
argued that “One Great City” denied suburbanites political self-determination. Vann and 
others believed a one-time, county-wide election would make consolidation successful at 
the polls because voters in the city of Birmingham could outweigh suburban voters who 
did not favor it. The measure would fail if each suburban city held separate elections. 
Speir and his allies also purposely confused the legal distinctions between consolidation 
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and annexation in their rhetoric against “One Great City.”
157
 It was easy to do; the 
enabling legislation was so complex, one of lawyer explained, that its proposed 
“constitutional amendments…were thicker than most statues” in the state constitution.
158
  
By all accounts, white suburbanites feared losing their way of life in a 
consolidated Birmingham. For example, sanitation workers in Mountain Brook picked up 
garbage behind houses, whereas in the city residents had to take their trash to the curb. 
Lawyer Thad Long explained, “That was going to make their lives less pleasant” in the 
Over-the-Mountain suburb. Long did not personally support consolidation but he wrote 
portions of the enabling legislation. He described himself as “a lawyer, acting and 
functioning as a lawyer” rather than as an individual citizen. Other white suburbanites, he 
recalled, “were scared to death that this hovering monster of the city of Birmingham… 
was going to come in and gobble them up somehow.”
159
 
“Lurking in the background” of the entire debate over “One Great City,” Long 
described, was the issue of school desegregation.
160
 It had sabotaged the 1964 merger and 
1959 annexation campaigns, which was why the “One Great City” legislative package 
took special care to provide for multiple school systems within a consolidated 
Birmingham.
161
 Liberty National Life Insurance Company had loaned its private jets to 
Vann and others to fly to Washington, DC, to make sure their plans for schools would not 
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be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
162
 Yet, Speir and others believed that the 
federal government would not approve the new school plans. Speir attributed his desire to 
preserve the autonomy of the Vestavia Hill School System, which he partly designed, as 
his “prime motivation” to stop “One Great City.” Very few African Americans lived in 
the Over-the-Mountain suburbs, yet Speir denied that his position against consolidation 
was “a racial matter.”
163
  
Speir shifted the blame to his working-class white neighbors in western 
Birmingham for harboring racist attitudes, but their reasons for opposing “One Great 
City” also spoke of class antagonisms. Some whites fled the city in the 1960s because 
they opposed the biracial civic elite. Speir’s colleagues had been members of the White 
Citizens Council; the Over-the-Mountain suburbanite called them “some mean 
characters.” In response to Richard Pizitz’s support of “One Great City,” western-area 
whites cut up their Pizitz department store charge cards and mailed them to their 
lender.
164
 White business leaders also had expressed concerns about Vann’s participation 
because he was “too controversial.”
165
 The last time he was a spokesman for a civic 
campaign, Jim Crow had fallen in Birmingham. The city had a completely new political 
culture and downtown landscape that some whites in metropolitan Birmingham rejected. 
They also had experienced the cost of “Design for Progress.” One small business owner 
declared, “In every city victimized by Urban Renewal, thousands of home owners have 
been uprooted, their homes demolished, and real estate operators enriched fabulously 
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while the victikms [sic] of Urban Renewal become burdened with debt load for a new 
home which the great paternal liberal government has forced upon them.” Urban renewal, 
he elaborated, was a “monstrous crime against humanity” intent on “racial integration 
and mongrelization [sic].”
166
   
The failure of “One Great City” revealed the limits of the civic elite vision of a 
new Birmingham. It was highly idealistic and utopian, without the slightest recognition 
that a sizable portion of black and white metropolitan citizens disagreed with or 
experienced the costs of progress. Thad Long, the lawyer who worked on the enabling 
legislation despite his opposition to it, remarked that Vann and his allies should have sold 
metropolitan consolidation to area citizens as a sacrifice for the greater good. The city, 
Long said, “face[d] a crisis of leadership” in that “the more talented, the more affluent 
people” living in the suburbs left the city to “a poorer, less educated, less wealthy 
base.”
167
 Speir reflected twenty-five years after the campaign, “Since Birmingham has 
now turned out to be minority and with all the problems…I thought, well maybe it would 
have been better” if consolidation had been successful.
168
 Speir and Long revealed white 
suburban ambivalence toward black political leadership of Birmingham, something that 
other white suburbanites in ONB accepted when they created the Community Affairs 
Committee. Even though “One Great City” would have limited black political power, it 
also would have bolstered the city’s tax base to provide services to its black and white 
residents. Neither racial equality nor economic opportunity could emerge if the city of 
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Birmingham could not finance them. This trade-off between black political power and the 
strengthening of Birmingham was a compromise that some white suburbanites refused to 
make. Core decline was a consequence of failed metropolitan consolidation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By 1970, Birmingham’s economic and political reformers had experienced major 
victories and disastrous setbacks in implementing their designs for progress. The changes 
that occurred in the mid- to late 1960s were the result of constant compromises between 
black and white men working on specific issues in a particular place and time. Volker, 
Gaston, and Townsend hardly represented the progressive coalition social activist Bayard 
Rustin imagined, but they individually held visions of Birmingham that were elastic 
enough to incorporate new challenges and agendas. In an era of intense political division, 
this new coalition was no small feat. Volker’s urban university, Gaston’s black business 
district, and Townsend’s suburban city could never immediately satisfy critics who 
derided their claims of progress. Their goals and strategies were long-term investments in 
building sources of economic, political, and spatial power in post-1965 Birmingham. 
 The informal structures of power remained the place for black and white civic 
leaders to hash out the details of governing a new Birmingham. Volker’s “Kitchen 
Cabinet,” Pitt’s “Friends of Miles,” and ONB’s Community Affairs Committee provided 
blacks and whites and suburbanites and urbanites with networks to design a new 
Birmingham hidden from public view. ONB’s role represented an elite version of citizen 
participation that combined the goals of representative government and metropolitan 
consolidation. Suburban whites and middle-class blacks had direct access to City Hall 
when voters and laws prevented their formal entrance. Within a few years, citizen 
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participation with municipal decision-making ability would include the working poor and 
other groups of citizens left out of the middle-class vision of the city. In contrast, the 
doors of access literally fell to the floor at UAB once Volker accomplished the first step 
toward forming an urban university. Volker recognized UAB’s long ties to African 
Americans as patients, employees, and residents of the Southside community. Federal 
non-discrimination requirements attached to research, building construction, and public 
health grants further prodded him to expand spaces for blacks and women within UAB. 
His urban campus soon would be bigger than the central business district.  
CHAPTER 5 
 
“ONE GREAT CITY”: BUILDING DIVERSITY AND POWER IN THE NEW 
METROPOLITAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1966-1976 
  
 The phenomenal growth of the University of Alabama in Birmingham (UAB) in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s made President Dr. Joseph F. Volker one of Birmingham’s 
most powerful civic leaders.
1
 In 1971, members of the Birmingham Area Chamber of 
Commerce chose him as one of the city’s top ten leaders throughout its 100-year history.
2
 
Volker’s selection was remarkable for a man who had a twenty-year reputation among 
some whites as a northern communist intent on “integrating” Birmingham. Volker slowly 
chipped away at Birmingham’s values and ideas to better reflect his own, and UAB was 
the physical site and public institution in which he invested them. Also on the Chamber’s 
list were realtor William P. Engel, entrepreneur A. G. Gaston, Alabama Power Company 
President Thomas W. Martin, department store magnate Louis Pizitz, lawyer Frank E. 
Spain, and founder of Liberty National Life Insurance Frank Samford––all of whom were 
involved with UAB in some form. Only one of the top ten leaders was an industrialist. 
Spain, who had been working with Volker and other administrators since the early 1950s, 
had long believed his civic investment in UAB would “make it a larger industry” for 
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Birmingham.
3
 For a city born out of the industrial revolution, the Chamber’s selections 
spoke to the emergence of Birmingham’s professional service economy.  
 
Figure 5.1 President Joseph F. Volker, 1969. (Courtesy of UAB Archives.)
 
 In the 1970s, UAB became a “city within a city” with a daily population of 
30,000 metropolitan area citizens moving within a 60-block campus. According to 
Operation New Birmingham (ONB), the city’s public-private redevelopment agency, the 
university “out-mushroom[ed] the parent community” of downtown’s central business 
district. UAB’s expansion was “staggering even in a city that had traditionally pointed 
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 Frank E. Spain to John Woods, November 9, 1970, File 32.100, Office of the President of the University 
of Alabama at Birmingham, Joseph F. Volker, 1969-1976 (hereafter cited as Volker-President), UAB 
Archives. 
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out its own rapid growth as a hallmark.”
4
 As president of UAB, Volker managed federal 
funding to build a new city of knowledge with quasi-municipal departments such as 
planning, facilities maintenance, and campus security. Block clearings, building 
construction, and parking decks expanded UAB’s presence in the city’s skyline and 
visually reinforced the university’s increasing power in civic affairs. Mayor George S. 
Seibels recognized Volker’s ability to mark progress through construction: “You have set 
an atmosphere that could be an example for the rest of the city to follow.”
5
 Volker 
wielded a near absolute control in how UAB would look and function as the economic 
and cultural center of a new Birmingham. 
 Under Volker’s leadership, UAB symbolized the image of progress Birmingham’s 
civic leaders had desired since 1962. Volker saw UAB as an “urban university” that 
would be a responsive and inclusive public institution for all metropolitan residents. “The 
fabric of the urban university,” he publicly remarked in 1975, “is determined by the 
overall needs of the community.”
6
 Volker often used local demands to justify many new 
components of UAB, including the Center for Labor Affairs, School of Engineering, 
Spain Rehabilitation Clinic, Rust Computer Center, and Women Studies curriculum. 
From the late 1960s onward, federal funding requirements regarding equal access and 
Volker’s agreeable implementation of them enhanced the image of UAB as an open, 
welcoming space for women and minorities. Its expansion physically made room for 
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 Operation New Birmingham, “Untitled,” news release, ca. 1970, File 11.2, Operation New Birmingham 
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 George S. Seibels to Joseph F. Volker, July 10, 1970, File 47.48, George S. Seibels Papers, BPL-DAM.  
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 Joseph F. Volker, speech, October 13, 1975, transcript, “Conference on Urban Universities,” Auburn 
University, Joseph F. Volker Papers, UAB Archives. 
 190!
those previously excluded or discouraged from using public institutions in the city. By 
the end of Volker’s tenure as president in 1976, the university’s growth reinforced racial 
diversity, economic growth, and land development as measures of progress in 
Birmingham.  
UAB’s prominence emerged out of its various services to black and white 
individuals, the massive infusion of federal funding, and the strengthening of private-
public partnerships in developing the professional service economy. Postwar programs of 
the New Deal welfare state had created the foundations for UAB and the expansion of the 
middle class in Birmingham. After 1964, federal officials accelerated this process 
through the Great Society. Through non-discrimination measures in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, African Americans gained access to the university as students. The act also 
applied to women, who perhaps became the biggest beneficiaries of non-discrimination 
and affirmative action programs. Both groups in Birmingham used their college 
education to gain access to the new professional service economy.  
The healthcare industry received a financial boon through the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid in the Social Security Act of 1966. These programs expanded the 
market demand for maturing healthcare specialties, such as cardiac surgery, for an aging 
population. They also provided African Americans with unparalleled access to medical 
care in Birmingham. As UAB’s first black faculty member Dr. James T. Montgomery 
bluntly noted, “It’s been Medicare and money….that integrated” hospitals.
7
 The National 
Institutes of Health, of course, continued to fund clinical research for medical 
breakthroughs. Universities with medical centers such as UAB benefited enormously 
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 James T. Montgomery, interview by Virginia Fisher, August 26, 1987, File 1.45, transcript, UAB 
Archives Oral History Interview Collection (hereafter cited as UAB Oral History), UAB Archives. 
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from this infusion of federal dollars to strengthen markets for healthcare. Consequently, 
supporting industries such as insurance and banking grew in kind. By the end of the 
1970s, the healthcare industry was the third largest segment of the national economy and 
the fastest growing one in the Birmingham region (See Appendix, Tables 5 and 6).
8
 
Volker and other university administrators supported an emerging set of rights for 
UAB that promoted the maxim, what is good for the university is good for Birmingham. 
A natural politician, Volker used UAB’s growing political and economic power in 
Birmingham as ways to prevent public officials and citizens from questioning its 
interests, needs, and actions. The university became the largest employer in the city by 
1978, an achievement certainly aided by the ongoing industrial disinvestment that 
stripped Birmingham of a stable blue-collar workforce. UAB was the single largest land 
developer in the city, which ultimately resulted in the re-forging and relocation of 
Birmingham’s identity as a “Magic City” within UAB’s campus. Volker, however, 
continually compromised his vision of a progressive and unified urban university as he 
made UAB an economic and civic powerhouse. The institution’s growth brought 
disruptions to Birmingham that perpetuated its economic, racial, and spatial divisions. 
Although UAB acted as a buffer to the continuing influence of deindustrialization in the 
metropolitan area, it primarily protected an educated and suburban white middle class. 
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 The number of workers in health services climbed from 6,295 in 1960 to 16,642 in 1970 (a 164.4 percent 
increase) and to 31,642 in 1980 (a 90.1 percent increase). US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
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(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), Table 87; Census of the Population, 1980, 
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Building an Urban University: The Center for Urban Affairs and Planning a New 
City 
 
 In his first annual report as president of the University of Alabama at 
Birmingham, Volker wrote, “The city, with its multitude of problems in government, 
transportation, race relations, services, education, [and] health, is the great inspiration for 
today’s thinkers and doers.” For over two decades, Birmingham had been “an immense 
laboratory for observation, case material, research, and professional practice,” but it was 
now time for UAB to shape the city. “The University of Alabama in Birmingham, its 
philosophy closely and properly akin to the latter part of the twentieth century,” Volker 
carefully noted, “is unlikely to look to the traditions of the past for its identity. It is of the 
present, and the needs of the future will shape its destiny.”
9
 
Separated by rail tracks from downtown’s marble and steel skyscrapers, UAB’s 
multi-storied red brick buildings created a second point of focus in the city’s skyline. Yet 
in 1966, poverty surrounded the campus in the form of shotgun housing, overgrown 
lawns, and the presence of African Americans. It also crept into the campus. Flooding 
plagued it because of the lack of drain sewers in the Southside neighborhood. Public 
officials at the municipal and federal levels joined with top executives of Liberty 
National Life Insurance and UAB to wipe out these slum conditions to build a new 
economic engine for Birmingham. After four years of planning, UAB acquired forty-five 
blocks of its surrounding neighborhood through federal urban renewal programs in 1969. 
Shortly thereafter, UAB became an autonomous university. 
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Through the expansion of UAB, Director of Planning Alfred A. Moffett destroyed 
the Jim Crow order that once dominated downtown. Moffett, previously of the University 
of Colorado Medical Center, saw the urban campus as a chance to “approach the ideal, 
and to provide for future conditions.”
10
 He emphasized an anticipatory, forward-thinking 
approach such as providing pedestrian walkways and landscaped greenery on top of 
campus buildings and above the city streets. UAB’s expansion wave knocked down block 
after block of black urban poverty and structural inequalities. These blocks could not 
support the university’s expected needs, including the weight of its buildings, power 
supply, and traffic system. Moffett lobbied municipal engineers, traffic coordinators, and 
utility companies to address these remnants of Jim Crow planning.
11
 He also loathed 
downtown planning based on “outmoded standards and conditions” and “pre-automobile 
concepts of 19
th
 Century vintage” main streets.
12
 Moffett’s design of UAB rendered it a 
modern city with a different look and identity from Birmingham’s decaying central 
business district less than six blocks away.       
 Moffett often altered campus plans to accommodate the needs of the Medical 
Center. By 1969, over one-third of UAB’s operating budget derived from federal funding 
and private investments in new programs, clinics, or classrooms (See Appendix, Tables 7 
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and 8).
13
 Between 1969 and 1976, UAB established 16 academic and medical centers of 
specialized study and added through construction or acquisition 28 buildings.
14
 Medical 
education broadened to include a School of Community and Allied Health, School of 
Health Services Administration, and Regional Technical Institute for Health Occupations, 
a center derived directly from War on Poverty programs. UAB also established the 
Alabama Regional Medical Program that was part of federal efforts to concentrate 
healthcare specializations such as cardiac care, cancer treatments, and stroke 
rehabilitation in regional zones. The University of Alabama School of Nursing finally 
moved from Tuscaloosa to Birmingham in 1967. Most of UAB’s new hires worked 
within the Medical Center, where faculty hires there outpaced University College’s three 
to one.
15
   
 University College, the academic side of UAB, made significant gains as well. 
Arguing that an urban university had to be “convenient to the people,” Volker continued 
its offerings of early morning and late night classes in the Schools of Business, 
Education, Engineering, and Arts and Sciences.
16
 Before 1969, UAB served primarily 
non-traditional college students such as engineers and teachers seeking continuing 
education. The new UAB now attracted traditional, college-aged students. Black and 
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white students flocked to Birmingham’s only four-year public university. Enrollment 
jumped from 3,881 in 1969 to 8,471 in 1976.
17
 As early as 1973, 11 percent of all 
undergraduate students were African American, and five years later, that number almost 
doubled to reach 21.7 percent.
18
    
 
Figure 5.2 Aerial view of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, looking west, 1979. The hospital 
complex is in the upper left corner. (Courtesy of UAB Archives.)  
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In 1969, Volker established the Center for Urban Affairs to help implement his 
version of an urban university.
19
 The Center worked with municipal departments and 
community agencies to develop policy solutions for the city’s problems. Volker initially 
tagged John Dunbar, one of his protégés, to lead the Center after his brief stint as a 
consultant for the National Institutes of Health.
20
 In the mid-1960s, Dunbar had gained an 
interest in urban affairs after his involvement with the Jefferson County Committee on 
Economic Opportunity (JCCEO), the local community action agency for the War on 
Poverty. In those meetings, Dunbar realized poor African Americans “ha[d] the same 
desire for their kids as my mama had for me.” A child of a divorced working mother, he 
further reflected, “I had almost been around black people all my life and never knew 
them, absolutely didn’t. And all of a sudden they became human beings, individuals, 
senses of humor, people.”
21
 Passion could not make up for the knowledge needed to run 
the Center effectively. Dunbar left the Center in 1970 to become UAB’s affirmative 
action officer, and Assistant Director Edward S. LaMonte took his place.       
 Under LaMonte’s leadership, the Center for Urban Affairs transformed into a 
civically engaged think-tank shaped by “New Left” scholarship. LaMonte first arrived in 
Birmingham in 1964 as a Harvard University undergraduate to work with students at the 
historically black Miles College. He returned to the city five years later after completing 
his doctoral coursework in political science at the University of Chicago. For his 
dissertation, he chose Birmingham as a case study of race, reform, and social welfare. 
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LaMonte represented a new generation of scholars who not only asked new questions but 
also broadly applied their knowledge by working with communities outside of academe. 
LaMonte served on numerous committees, including the Community Affairs Committee 
of Operation New Birmingham (ONB), in which he advocated for policy changes to 
further push Birmingham toward racial progress and urban vitality. Along with historian 
Blaine A. Brownell, who was chair of the Department of Urban Studies, LaMonte used 
the Center to introduce Birmingham to new ways of thinking. Their work in UAB and 
Birmingham subsequently influenced the development of a new field, southern urban 
history.
22
 
 UAB’s stated focus as an “urban university” provided a place for LaMonte and 
Brownell to fuse their knowledge based on scholarly literature and hands-on experience 
in urban affairs to raise social consciousness among white and black students. The 
Department of Urban Studies offered courses in black history, contemporary black 
political thought, and the urban crisis. Brownell confided to LaMonte, “I am not 
interested in turning out bureaucrats, but a bunch of tigers who have not only the skills 
but the intellectual proclivity to make fundamental changes when they seem necessary. 
To do this, we need to concentrate on social awareness, social criticism, etc., and work 
their butts off!”
23
 Brownell and LaMonte secured student internships at City Hall through 
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their connections to ONB. This service-learning component gave students the opportunity 
to see how the municipal system worked and how it could change. Brownell and 
LaMonte also wanted to hire a black faculty member because urban studies necessarily 
involved issues affecting African Americans. In the fall of 1973, Odessa Woolfolk joined 
the Center of Urban Affairs as a full-time project coordinator and the Department of 
Urban Studies as a part-time instructor of black history courses.
24
 
 LaMonte and Brownell also encouraged their students to launch innovative 
initiatives that addressed urban problems. One such student was Prince C. Chambliss Jr. 
who majored in political science. Chambliss quickly attracted the attention of Brownell 
and LaMonte after his transfer to UAB in 1970. Brownell characterized him “as a friend 
of our program and as someone whom we should cultivate whenever possible.”
25
 
Chambliss was instrumental in establishing the student-led Afro-American Association. 
As its president, he organized a Saturday morning tutoring program for black middle 
school students at the Bell-Ullman Building, which was formerly the site of one of the 
three all-black high schools in Birmingham before 1965. “Since the building was taken 
from the community,” Chambliss explained to the Birmingham News, “we feel it’s in the 
interest of the University to give the building back to the community.”
26
 Chambliss also 
urged University College administrators to implement a deferred payment plan for 
textbooks to help keep low-income, predominately minority students from joining the 
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“ever-increasing undergraduate probation list.”
27
 Chambliss’ student activism won him 
the attention of Volker. The president hired him as his special assistant to study 
approaches for encouraging black students to apply to professional schools. Indeed, 
Chambliss left UAB to attend Harvard Law School. 
 Despite the Center’s importance to Volker’s vision of an urban university, it 
lacked administrative and financial support. Indeed, as early as 1970, Dunbar worried 
about the Center’s funding, role, and placement in the university because it served both 
academic and community development functions.
28
 The issue was never resolved until 
the Department of Urban Studies folded into the Department of Political Science in 1980. 
LaMonte later confessed that Executive Vice-President of University College George C. 
Campbell never understood the Center’s purpose or the role of an urban university.
29
 
Consequently, the Center remained underfunded. It drew heavily on outside sources to 
fund its work, often tying LaMonte and his staff to ONB and municipal departments. 
Center staff developed policy recommendations to reform the Birmingham Police 
Department, rehabilitate the city’s inadequate housing stock, and revitalize urban 
neighborhoods. They also worked with Miles College and the Jefferson County 
Department of Public Health to encourage and prepare African Americans for higher 
education, especially in the health sciences. Woolfolk, in particular, worked with the 
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JCCEO to help their clients prepare for the civil service exam.30 All of these activities in 
the Center, which were funded largely by non-UAB sources, were part of LaMonte’s 
efforts to bring African Americans into the political and civic life of Birmingham. The 
Center’s relative isolation in UAB, however, indicated that LaMonte’s social justice 
advocacy was not a central concern of university administrators.  
Equal Opportunity Employer?: Affirmative Action for Women and African 
Americans 
 
In June 1969, over 70 black maintenance employees in University Hospital filed a 
complaint with the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) charging 
UAB with racial discrimination. Their grievances included limited employment 
advancement, segregated women’s locker rooms, and uniforms of a different style and 
color that set them apart from their white co-workers in the main hospital cafeteria.31 
HEW officials found the charges to be true. They also noted that white supervisors 
continued the practice of referring to blacks in “traditional and customary terms” that 
“dehumanized rather than dignified them as persons.”32 If HEW officially charged UAB 
with disregarding non-discrimination mandates, the university could lose $17 million in 
federal contracts and grants in that academic year (See Appendix, Table 7). A non-
compliance finding also could delay or cancel UAB’s urban renewal campaign, which the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development had not yet approved.33 Volker and his 
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team quickly acted. Administrators ordered one of the dressing rooms closed, thereby 
forcing black and white women to use the other one that remained open. Volker 
recognized that different cafeteria uniforms “suggest[ed] difference by race rather than 
job function,” so he ordered all of them to wear the same style and color.
34
 All of these 
material changes resembled the ones Volker and his team undertook in 1965 to 
desegregate UAB.  
 As the result of the initiatives taken by employees and the dictates of federal 
policy, Volker turned his attention to developing an affirmative action plan for UAB.
35
 
Volker prefaced the plan by characterizing UAB “as an instrument of the finest ideals of 
citizenship.” The university “holds as traditional its responsibility for improving the 
conditions of life for the people of Alabama, the Nation, and all countries of the world 
community….Inherent in its implementation is the University’s design to lend new 
efforts, imagination, and resources to the recruitment, employment, development, and full 
utilization of our country’s disadvantaged citizens.”
36
 The plan focused on university-
wide communication, on-the-job training, and minority recruitment in the non-academic 
workforce.  
To overcome personal bias in employment, UAB implemented a universal hiring 
system that vetted all openings through the Personnel Department. That department 
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restructured employment categories to better reflect job duties, explain qualifications for 
those jobs, and addressed HEW’s concerns.
37
 HEW had noted the overall placement of 
African Americans in “dead-end jobs of lower level categories.”
38
 An earlier and 
anonymous complaint made mention of the fact that supervisors told “the Negro women 
to do some of the duties that men are suppose[d] to perform.”
39
 The precision of the plan 
could point to where employment segregation existed and affirm UAB’s commitment to 
“equal pay for equal work.”
40
 Leonard Harper, director of the Personnel Department, 
hoped that the expansive nature of UAB’s affirmative action plan would “get us out of 
the numbers business.”
41
 
 Except for the rejection of numerical objectives for employment and education, 
UAB’s plan mirrored the demands and suggestions for affirmative action made by many 
labor and civil rights activists at the national level.
42
 UAB administrators, Harper 
explained to HEW, “were philosophically opposed” to quotas. “The idea suggest[s] 
limiting features to our program” that “work against the realization of full equal 
employment opportunity,” and numerical objectives would “minimize efforts once they 
are reached.”
43
 Practically, however, administrators could not reach them. In 1969, only 
three black men and one black woman had joined the Medical Center faculty and enjoyed 
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hospital privileges.
44
 Although these sparse numbers in professional employment 
suggested discrimination, they reflected the detrimental effects of Jim Crow on African 
American higher and secondary education. As late as 1973, there were only seventy black 
doctors, thirty-nine black dentists, and one black optometrist practicing in the entire state 
of Alabama.
45
 Volker fretted that “the marginal Negro applicant is doomed to rejection” 
under standard medical school admission practices. Against intense opposition from 
clinical faculty, Volker adopted a double-review system to “close the gap between the 
‘haves’ and ‘have nots.’”
46
 
UAB failed to gain more than token black male admissions for the Schools of 
Medicine and Dentistry, but its newly created schools in healthcare support services 
attracted black women. This discrepancy resulted in the historical employment positions 
African American men and women held in the university. Because of Jim Crow laws that 
governed healthcare services and UAB’s role as an indigent care provider, black women 
always had been a part of the campus as allied health professionals. The desegregation of 
education at UAB granted them the educational qualifications to become occupational 
therapists and licensed practical nurses or to learn new healthcare support specialties. By 
1973, blacks comprised 16 percent each of the School of Community and Allied Health, 
School of Nursing, and Graduate School enrollment.
47
 Within five years, black women 
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represented 68.3 percent of all African American students.
48
 Their presence as students 
spoke to how far public universities in Alabama had come since Vivian Malone 
attempted to enroll at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa in June 1963.  
 
Figure 5.3 University College students, 1970. (Courtesy of UAB Archives.) 
Volker took a hands-on approach to recruit promising black instructors, 
undergraduates, and professional students and often pursued candidates suggested by 
prominent civic leaders and friends. John Munro, director of Freshman Studies at Miles 
College, suggested a program to enroll talented black high schoolers in pre-collegiate 
classes as a way of moving them “toward UAB and toward a profession, especially in the 
sciences.” Munro, who was white, also suggested Rev. Abraham L. Woods II, a 
prominent religious and civil rights leader, as an instructor for black history courses at 
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UAB.
49
 University of Alabama Trustee Ehney Camp urged Volker to employ one 
promising black male student who currently attended Dartmouth University and was 
interested in a healthcare career. Camp urged Volker to see these personal connections to 
UAB as vital to building progress: “The Birmingham community needs to retain as many 
as possible of the bright young black people in order to provide more effective leadership 
as we attempt to maintain good race relations.”
50
 School of Dentistry Dean Charles A. 
“Scotty” McCallum asked entrepreneur A. G. Gaston to fund summer school tuition for 
the School’s first two black dental students. He also wanted Gaston “to assist us in 
developing more community support for those students who have proven themselves as 
being fine citizens and who are desirous of attending professional schools.”
51
 Volker and 
his allies used their relationships with black civic elites to find the high-profile black 
students and faculty members needed to create a more desegregated UAB. These actions 
rendered UAB as a public institution eager to advance racial progress in Birmingham.   
Despite Volker’s embrace of affirmative action and measures to correct the racial 
imbalances in medical education and employment, UAB did more to standardize racial 
and gender hierarchies than correct them. In 1969, women accounted for two-thirds of the 
UAB workforce, and African Americans held one-third of all jobs. These groups 
provided support services such as housekeepers, secretaries, technicians, and lower-level 
healthcare workers. Nursing and allied health professions, which were expanding 
employment options for white and black women, fell under the affirmative action plan, 
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but the predominantly white male clinical faculty did not.
52
 Because the university’s plan 
published job descriptions and salary levels of its non-academic workforce, the labor of 
women and African Americans fell under public review. In 1975, administrators removed 
the years of experience from job descriptions because they felt it potentially excluded 
women and African Americans from employment advancement.
53
 In practice, the policy 
negated experience as a factor in determining promotion and salaries.  
 The adoption of the affirmative action plan occurred at the same time different 
colleges, schools, and departments administratively reorganized into one university. Yet, 
academic freedom often meant that most schools and departments operated independently 
of each other.
54
 Deans and department heads frequently failed to post job openings 
through the Personnel Department. Academic employment did not fall under the purview 
of affirmative action until 1973. Administrators urged academic and medical department 
chairs to make “good faith searches” for new faculty members that included African 
Americans and women.
55
 Chairs in the hard or applied sciences insisted that the lack of 
Ph.D.s among these groups made it “a matter of chance” to hire them.
56
 Neither they nor 
administrators, however, set up mechanisms to encourage black and women 
undergraduates to pursue graduate education. Less than a year later, faculty hires largely 
remained white men. John Dunbar, UAB’s affirmative action officer, nevertheless 
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thanked administrators for doing “a commendable job in recruiting and hiring females 
and minorities in relationship to their availability in the market place.”
57
 Dunbar also 
believed that further oversight over faculty employment “would be contrary to the dearest 
traditions of this university.”
58
 The continuing legacy of racial inequalities in secondary 
education and the ideals of academic freedom that infused the university inhibited equal 
opportunity employment in professional positions.    
 Department chairs often overlooked internal candidates such as the numerous 
female instructors hired to meet growing enrollment demand in the Extension Center, 
University College’s predecessor, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the spring of 
1972, Grace Andrews, a white instructor in the English Department, sued UAB on the 
grounds of sex discrimination. Andrews, who earned a masters degree from the 
University of Alabama, charged UAB with failing to promote or grant tenure to her after 
a decade of teaching experience.
59
 A similar suit followed in early 1974 from Martha 
Johnson in the Art Department.
60
 Part of becoming a university was having faculty with 
Ph.D.s. UAB administrators rejected the claims of these and other lawsuits by pointing 
out that women were 23.1 percent of the faculty in 1973. Most of these women, however, 
were not teaching as professors. In 1971, there were 62 female instructors and 15 female 
lecturers, representing 69.4 percent of all women academics in UAB.
61
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 An increase of labor activism among service workers and public employees in the 
late 1960s to mid-1970s also drove Volker’s acute attention to support workers. UAB’s 
top financial officer Paul A. Brann remarked, “Since the civil rights movement and the 
labor union movement have joined hands in programs of this type, I assume that the 
hospitals…may be targets.”
62
 Brann indirectly referenced the 100-day strike of hospital 
workers at the Medical College of South Carolina in Charleston from March to June 
1969. Black hospital workers, mostly women, sought higher wages and unionization, and 
their efforts attracted the national branch of the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store 
Workers Union and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Brann and others 
urged Volker to privatize food and laundry services, jobs held by blacks and women, to 
avoid unionization, but they remained public employees during Volker’s tenure.
63
 In 
1972, Volker ordered raises for University Hospital staff on the orders of the University 
of Alabama Board of Trustees to inhibit unionization among workers.
64
  
Volker and his administrative team also adopted wide-ranging employee benefit 
programs to appease UAB’s workforce. Beginning in 1971, the university provided free 
education to qualified workers at all levels. Programs for a general education degree for 
high school dropouts and continuing education for healthcare professionals allowed 
workers to take classes for certification, self-interest, or self-improvement.
65
 These 
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classes did not necessarily result in higher salaries. A biweekly bulletin highlighting 
service workers and programs available to them was distributed across the campus, which 
announced their contributions to casual faculty or student readers. UAB also 
implemented a twenty-four hour complaint and suggestion hotline as another way to 
symbolize the university’s open-door policy.
66
 Volker had a reputation for checking in on 
the lowest-paid employees of the hospitals. One female director sarcastically remarked, 
Volker “wasn’t very interested in whether I was happy or not, but he was interested in 
whether the cashier was happy and the person who was taking care of the grass.”
67
 A 
male colleague remembered, “You might see him at six o’clock down there talking to a 
janitor….He had a heck of a G-2 system, and it was a personal.”
68
 
The presence of and opportunities for women and African Americans as workers 
and students gave UAB a progressive image, one cultivated by Gloria Goldstein, director 
of UAB’s Office of Public Relations and Marketing. Goldstein oversaw all bulletins and 
magazines for UAB employees, and she often worked with Operation New Birmingham 
(ONB) staff to help publicize UAB and its scientific breakthroughs in the national 
media.
69
 She assumed the directorship of her office in 1968 after a male colleague 
ignored the president’s directives. “Believe you me,” she said, “I learned what was 
acceptable to [Volker] and what was not, and I didn’t do what wasn’t acceptable to 
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him.”
70
 A niece of realtor William P. Engel, a major donor to UAB, Goldstein had 
worked with Volker since 1962. She was both intimidated and inspired by the president. 
Volker loathed public relations because he believed accomplishments should be 
celebrated once they were achieved rather than when they remained mere goals. 
However, he encouraged Goldstein to “get her tickets,” or earn professional credentials 
and personal confidence as a publicist through higher education. She never did so, but 
Goldstein worked hard to overcome her fears of inadequacy. “I had to prove I could do it 
because I was female,” she explained.  
Despite its image as an equal opportunity employer, UAB remained an elite club 
for white men, as Goldstein knew all too well. She was one of the few white women who 
occupied a top-level administrative position at UAB. At the time, she did not see her 
ascent as a form of women’s liberation and later characterized her past attitude as the 
“married with children syndrome.”
71
 Her advancement within UAB’s administration was 
personally significant and served as evidence of equal opportunity employment, but it 
was also rare.  
UAB’s affirmative action plan, employee benefit system, and image of 
progressive race relations were ways Volker interpreted federal mandates and worker 
demands to avoid discrimination and unionization. All of these actions provided the 
means to measure and promote racial and gender diversity but not the equal opportunities 
advocates demanded. Barriers to women and African Americans in high-level positions 
continued in spite of the fact that educational opportunities for them expanded after 1965. 
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As of 2007, women remained roughly two-thirds and blacks one-third of the UAB 
workforce. In that year, women held 38.1 percent of all faculty and executive 
administration positions, representing a substantial increase from the early 1970s but not 
proportional to their placement in the overall workforce. African Americans fared much 
worse, representing only 5.7 percent of those positions.
72
 UAB’s workforce, then and 
now, resembles those of universities across the nation that have implemented affirmative 
action programs.  Institutions of higher education have played central roles in sustaining 
the myths of a meritocracy and a diverse public life.  
 
Building the Modern Research University: Dr. John W. Kirklin and the 
Privatization of Academic Healthcare 
 
In September 1966, Dr. John W. Kirklin arrived in Birmingham to become the 
new chair of surgery in the School of Medicine and surgeon-in-chief of University 
Hospital. A world-renowned pioneer in open-heart and transplantation surgery, Kirklin 
decided to leave the Mayo Clinic and turned down an offer from the Children’s Hospital 
in Boston to join UAB. According to an anonymous colleague, he could “build an empire 
in Birmingham” without interference.
73
 Birmingham’s civic elite interpreted the arrival of 
Kirklin as an indication of a changing city. As future mayor Richard Arrington Jr. 
recalled, “All of us who were trying to find a way to a new city took [it] as a strong 
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indication of the future.”
74
 “People would gush over me” at cocktail parties, Kirklin 
recalled. They said, “‘how happy we are to have you in Birmingham [but] I just hope I 
don’t have to be a patient in your hospital.’” After meeting private-practice surgeons in 
the Birmingham area, Kirklin learned, “I had come to preside over a charity hospital that 
no one would go to if they had the choice of going somewhere else.”
75
   
 
Figure 5.4 Dr. John W. Kirklin, ca. late 1960s. (Courtesy of the National Institutes of Health Portrait 
Gallery Online.) 
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Within a year, a number of professional organizations and national media outlets 
took note of the dramatic changes converging on UAB. Volker had won university 
designation for UAB in 1966. Kirklin’s arrival that same year, however, was the catalyst 
for transforming UAB from a teaching hospital for indigent patients into a modern 
research university with a world-class medical center. In 1967, UAB was one of the top 
25 favored recipients of the National Institutes of Heath (NIH), and Ladies Home Journal 
named it one of “America’s Ten Best Hospitals.” According to an informal poll 
conducted by the Journal of the American Medical Association, UAB was the most 
rapidly improving medical school in the South.
76
 By late summer in 1969, Volker 
received word from the Department of Housing and Urban Development that it approved 
UAB’s 45-block urban renewal application. Shortly thereafter, Volker won full autonomy 
for UAB.      
By 1972, Kirklin had brought a level of prestige and professionalism to the 
Medical Center that complemented its modern renovations and specialization of services. 
His influence extended to minor details, such as implementing a professional suit-and-tie 
dress code for physicians to recruiting top-notch specialists in gynecology and 
radiology.
77
 His ego also grew proportional to the increasing stature of the Medical 
Center based on cardiovascular healthcare. As S. Richardson Hill, who was executive 
vice-president of Health Affairs at the time, recalled, “If you come to a place like 
Alabama, whatever you did was bound to be your own and not a part of Harvard or Johns 
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Hopkins.”78 Kirklin chose UAB because his authority and expertise would not be 
questioned.79 In less than six years, he had transformed the image of the Medical Center 
as an indigent hospital into a world-class institution. 
 Even as the Medical Center brought in millions of dollars in the early 1970s, 
University Hospital operated in the red. It could not afford its immediate and projected 
growth needs. Even with Medicaid and Medicare, indigent care costs drained University 
Hospital revenue, with a projected $600,000 to $1 million deficit for 1972.80 
Administrators believed this annual deficit, produced by insufficient and contractual 
municipal, county, and state funds, drained money from research and teaching 
objectives.81 These and other costs left University Hospital, the centerpiece of the 
Medical Center, nearly bankrupt.  
 Over a ten-year period, Paul W. Brann, executive vice-president of Fiscal Affairs, 
“changed a fiscal tower of Babylon into a fiscal tower of strength” by offsetting hospital 
losses and poor state allocations with money from the Faculty and Professional Service 
Fund.82 The Fund pooled all for-fee patient services delivered by clinicians. Brann 
allocated the remainder to specific departments within the Medical Center that chairs then 
used to recruit new faculty, give bonus incentives, or throw social or charitable cocktail 
parties––all activities that state appropriations would not cover. Brann’s centralized 
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control of the Fund led many Medical Center faculty, including the School of Medicine’s 
Dean Clifton Meador, to believe their professional services subsidized the cost of 
University College. In fact, bond initiatives, tuition, and state appropriations for 
University College often supported the Medical Center’s growth during the early 1970s.83 
Nevertheless, as UAB lawyer Rufus Bealle remembered, “The doctors thought it was 
their money and they wanted to spend it the way they wanted to and they didn’t want any 
restrictions over it.”84   
 In May 1972 “all hell broke loose” when Kirklin, Meador, and John T. Reeves, 
chair of the Department of Medicine, resigned in protest over Brann’s practice of 
“taxing” the Faculty and Professional Service Fund.85 Brann perceived their actions as a 
personal attack against him and resigned in humiliation. Under orders from Volker, 
Gloria Goldstein rushed to the local newspapers and pleaded with them not to report the 
resignation of Kirklin. A $5 million NIH grant for cardiovascular research and the 
prestige of a rumored Lister Medal by the Royal College of Surgeons of London for 
Kirklin hung in the balance.86 Volker instructed Hill to meet with Kirklin and resolve the 
crisis. At the heart of the revolt was clinician control over the revenues they produced; 
clinicians wanted salaries that reflected their knowledge and skill. As Kirklin recalled, 
former faculty had left UAB “to make their fortunes and to make certain that this 
remained an indigent hospital.”87 The only way to reverse this trend and attract top-notch 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 McWilliams, New Lights in the Valley, 254-59. 
84 Rufus Bealle, interview by Virginia Fisher, August 19, 1989, File 2.1, transcript, UAB Oral History. 
85 McWilliams, New Lights in the Valley, 254. 
86 Goldstein, interview, and McWilliams, New Lights in the Valley, 257. 
87 Kirklin, interview. 
 216!
faculty, Kirklin believed, would be to offer them commensurate salaries. Indeed, in 1966, 
Volker asked University of Alabama President Frank A. Rose to raise the salaries to 
private-practice levels for Hill and Charles A. “Scotty” McCallum for their “continuous 
sacrifice[s]” in building the Schools of Medicine and Dentistry. Hill’s unsuccessful 
resignation had prompted Volker’s request.
88
 Kirklin firmly believed that “for academic 
medicine to succeed it has to be a real-life combination of public and private 
enterprise.”
89
  
 Within a week, Hill and Volker acceded to Kirklin’s demands to privatize 
healthcare services at UAB. All resignations were rescinded. The UAB Health Services 
Foundation (HSF), a private, non-profit corporation controlled by physicians, replaced 
the Faculty and Professional Service Fund. Whereas clinicians’ profits had provided 
UAB with extra revenue to fill the holes in its budget, the Foundation adopted a new 
formula. Kirklin agreed that the Foundation would pay for indigent care cost overruns for 
the rest of the year and would annually donate money to central administration and 
University Hospital to use publicly funded services, facilities, and equipment.
90
 Yet, the 
central contribution of the HSF to the development of UAB was to make the practice of 
academic medicine more lucrative. The Foundation supplemented poor state 
appropriations by paying white male clinicians a salary based on the growing market 
demand for their specialized services. Because the HSF was a private corporation, 
clinicians’ total salaries as state employees were not public information. At a time when 
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the administration actively discouraged unionization among healthcare support and 
service workers, Volker essentially allowed dentists, physicians, and other clinicians to 
organize themselves into one large private practice. The Foundation, of course, excluded 
allied health professionals and nurses. Kirklin’s revolt successfully privatized healthcare 
services provided by professionally educated white men.  
 Internal reaction revealed a split between administrators, clinicians, and faculty 
over how to develop UAB. Goldstein was shocked: “I just couldn’t believe [Hill] had 
done it; I really thought he ought to fire all of them.”
91
 To her, Kirklin’s demands broke 
the team spirit that had built UAB for over twenty-five years. Volker privately argued 
with clinical faculty about University College’s central role in the development of the 
Medical Center because of its Basic Sciences program. Dean Meador continued to 
disagree, and Volker and Hill pressured him to resign later that fall.
92
 Bealle, who was 
aware of how underfunded UAB was in a key period of growth, expressed regret about 
“the apparent loss of control by the administration over such a large amount of money 
and resources.”
93
 The consequences were grave, especially to Volker’s vision of an 
integrated urban university in a state with historically poor allocations to institutions of 
higher education. As Goldstein remarked, UAB was a system of “the haves and the have-
nots.” “All the money [wa]s up here” at the Medical Center, she explained, and “they 
struggle[d] a lot more down there” at University College.
94
 The creation of the HSF 
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ultimately built a chasm so wide between the Medical Center and University College that 
neither Volker nor his predecessors could overcome it. 
 Following administrators’ concessions to Kirklin, the foundation for a modern 
research university with a world-class medical center was complete. UAB now was a 
public-private partnership. The university received public funding to provide education 
and healthcare services, while the Health Services Foundation generated wealth for a 
select group of individuals, primarily white men. Indigent care ceased to drain money 
after the opening of Jefferson County’s new Mercy Hospital in October 1972, a few 
months after the establishment of the HSF. Kirklin’s arrival coincided with the 
maturation of healthcare specializations and the federal government’s policies to 
consolidate those services by region. Patients who had Medicare or private insurance 
flocked to the Medical Center. In the 1970s, UAB became nationally known for cardiac 
care performed by Kirklin, especially after Douglass Cater, a Montgomery native and 
former presidential advisor on health, education, and welfare programs, raved about the 
surgeon to a New York Times audience in 1978.
95
 By then, Kirklin had broadened the 
patient population across race and class and received more than ample financial 
compensation in return. Together, these changes in clinician compensation, patient 
population, and market demand made healthcare services an enormously profitable 
enterprise in Birmingham. 
 
Building the Professional Service Economy: Private Philanthropy and Liberty 
National Life Insurance 
 
 Although federal funding largely spurred the clinical and research growth of the 
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Medical Center, local white civic elites also had sponsored many of these developments 
since the mid- to late 1950s. Frank E. and Margaret Spain bemoaned the lack of 
healthcare in their hometown and across the southeastern region. Their daughter survived 
polio, but Margaret was acutely aware of the dearth of rehabilitation facilities in the 
South. Her brother had been born blind and paralyzed. Although her father had been a 
president of First National Bank of Birmingham, his money could not buy comfort or 
therapy for his son.
96
 In 1962, the Spains made the single-largest individual contribution 
to the Medical Center when they gave nearly a million dollars to match federal funding 
for what became the Spain Rehabilitation Clinic. While he was the lawyer for the 
Housing Authority of the Birmingham District (HABD), Frank orchestrated the 1953-
1959 urban renewal campaign that expanded the Medical Center from four to twelve 
blocks. The Spain family was an invaluable asset to UAB administrators.  
 Although the Spains were not the first high-profile family to donate to the 
Birmingham campus, their philanthropy prompted others to give. One prominent white 
family established a chaired professorship in surgery that ultimately went to Kirklin.
97
 
Bertha Smolian, heir to the Pizitz’s department store fortune, donated matching money 
for the Smolian Psychiatric Center in 1960. She also donated her palatial estate with 
sculpture gardens atop Red Mountain in the late 1960s that administrators used as a 
faculty club, international hosting facility, and fundraising activity center. Following 
recovery from heart surgery in the Medical Center in 1969, George Rust, scion of the 
Rust Engineering Company family fortune, donated a significant sum to develop a 
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computer center, one of his new interests. He also co-sponsored drives to raise money for 
a cardiovascular center and secured donations from Birmingham’s two largest employers 
in the early 1960s, U.S. Steel and Hayes Aircraft.
98
 Realtor William P. Engel, formerly a 
president of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, donated almost half of the local 
matching funds to establish a federally supported Psychiatric Day Care Center in 1967.
99
 
By the early 1970s, private donations from individuals and corporations nearly matched 
state-appropriations for UAB’s total operating funds, with 15 percent from private 
sources and 20 percent from the state of Alabama.
100
 
 This infusion of local wealth stemmed from a long tradition of white philanthropy 
to support social welfare initiatives in Birmingham.
101
 The Spain family, for example, 
was driven by spiritual and communal values. A son of a Methodist preacher, Frank, as 
his daughter described him, believed he “didn’t own his money but was a steward of 
it.”
102
 In 1952, he served as the president of Rotary International, a service organization 
for business leaders who believed in giving back to their home communities. Spain lived 
by the organization’s twin mottos, “service above self” and “one profits most who serves 
best.” He defined the Rotarians as “a fellowship of noblemen….measured by its 
obligations, not its rights or privileges.” During the Jim Crow era, Spain believed his 
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interest in community welfare was “controversial” because philanthropic endeavors 
sought to change established policies and behaviors in Birmingham.
103
 In 1959, he 
organized the Greater Birmingham Foundation to shape local welfare services such as 
healthcare and education.  
Wealthy white families of Birmingham, however, partnered with UAB for more 
than philanthropic reasons. Although inspired by ideas of Christian charity and service, 
the Spains did not welcome other foundations, agencies, or non-profit services that 
challenged what they believed. In 1971 Peggy Spain McDonald, Frank’s daughter and 
president of the Greater Birmingham Foundation, asked Volker to help quash the local 
Community Service Council’s recent effort to organize a statewide public health planning 
agency. The Office of Economic Opportunity funded the council. McDonald disliked its 
“liberal thought” that would transform “the volunteer sector…from service oriented 
agencies to…social action planning groups.”
104
 Frank agreed with his daughter. He 
suggested that the Community Chest, a charitable organization that pooled private 
wealth, withdraw funds from the Community Service Council because it “has 
demonstrated its ability to obtain all the funding it needs and more from the federal 
government.”
105
 Such logic did not apply to UAB. Spain also complained to Volker about 
the actions of faculty and students he disagreed with such as civil rights activism and 
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consumer advocacy.
106
 Although generous, the Spains’ philanthropy to UAB also bought 
the family influence over its total development. 
Besides his personal commitment to UAB, Frank Spain helped to strengthen the 
university’s ties to Birmingham’s business community, especially with Liberty National 
Life Insurance Company, the largest such company in Alabama. Spain was its general 
counselor and sat on its Board of Trustees. Two of Liberty National’s executive vice-
presidents played crucial roles in the development of UAB. Ehney A. Camp joined the 
University of Alabama (UA) Board of Trustees in 1959, and Jack McSpadden oversaw a 
citizens committee appointed by Mayor Albert B. Boutwell that approved UAB’s urban 
renewal campaign in 1965. Liberty National stood to capitalize on UAB’s expanding 
employment base and healthcare services because it offered life and health insurance. 
Engineering executive George Rust recalled with humor a story about the financial 
connection between the university and the company. At a fundraising dinner for the new 
cardiac care center attended by Birmingham’s business elite, Rust related, John Kirklin 
commented on UAB’s relationship with Liberty National: “‘Every year this hospital 
keeps me in it, that insurance company makes’” money. McSpadden “whoop[ed]” with 
laughter.
107
  
 Through his role in the urban renewal campaign, McSpadden embodied the link 
between the private and public interests that built UAB. As a suburban citizen and 
businessman, McSpadden became intimately involved in the urban renewal acquisition 
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for the public university. He volunteered countless hours over eight years in discussions 
with officials from UAB, HABD, and City Hall. UAB renewed his civic pride in 
Birmingham. He saw the university as an answer to so many urban problems. “Not only 
does it carry with it a high economic value,” he explained to a colleague, “but in addition 
it carries with it promise for better education…[and] better health for our community.”
108
 
McSpadden ensured that his company did not experience any hardships from the 
university’s growth. UAB’s snaggletooth border on Fifth Avenue South excluded lots 
owned by Liberty National.
109
     
 Private interest in Southside grew tremendously after the 1965 announcement of 
the urban renewal project. Volker and McSpadden lobbied various municipal agencies to 
cease rezoning or property improvement hearings around the project site. Interest from 
commercial enterprises and private practice clinics drove up the value of land UAB 
wanted to buy.
110
 The Birmingham City Council acquiesced to UAB’s request in late 
1966, but Volker met fierce resistance from the Birmingham Planning Commission. 
William H. Grimmer, chair of the commission, “went into a tirade about the Medical 
Center constantly requesting property for future development,” “disrupting free 
enterprise,” and “hindering progress.”
111
 According to McSpadden, UAB wanted the 
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entire forty-five block area “not necessarily because [it] planned to use all of the property 
but because [the university] wanted to use it or control the use of the property.”
112
 Rather 
than blocking private enterprise, Volker wanted private businesses, such as Liberty 
National, a drive-thru bank, or parking decks, near specific parts of the campus to 
complement an expanded UAB. 
 Liberty National executives worked tirelessly on behalf of UAB, and Camp, one 
of its executive vice-presidents and UA trustee, expected his company to profit from its 
relationship with the university. He was irate when Liberty National was excluded from 
bidding on an insurance package designed to placate Kirklin. “You fellows,” he wrote to 
Brann and Volker, “have a much greater obligation to conduct yourselves in such a way 
as to build loyalty and devotion on the part of those interested citizens who have shown 
an interest in your work and who have demonstrated a desire to be of help.”
113
 Camp also 
had close relationships with and served on the boards of some of Alabama’s premier 
banks. After local and state banks loaned money for Medical Center construction, Camp 
confided to one of its chairmen, “I hope in the years ahead we will be able to find some 
substantial position in the overall financial program of the University. As one of the 
leading five banks, I think we should participate on both sides of the ledger––deposit-
wise and loan-wise.”
114
   
UAB’s position as the anchor of Birmingham’s professional service economy 
affected the development of support industries. One early forecast predicting the future 
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needs of UAB called for companies that provided disposable medical supplies, laboratory 
animal farming, and textbook warehousing as well as printing plants in the Birmingham 
area.115 UAB’s impact on Birmingham’s biggest banks loosened the grip that 
industrialists previously had on them. From 1973 to 1976, university-related deposits 
expanded the credit base of local banks to $187 billion (See Appendix, Table 9).116 Other 
big professional service industries such as architecture, engineering, and retail also 
benefited from UAB’s growth. University-related business activity contributed over $220 
million to local business volume in 1974 and over $306 million three years later. 
Between 1974 and 1977, the number of construction jobs directly attributable to UAB 
rose 74.4 percent; this number did not include new homes, suburban malls, and office 
buildings that popped up around the Medical Center and metropolitan area to serve new 
residents. University students and employees influenced the development of the local 
service industry, generating demand for new businesses ranging from bookstores to bars 
with good beer (See Appendix, Table 10).117 By the end of the 1970s, Southside’s 
commercial district, Five Points South, experienced a revitalization driven by university 
activity. 
 Private citizens like Camp, McSpadden, and Spain as well as Liberty National and 
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other companies ensured Birmingham’s transition from an industrial to a service 
economy by wholeheartedly supporting the development of UAB. Banking, insurance, 
construction, architecture, and other professional service companies expanded the market 
shares for their services and capitalized on the billions of dollars generated by UAB. So, 
too, did their shareholders. Camp, McSpadden, and Spain enjoyed the ear of Volker and 
other top administrators in trying to shape university policy to suit their politics and 
corporate needs. In 1985, Peggy Spain McDonald reflected on her family’s role in 
developing “our excellent medical facilities”: “We have…benefited from our work with 
UAB….This whole city has changed.”
118
 Far from being memorialized through new 
buildings, white elites enjoyed immense returns on their investments in developing UAB 
and tying it to their corporate and civic interests in the professional service economy.  
 
The Spatial Implications of UAB on the Birmingham Metropolitan Area 
 
 Metropolitan development in the 1970s and beyond reflected the growth of the 
professional service economy in Birmingham. In that decade, professional and related 
services, which included healthcare and education, grew by nearly 60 percent, and the 
finance, insurance, and real estate industries experienced a similar increase. In contrast, 
manufacturing jobs in the metropolitan area grew by only 2 percent (See Appendix 
Tables 5 and 6). White working-class neighborhoods to the immediate north and west of 
downtown experienced a correlated population decline or stagnation (See Appendix, 
Tables 3 and 4).
119
 They also underwent stark racial transitioning as African Americans, 
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driven out of their homes by the late 1960s urban renewal campaigns, sought new places 
to live. Private housing developers bypassed the city and drove market demand for 
middle-class suburban housing to the east and south of Birmingham. Whites 
overwhelmingly flocked to these areas. Because of the failure of metropolitan 
consolidation in 1970, a campaign known as “One Great City,” racial and class divisions 
further marked the city and its independent suburbs.  
As Birmingham’s economic anchor, UAB’s growth largely contributed to the 
clustering of white middle-class suburbs south of Red Mountain that sustained racial and 
class privilege in metropolitan Birmingham. In 1974, a small survey of top faculty and 
administrators revealed that 47 percent lived in Jefferson County suburbs surrounding 
Birmingham; within ten years, nearly 60 percent did.120 The affluent Over-the-Mountain 
suburbs of Homewood and Mountain Brook reached a population capacity of around 
20,000 in 1970, but the population of the two adjoining suburbs, Hoover and Vestavia 
Hills, swelled throughout the decade.121 In 1980, residents in these overwhelmingly white 
suburbs enjoyed a median family income ranging from $22,455 to $42,389, whereas 
those in the working-class suburb of Fairfield earned $17,376. The median family income 
of the city of Birmingham was even less, coming in at $15,210; more than 50 percent of 
its residents were African American by 1980 (See Appendix, Tables 3 and 4).122 Most 
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new residents who lived in the upper- and middle-class Over-the-Mountain suburbs saw 
Birmingham as a place to work rather than as a place to live. 
 Black and white urban residents experienced the consequences of UAB’s growth. 
Over 11,000 African Americans pushed out of Southside and other neighborhoods by 
urban renewal projects had to move somewhere they could afford. Due to changes in 
federal public housing programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the city of 
Birmingham added no more units. It shelved plans for Park West, a middle-class public 
housing project near the black business district that was one of the twelve steps in ONB’s 
“Design for Progress.” Over one-third of the city’s entire housing stock was unsound, but 
white flight opened up neighborhoods long off limits to African Americans.123 One of 
those neighborhoods was Woodlawn, the former political stronghold of T. Eugene “Bull” 
Connor and the white working class.124 Woodlawn served as a buffer between land zoned 
for heavy industry and the politically independent Over-the-Mountain suburb of 
Mountain Brook. In the mid-1970s, the city used federal funds to upgrade Woodlawn’s 
main street and rehabilitate housing as ways to keep local commerce and white residents 
in the neighborhood. Whites, nevertheless, continued to flee to the suburbs, leaving their 
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old homes to African Americans. By 1980, 40.2 percent of Woodlawn residents were 
black.
125
 
 The transformation of the Southside community was yet another erasure of 
African American presence in and around UAB as it became a world-renowned medical 
center and Birmingham’s economic engine. Organized into three separate neighborhoods, 
the community experienced a complete overhaul. UAB’s 1969 expansion wiped out the 
black Southside neighborhood, displacing over 5,000 African Americans residents and 
setting in motion a decline in the total African American population in the larger 
community from 40 to 20 percent by 1972.
126
 The Five Points South neighborhood was 
once a thriving, upscale business district that now catered to employees and students. 
Prominent first families of Birmingham built stately mansions in Glen Iris, which also 
had more moderately sized, middle-class homes.  
 The demand for student and faculty housing caused by UAB’s expansion directly 
affected the character of the larger Southside community. Volker saw Southside as 
“potentially a site where many of our faculty, students, and staff would live provided 
their particular residential needs be met.”
127
 Campus plans did not include dormitories, a 
promise Volker made to the UA Board of Trustees and alumni to distinguish his 
university from the one in Tuscaloosa. Traditional college students caused a severe 
housing crunch in Southside. An informal University College survey in 1970 revealed 
that 86 percent of current students expressed an interest in renting a home or apartment in 
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Southside.
128
 One of Volker’s protégés was particularly interested in transforming Glen 
Iris into a “university type neighborhood” for faculty.
129
 Because of the demands for 
housing and university activity, the Birmingham Planning Commission adopted a new 
land use plan that rezoned large portions of the Southside community for commercial 
businesses, multi-family homes, and apartments.
130
 A Texan real estate developer began 
the process of constructing huge apartment complexes in Glen Iris, destroying the 
neighborhood’s integrity, historical character, and stately views of downtown 
Birmingham.
131
   
 Southside residents pushed back against the encroaching development of 
apartment complexes, multi-family homes, and commercial areas brought about by 
UAB’s growth. In addition, most whites and white-ethnics in the community believed 
that “the black, the hippie, and the student have placed a certain stigma on Southside 
living.”
132
 In November 1971, a group of residents, business owners, and community 
agency representatives formed the Southside Action Committee (SAC). The new group 
offered “a forum for all individuals who live in or are part of the Southside community, 
to identify the needs of the Southside community and to attempt to mobilize and 
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coordinate resources to meet needs.”
133
 Joe Walker, one of LaMonte’s assistants, was the 
initial convener of SAC; eight more people affiliated with UAB joined the group.
134
 In 
all, UAB-affiliated members constituted nearly a tenth of the attendees at SAC meetings 
in 1972. LaMonte notified Volker about the group and justified his involvement as a way 
to “bring up some questions concerning the relationship of the University to the 
community around us.”
135
 Walker stated SAC was not intent on “stopping change but 
committed to making change more humane.”
136
 Betty Bock, SAC member and future 
Center for Urban Affairs staff member, promoted citizen participation in making these 
changes: “It is more a question whether it will be apartments and businesses only or a 
community with houses, apartments, business, and green space.”
137
  
Bock, Walker, and other SAC members were among many people in Birmingham 
who demanded control of their neighborhoods at a time of headlong change, yet they did 
not criticize their expanding neighbor. UAB most likely escaped such criticism because 
of the university’s range of social services that it offered to neighborhood residents, 
including early childhood development and medical clinics. Center staff also 
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personalized the institution in their interactions with SAC members and Southside 
residents. The target of SAC’s criticism, as well as that of other neighborhoods, was 
Operation New Birmingham (ONB), the public-private redevelopment agency led by 
white Over-the-Mountain suburbanites. Its pro-growth vision and emphasis on downtown 
and commercial development alienated urban residents reeling from economic change 
and neighborhood disruption. The transition residents felt and the growth ONB promoted, 
however, centered on UAB. The university emerged unscathed from the debates between 
residents and ONB over the direction of urban Birmingham. This lack of community 
criticism reflected Volker’s successful marketing of UAB as an urban university and 
agent of social change.  
 
Conclusion  
At a time when white flight, deindustrialization, soaring crime rates, and the rise 
of black political power wrought welcome and unwelcome changes to Birmingham, 
UAB’s growth as an employer and provider of education brought all races and stability to 
downtown throughout the 1970s. By cultivating an image of UAB as a responsive public 
institution, Volker’s “Birmingham community” was an inclusive one in which members 
had a personal connection to specific people, features, and services within the urban 
campus. According to Gloria Goldstein, Volker strove to create “a feeling of family” he 
believed was essential to a university community. “We did try and make everybody feel 
that they were part of this university,” she noted.
138
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UAB’s image as a welcoming institution and the foundation of the city’s progress 
was reinforced by its 1978 conference “Birmingham 1963-1978: Civil Rights and Social 
Change.” The conference marked the fifteenth anniversary of Birmingham’s civil rights 
demonstrations and brought together key black and white participants. Since 1963, most 
of these men had forged a biracial political coalition that addressed the city’s continuing 
racial strife and urban decline. The development UAB and the professional service 
economy were part of their answers. The conference offered Birmingham’s biracial civic 
elites an opportunity to tell their corresponding yet conflicting stories of the long summer 
of 1963 as well as their opinions of the progress made since then.
139
 Rev. Fred L. 
Shuttlesworth, the militant leader of the local civil rights movement who fought against 
an industrial Jim Crow order in the early 1960s, noted, “This [conference] is the first time 
that a largely white institution has invited me back” to Birmingham.
140
 His participation 
publically signaled how Volker’s UAB successfully combined economic growth and 
racial inclusion as the twin pillars of a new Birmingham.  
Although Goldstein and others believed that UAB “saved Birmingham,” the 
university transformed the metropolitan area in unequal ways.
141
 Hierarchies based on 
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class, sex, and race remained embedded in the university’s workforce. UAB’s economic 
power rested on its ability to educate and train students in new employment fields, 
especially the health sciences. In 1972, Volker explained to a friend, “A manpower pool 
of educated people is an assurance of economic growth.”
142
 Education and ability rather 
than race or sex became the keys to accessing the new political economy. UAB’s mission 
as an educational institution advanced notions of a meritocracy, but one’s level of 
education, often dictated by race and sex, determined how they financially benefitted 
from the healthcare economy. While women and African Americans gained a foothold in 
the health sciences, they largely labored under white men who dominated the high-paying 
administrative, clinical, and research positions.  
UAB’s open access policy and image of diversity concealed the segregation of 
education, employment, and resources that was visibly evident in the total campus. 
Alfred Moffett’s original campus plan called for the physical integration of the Medical 
Center and University College by constructing plazas and promenades on top of buildings 
connected by skywalks.
143
 These above-ground green spaces would offer views of 
downtown and Red Mountain and would serve as community gathering spots for faculty 
and students from both sides of the campus. These designs never materialized. The 
Medical Center and University College remained separated, in funding, stature, and 
aesthetics. The UAB campus, in its actual design and the people who remain ordered by 
it, recreated the spatial divisions of metropolitan Birmingham by race and class that 
continued to harden throughout the 1970s and beyond. The affluent, overwhelmingly 
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white Over-the-Mountain suburbs, home to UAB’s top professional class, faced off with 
the increasingly poor, black city of Birmingham, home to UAB’s low-wage service 
workers. The UAB campus stood in the middle, on the south side of downtown 
Birmingham representing a compromised vision of “One Great City.” 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
“ALL-AMERICA CITY”: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, PUBLIC 
IMPROVEMENTS, AND BIRACIAL COMMUNICATION, 1969-1979 
 
 In the summer of 1969, sixty-four-year-old Lula Menefee led a group of forty 
African American women to City Hall in downtown Birmingham. As president of the 
Collegeville Coordinating Council, Menefee demanded police attention and protection of 
her neighborhood, which was wracked by murder, prostitution, gambling, and the drug 
trade. Located less than three miles from downtown yet isolated by rail lines and 
industrial plants, Collegeville was a structurally deteriorating neighborhood with shack 
housing, unpaved streets, open ditches, poor utility service, and heavy pollution. It was 
home to almost 7,000 African Americans, the majority of whom lived below the poverty 
line.
1
 Although civic leaders historically neglected the neighborhood––or “rejected” it as 
one resident remembered––Mayor George S. Seibels warmly greeted Menefee and her 
group.
2
 Seibels promised Menefee that his administration would address Collegeville’s 
problems, including police-community relations. With his usual candor, Seibels confided 
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to a colleague that Menefee’s concerns “w[ere] nothing new to me….The only thing new 
about it was the fact that [she] had gotten up the nerve to come in.”
3
   
 By going directly to City Hall, Menefee forced Seibels to rethink how his 
administration interpreted who “citizens” of Birmingham were and where they lived. In 
1970 over 125,000 African Americans lived in neighborhoods spread across the city. 
Some encircled the downtown area, but more still were scattered across the west and 
north. Former civic leaders had limited where African Americans could live in the city 
through zoning laws that boxed black neighborhoods into areas zoned for heavy industry. 
Devastating urban renewal programs also destroyed black neighborhoods. Birmingham’s 
interstate-highway system ran through hard-won middle-class neighborhoods, while the 
Civic Center and the University of Alabama at Birmingham replaced some of the poorest 
ones.
4
 Over 10,000 blacks left the city of Birmingham entirely in the 1960s, but the 10 
neighborhoods most affected by urban renewal lost 24,000 residents.
5
 The evolution of 
the industrial and thus far the post-industrial economy eviscerated black neighborhoods 
(See Appendix, Tables 11 and 12).  
Beginning in 1969, black neighborhood advocates and civic leaders strove to 
improve the material and political conditions for African Americans living in 
Birmingham. Seibels turned the task over to Operation New Birmingham (ONB), the 
city’s public-private redevelopment agency run by suburban whites with the aid of black 
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civic elites.
6
 ONB established the Community Affairs Committee (CAC) in the spring of 
1969 as a response to black elite demands to broaden minority representation in 
Birmingham’s public life. Menefee, however, brought elite attention to neighborhood 
conditions, which too often lacked basic public services such as an adequate water 
supply. Her actions prompted Vincent S. Townsend, ONB’s permanent chairman of the 
board and editor of the Birmingham News, to change the image and scope of the 
organization from a downtown redevelopment agency to one working in the 
neighborhoods. In an essay published in Ebony magazine in its August 1971 special issue 
“The South Today,” Townsend described ONB as a “community action agency.” Black 
and white members used civility rather than extremism to influence the direction of 
Birmingham. ONB, Townsend claimed, created new spaces of interaction where blacks 
and whites “can meet face to face and thrash out the problems of” Birmingham “in the 
conference room and not in the streets.”
7
 By including Menefee in those discussions, 
black and white elites in ONB launched wide-ranging programs to combat poverty, 
upgrade structural conditions of neighborhoods, and improve overall black-white 
relations in the city. 
As new power players in the biracial metropolitan coalition, Menefee and other 
black neighborhood advocates worked through ONB to redraw the boundaries of 
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citizenship in Birmingham. In Monday morning CAC meetings in downtown and field 
trips to neighborhoods, blacks and whites exhibited an understanding that their culturally 
constructed differences such as race and class shaped their perceptions of Birmingham. 
At the center of their discussion was how to renew urban space. Their answers included 
citizen participation, public improvements, and representation within municipal 
government. The policy legacies of Great Society programs, including “maximum 
feasible participation” and non-discrimination requirements, continued to influence 
federal urban policies in the 1970s. Civic elites and municipal officials depended on 
federal funds as an alternative to raising taxes. They broadly interpreted federal mandates 
rather than implementing the bare minimum that further pushed the city toward 
democratic governance. Birmingham’s new image as an “All-America City” for its racial 
progress also motivated municipal officials and white civic elites to look beyond the 
needs of Over-the-Mountain white suburbanites. Birmingham’s citizen participation 
program based on neighborhoods did just that.    
The recognition of neighborhoods had a profound impact on municipal politics in 
the 1970s as larger economic and spatial changes occurred in metropolitan Birmingham. 
In 1971, industrial plants began to close, including one of the first in Birmingham, Sloss 
Furnaces. Long denied entrance to many labor unions and limited in industrial 
employment, some African Americans increasingly turned to higher education and the 
healthcare field at the rapidly growing University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) as 
alternative avenues of economic power after 1964. Although class differences had created 
deep divides among African Americans, they mattered little in determining where blacks 
could live in metropolitan Birmingham. Dr. Richard Arrington Jr. told a journalist from 
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TIME magazine in 1976 that blacks had “difficulty” in “cracking the suburbs,” which 
revealed the limits of moderate biracial politics and federal policy in changing the 
location of black living spaces.
8
 As the decade came to a close, African Americans were 
55.6 percent of urban residents, virtually switching places with whites who were 57.8 
percent of the 1970 population (See Appendix, Table 2).
9
 Blacks also represented 44.5 
percent of the total urban electorate by 1979. Deindustrialization, urban renewal 
programs, white flight, and the failure of metropolitan consolidation had created the 
conditions for African Americans to use their neighborhoods, and eventually the city 
itself, as sites of political power.  
The composition of the biracial metropolitan coalition also shifted in response to 
the concentration of black voters in the city. The at-large composition of the city council 
continued to yield black and white municipal officials. In 1971 Birmingham’s perpetual 
reformer David J. Vann and political newcomer Dr. Richard Arrington Jr. won council 
seats. Both enjoyed black and white support. Four years later, Vann became mayor after 
Seibels adopted a race-baiting campaign. Whites had grown fearful of black political 
power, while blacks resented white control of Birmingham. Yet, the sweeping changes 
citizen participation and neighborhood representation wrought pushed Vann and his black 
allies to govern Birmingham on behalf of its urban rather than suburban citizens. “We 
don’t make any claim that we’ve licked racism,” Mayor Vann confessed in 1976, but 
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black and white elites have “learned to face the problem candidly.”
10
 White liberals and 
black elites still believed biracial communication was the most important governing 
strategy as Birmingham shifted from a majority white to a majority black city.  
  
Redefining Progress: Lula Menefee, Black Women’s Activism, and Collegeville 
 In 1971, Lula Menefee declared that progress in Collegeville could not be 
measured by other “sections of our city and surrounding suburbs” that were affluent or 
stable “but in comparison to Collegeville itself.”
11
 The neighborhood originally 
developed at the turn of the century as company housing for an upwardly mobile and 
industrial black working class. A small elementary school, Lauderdale College, gave the 
neighborhood its name; a tiny commercial district provided residents with services and 
goods. Rev. Milton Sears, pastor of Bethel Baptist Church from 1916 to 1938 and father 
of future City Councilor Bessie Estell, was one of the neighborhood’s formative leaders.  
Sears promoted ideas of race pride, uplift, and community similar to Booker T. 
Washington, and he was practical in his navigation of Jim Crow in Birmingham. He did 
not raise questions about “separate-but-equal.” In his fight to allow the National Baptist 
Convention, an all-black organization, to hold its annual meeting in the municipal 
auditorium in 1924, Sears gained local fame for challenging civic officials to allow 
blacks use of public facilities.
12
 He also became an informant for the Birmingham Police 
Department as a way to win favor and protection among municipal officials. When 
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communists entered his church on a Sunday morning in 1934 after learning Sears turned 
in one of their organizers, the pastor wielded a shotgun in front of thousands of 
worshipers to ward off the intruders. Attendance at Bethel dropped from 2,000 to 200 
after the incident. Because Sears had lost his influence among black Birminghamians, 
Collegeville also fell from its position as a favored black neighborhood among white 
officials.
13
  
As a lifelong resident of Collegeville born in 1905, Menefee grew up under the 
influence of Sears and others who worked toward uplifting the all-black industrial 
neighborhood. “Doctors and lawyers and everything came out of Collegeville,” recalled 
LaVerne Revis Martin, a youth civil rights activist and one of Menefee’s neighbors.
14
  
Although employment options for black women remained largely limited to the home and 
school, Menefee became an agent for the Durham-based North Carolina Mutual 
Insurance Company in the early 1940s. Her job gave her the mobility to move throughout 
black Birmingham, collecting premiums around industrial plants on payday and visiting 
clients in their homes. She enjoyed a reputation as an agent who cared about her clients.
15
 
She also was a married mother of two daughters. Martin remembered Collegeville as a 
“very quiet” and safe neighborhood for youth in the 1940s.
16
 Tragedy struck, however, in 
1949 when Menefee’s husband Clifford passed away. By 1957 Menefee had moved from 
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the northeastern part of the neighborhood to Twenty-Eighth Avenue North in a home one 
block south of Bethel Baptist Church.
17
 
The environmental conditions that made the neighborhood––industrialization and 
Jim Crow––unmade the neighborhood by the late 1950s. Boxed in by an industrial 
landscape, Collegeville was completely separated from the rest of Birmingham. Coke and 
metals plants bordered the neighborhood to the north, while the Southern and L&N 
Railroad Companies and US Highway 79 encircled the neighborhood to connect the 
plants to the mines of northeastern Alabama. Huntsville Road, which diagonally split the 
neighborhood into two halves, was the only street that led residents out of Collegeville. 
Life in Collegeville was “trucked in, trained in, smoked in,” as one present-day resident 
described it.
18
 Air pollution cast the neighborhood in shadows and induced poor health 
among its residents. Soil used for backyard gardens became highly toxic with arsenic and 
other cancer-causing agents due to nearly seventy years of coke production by U.S. Pipe 
and Foundry, formerly Sloss Industries.
19
 Some residents did not have sewer, water, or 
electricity service. Black men employed in the industrial economy steadily began losing 
their jobs from 1950 onward, forcing hundreds of families into poverty.
20
 Crime was on 
the rise along the neighborhood’s dead end streets. 
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Figure 6.1 Children at play in an unidentified Birmingham neighborhood near a U.S. Steel Plant, 1972. 
(Courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration Digital Collection.) 
No African American living within the borders of Collegeville escaped the 
material inequalities of Birmingham’s Jim Crow industrial order, yet the neighborhood 
had a long history of racial uplift. One way residents combated the effects of segregation 
and structural racism was through the Collegeville-Harriman Park Civic League. Since 
the 1920s, black Birminghamians had used civic leagues to order, improve, and govern 
their living spaces. Unlike civil rights organizations or labor unions that pulled support 
for their efforts from all over Birmingham, civic leagues were neighborhood-specific. 
They sought to combat environmental racism and the maldistribution of municipal 
resources at the micro-level. Beautification campaigns, neighborhood watches, and social 
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gatherings were all ways the leagues kept neighborhoods together in the face of chronic 
problems.
21
  
African American responses to life in Collegeville produced a variety of 
“crabgrass-roots” civil rights activism, vaulting the neighborhood to one of the most 
active centers of the local movement in the late 1950s.
22
 From 1953 to 1961, the Rev. 
Fred L. Shuttlesworth occupied the pulpit at Bethel Baptist Church. As Shuttlesworth’s 
biographer Andrew Manis observed, Sears’ formative influence on Bethel made it “an 
unlikely congregation for a pastor that would eventually challenge the racial status quo” 
in Birmingham and the nation.
23
 Shuttlesworth’s initial contributions to Bethel included 
attracting younger parishioners, launching voter drives with other black churches and 
organizations, and cleaning up the neighborhood. His civic activities in Collegeville shed 
light on the ways he could “destroy segregation…embarrass the system, and challenge 
the system from within.”
24
 In the summer of 1955, he convinced black ministers to 
support his petition to the Birmingham City Commission requesting black policemen. 
Shuttlesworth wanted these new officers to patrol areas of high crime in black 
neighborhoods such as Collegeville. Citing the need for law and order but also 
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questioning the existence of an all-white force, Shuttlesworth’s subversive attack on Jim 
Crow and the Birmingham Police Department catapulted him into a leadership position 
for blacks across the city. In 1956, he organized the Alabama Christian Movement for 
Human Rights (ACMHR) after a state court injunction banned the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other civil rights organizations. 
As Shuttlesworth became one of Alabama’s most militant civil rights activists, he 
and Collegeville residents experienced the extreme measures some whites undertook to 
maintain segregation and white supremacy. Acting without fear of reprisal from the 
Birmingham Police Department, Ku Klux Klan members bombed Bethel Baptist Church 
and its parsonage twice. One youth who lived nearby described the impact of the 
December 1956 bombing “as if the earth had just erupted. You could feel the thrust of it 
and the smell of it.”
25
 LaVerne Revis Martin, who lived near the parsonage, recalled that 
the force of the 1958 explosion shattered her home’s windows; flying shards of glass 
injured her infant daughter asleep in her crib.
26
 Menefee most likely experienced the 
effects of the 1958 bombing given the proximity of her home to the church. These 
bombings also shook the faith of some Bethel worshipers. By the early 1960s, criticism 
of Shuttlesworth’s pastoral duties as well as worries over further destruction to Bethel 
emerged as topics of conversation among members. As Martin, who attended Bethel 
every Sunday and marched with Shuttlesworth, explained, “The church and the 
movement is separate.”
27
 For these and other personal reasons, Shuttlesworth left Bethel 
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and Birmingham in the summer of 1961, pushing Collegeville out of the public spotlight 
as a center of civil rights activism.
28
  
Although Shuttlesworth’s activities rightly have been hailed as heroic and 
successful, life for residents in Collegeville continued to deteriorate into the 1960s due to 
municipal policies and chronic environmental, economic, and social problems. One 
anonymous public official sympathetically noted that most residents were “beating their 
heads against a brick economic wall,” a situation made worse by the continuing rate of 
industrial disinvestment.
29
 A public housing project, completed in 1964, wiped out an 
entire section of western Collegeville. Not all of the displaced residents found new homes 
there. Carver High School, established in 1956, lost teachers and students as part of the 
city’s school desegregation plan. Scores of black men largely disappeared from the 
neighborhood through abandonment, unemployment, disability, death, or imprisonment. 
Lynburg Sanders, a probation officer assigned to parolees living in Collegeville, 
remarked, “In most families, there are no fathers and the youths look to any adult male 
for direction. When they can’t find it, they flounder and get into trouble.”
30
 Collegeville 
was experiencing a drain of traditional leadership roles and loss of community members. 
By the end of the 1960s, Collegeville was a “ghetto-poverty track” with a high 
unemployment rate and an increasing number of households led by single women.
31
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A complicated underworld of crime involving African Americans and white 
police officers threatened to take over the neighborhood.
32
 Violence committed by youth 
gangs became more prevalent in the neighborhood’s main streets and schools. Menefee 
and others feared young women and children risked personal assault or falling victim to 
prostitution.
33
 Residents identified apartment buildings and other multi-family housing 
units as the breeding places for crime, but the Birmingham Police Department did 
nothing to address their concerns.
34
 White police officers sanctioned criminal activity. 
Menefee described one who went door-to-door collecting his fees “like an insurance 
agent.”
35
 Officers violently extracted kickbacks from owners and patrons of houses of 
prostitution and gambling and underground whiskey joints in black neighborhoods. 
Whether it was money, booze, or sex, these perks of brute white power were 
“institutionalized” behavior at the Birmingham Police Department.
36
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 “Tired of the crime, violence, and filth,” Menefee organized her neighbors into 
the Collegeville Coordinating Council and surveyed residents on how they wanted to 
improve the neighborhood. Menefee drew from her experience with the North 
Birmingham Federation of Women, a voting rights group, to identify and organize voters 
block-by-block. In the summer of 1969 Menefee and her group of women “went down to 
the city fathers and asked for help.”
37
 They demanded that the city increase police 
enforcement to combat gangs and crime, fine landlords who refused to refurbish 
substandard housing up to municipal code, and extend basic utilities to residents without 
them.
38
 Menefee’s demands, which became known as the “Collegeville Fourteen Points,” 
concretely focused on African American living conditions. They sharply contrasted with 
the black elite’s “Fourteen Points” issued a few months before that emphasized black 
representation in the legal functions of local government. The conditions of the 
neighborhood had made life unbearable for Menefee and other respectable black citizens, 
especially women, who chose to live in Collegeville for familial and community ties or 
who slowly found themselves economically boxed into the neighborhood.  
The “Collegeville Fourteen Points” recognized the central contributions of 
women in everyday life. Black women’s activism deeply reflected neighborhood 
conditions and the legacies of racial uplift. Some of their demands previously had been 
advocated by Collegeville’s male civic leaders, including Shuttlesworth, but Menefee and 
other women pushed for programs to address problems specific to their roles as 
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community matriarchs, mothers, wives, and sisters. Indeed, her group was an alternative 
to the older Collegeville-Harriman Park Civic League run by Benjamin Greene.
39
 For 
decades, black women like Menefee had struggled to hold their families together and 
survive in a neighborhood they no longer recognized. The neighborhood’s “Fourteen 
Points” called for daycare centers for “working mothers,” juvenile delinquency 
prevention programs, and rehabilitation centers for parolees. These programs would 
relieve women from the total burden of providing support for youth and adult men. 
Menefee wanted residents to “take greater responsibility and pride in their children and 
consequently their neighborhood.”
40
  
Menefee’s promotion of citizen participation based on moral values, self-help, 
and community identity aligned with the goals of civic elites in building a “new” 
Birmingham. Although she came from the same neighborhood and tradition of activism 
as Shuttlesworth, who civic elites disdained, Menefee’s personality and methods 
appealed to Mayor Seibels and civic elites in Operation New Birmingham (ONB). As an 
elderly black woman, Menefee had an unquestionable moral authority over issues that 
appeared to be domestic and material but were also deeply and deceptively political. She 
achieved measures of first-class citizenship as a black woman despite the odds against 
her; she was a respectable member of society, meeting standards for both Collegeville 
and downtown. She worked in the professional services, witnesssing the boom of 
southern black middle class expansion, and also experienced the effects of 
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deindustrialization. Menefee, not black men or black civic elites, gave voice to her 
neighborhood. ONB and Seibels needed Menefee to convey an image of open, responsive 
governance to black Birminghamians as much as she needed them to improve 
Collegeville. 
 
Into the Neighborhoods: The Community Affairs Committee and the Neighborhood 
Planning Program 
 
Civic leaders’ strategic embrace of Lula Menefee shifted the focus of Operation 
New Birmingham (ONB) from downtown to the neighborhoods. ONB replaced its 
Downtown Development Committee with a Community Development Department led by 
former New Dealer Thad Holt.
41
 Holt matched multiple federal programs with goals 
outlined by the Community Affairs Committee (CAC), an elite biracial citizens group 
established in the spring of 1969. CAC subcommittees, each co-led by a black and white 
member, studied urban problems and suggested policy recommendations to public 
officials. Black and white civic elites’ exposure to Lula Menefee grounded their 
discussions of poverty, health, and housing and challenged their privileged perspectives. 
On field trips to areas “tucked away out of the sight and minds of most of Birmingham,” 
civic leaders witnessed conditions far from the comforts they enjoyed in their suburban 
neighborhoods.
42
 As Holt explained, “The more on-site inspections we have by members 
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of the Community Affairs Committee, the more understanding and feeling of confidence 
will be developed.”
43
 By purposefully recognizing class, racial, and spatial barriers to 
citizen participation and representation in Birmingham, CAC and Holt’s department 
transformed ONB into the community action agency Vincent Townsend claimed it was.  
Between 1969 and 1974, ONB and its various programs created new spaces of 
political and interpersonal interaction between urban blacks and suburban whites. 
Influenced by federal programs, motivated by political necessity, and anchored in shared 
values of self-help, these networks of cross-class biracial communication in metropolitan 
Birmingham were unprecedented. Most whites never had dared to enter all-black 
neighborhoods like Collegeville, yet most white elites required black presence in their 
neighborhoods and work spaces. By confining blacks to service roles at home and work, 
whites personally interacted with blacks in ways acceptable to them. Menefee’s middle-
class respectability and self-help philosophy made it easier for white civic elites to 
understand her. Visiting Collegeville, however, challenged their perceptions of what life 
was like in Birmingham. For urban blacks like Menefee, they became a recognized part 
of Birmingham’s shifting power structure. The police department, utility companies, and 
the media listened to them, if not always satisfactorily. Although limited to advisory and 
beneficiary roles, African Americans who used ONB resources gained what were for 
them new public services and access to power.  
With vast experience in distributing federal funds, Holt was an ideal choice to 
lead ONB into Birmingham’s neighborhoods. A retired broadcasting executive, Holt’s 
greatest achievement was establishing the publicly funded Alabama Educational 
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Television network. He went back to work for ONB on a volunteer basis at the request of 
Townsend, a longtime colleague. In the 1930s, Holt oversaw the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration, Works Progress Administration, and National Youth 
Administration for the state of Alabama. Keeping with the racial politics of the era, he 
maintained an unequal distribution of federal aid among whites and blacks. Yet, these 
New Deal agencies were similar to the programs he launched to address the needs of 
Birmingham citizens like Lula Menefee. A full-time lobbyist in Washington, DC, notified 
Holt and other ONB directors about the availability of federal funds for nearly every type 
of urban program, from housing modifications to beautification. ONB’s reliance on 
federal aid initiated sweeping political and social changes few foresaw. 
Holt used innovative strategies and a combination of federal funding and private 
philanthropy to address basic standard of living issues. Before 1969, one office in 
downtown Birmingham served all Jefferson County citizens who potentially qualified for 
food stamps, a US Department of Agriculture program. Lack of transportation to the 
office coupled with long lines discouraged potential clients and made the program 
ineffective in combating hunger. On the recommendation of a CAC subcommittee, Holt 
launched a fundraising campaign among ONB members to expand the food stamp 
program. One ONB director won local business support for the program by citing 
potential tax increases from subsidized food sales at grocery stores.
44
 These efforts led to 
the opening of a new food stamp office in a racially mixed industrial area between 
Birmingham and its sister city of Bessemer to the west. Holt also took the food stamp 
program on the road. Using refurbished school buses, volunteers traveled throughout 
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Jefferson County to meet in-need citizens where they lived to speed up the verification 
process.
45
 The bus visited Collegeville regularly.
46
 The simple acts of opening a new 
office and creating mobile clinics were reversals of the city’s and county’s historic 
refusal to expand social services or remove impediments that curtailed access to them. 
They also won ONB good publicity. Holt and others traveled to Washington to share 
their methods with federal officials who wanted to revise food stamp policies. By the 
mid-1970s, Holt’s work led to a 400 percent monthly increase in local food stamp 
distribution, reaching an average of 10,000 households.
47
   
 Launched in 1970, the Neighborhood Planning Program put blacks from sixteen 
poverty neighborhoods in direct contact with white municipal department heads and 
presidents of utility companies.
48
 It used comprehensive planning assistance funds from 
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development to help residents identify and 
implement public works initiatives (See Appendix, Table 11). The stature of ONB 
opened municipal and corporate doors previously closed to urban blacks. Some of 
metropolitan Birmingham’s poorest black citizens and wealthiest white ones met face-to-
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face to discuss neighborhood improvements. Their personal interaction eroded racial, 
class, and structural barriers that previously had fostered a culture of benign neglect in 
Birmingham. Residents in poverty neighborhoods had their streets paved, ditches 
covered, parks and recreation facilities built, safer traffic patterns established, and water, 
sewer, and power lines extended to their homes.
49
 Holt believed the program would “help 
develop confidence in the residents of these communities in helping them help 
themselves.”
50
 
 The Neighborhood Planning Program gave poor and black residents of 
Birmingham a chance to personally lobby for public services most whites took for 
granted. Menefee’s original demands inspired the creation of the program, and 
Collegeville became a pilot site in its first year. About 3 percent of Collegeville residents 
did not have access to water in their homes, but many more did not have adequate service 
and supply. “It is an unbelievable situation,” black insurance executive and CAC member 
John Drew remarked, that in 1970 Jefferson County residents lacked running water in 
their homes.
51
 W. Cecil Bauer, president of South Central Bell Telephone Company and 
co-chair of CAC, explained to the public, “Problems like Collegeville’s water have been 
there for a long time” because “they’ve been given a low priority for action.”
52
 A 
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recalcitrant Birmingham Water Works Board insisted user fees would not cover the cost 
of extending water and sewage service to Collegeville and other black poverty 
neighborhoods. Drew, Bauer, and other CAC members successfully lobbied board 
members and the city of Birmingham to subsidize the cost of new service lines.
53
 CAC 
continued to press the Birmingham Water Works Board and other utility companies to 
extend services to poor neighborhoods off the grid. The collaboration between black 
neighborhood advocates like Menefee and white corporate leaders in expanding access to 
water service profoundly affected black citizens who went without this fundamentally 
basic standard of living. 
 ONB staff members visited neighborhoods throughout Birmingham from 1970 to 
1974 as part of their work for the Neighborhood Planning Program. Ralph Logan and 
Charles Montgomery, who were white, and William Sherman, who was black, listened to 
citizens’ needs, recommended a variety of programs, and connected them with the proper 
municipal or county agency. Logan worked in Collegeville and formed a personal 
relationship with Menefee. He enjoyed a birthday supper with her, an occasion that surely 
deepened their mutual trust and fostered their professional relationship.
54
 Field agents 
drove to obscure neighborhoods, even on the weekends, “for the express purpose of 
learning their location,” as Sherman reported. Many residents did not know that ONB 
worked in the neighborhoods, and most blacks had a generally negative image of the 
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organization. Sherman repeated ONB’s mantra when he told residents that the 
Neighborhood Planning Program was “a catalyst to help them help themselves.”
55
 
 African Americans used their homes and communities in the Neighborhood 
Planning Program as tools to access the formal and informal structures of power in 
Birmingham. No other program, committee, or segment of municipal government 
recognized residence in the precise way the Neighborhood Planning Program did. As one 
ONB executive remarked, the program “ha[s] taken the establishment and related them to 
the neighborhood groups.”
56
 Menefee and other African Americans shared with white 
elites the values of self-help and community improvement. When Menefee met with 
Logan and others affiliated with ONB in the streets of Collegeville, she lobbied for 
immediate and material changes in the living spaces of African Americans. Her home 
became her source of political power. The dialogue she fashioned in her neighborhood 
continued in downtown at Monday morning CAC meetings. In 1973, Menefee joined 
ONB’s Board of Directors, symbolizing the importance of black neighborhood 
representation in Birmingham’s new power structure.  
 The Community Affairs Committee and Holt’s Community Development 
Department also addressed police-community relations, one of the most explosive issues 
in Birmingham that largely pitted blacks and whites against each other. Indeed, a riot 
over a police shooting of African Americans prompted the formation of CAC. Poor 
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police-community relations also resulted from a lack of services and collusion between 
white officers and black criminals. Mayor Seibels, Holt, and CAC members placed 
pressure on the Birmingham Police Department to launch a crime prevention program in 
Collegeville in 1970. More officers patrolled its streets, warding off criminal activity with 
their presence and engaging in conversations with residents. Citizen participation was 
crucial to crime prevention and renewing police-community relations. Crime did abate 
for a while. Menefee received death threats from those who made their livelihoods from 
neighborhood crime, but she shrugged them off: “I’m old enough to die…as long as I 
have not lived in vain.”
57
 Menefee welcomed the changes to her neighborhood. “It’s safe 
to walk the streets now,” she admitted, “but there’s still work to be done.”
58
  
 The Collegeville crime prevention program transformed into one of ONB’s most 
inspired if superficial efforts, the Police Athletic Team League (PAT), to improve police-
community relations. A pick-up game of baseball between white officers and black youth 
turned into a citywide recreational program. Over 500 youths tried out for 200 slots in 
1972; the program eventually expanded to basketball.
59
 Holt and ONB members, 
particularly W. Temple Tutwiler II from one of Birmingham’s first prominent families, 
actively solicited civic elites to fund the program. Donations provided equipment, team 
jerseys, field maintenance, tutoring programs, and transportation costs. Teams played on 
the diamond in the historic Rickwood Field, previously home to the Black Birmingham 
Barons and repeatedly closed to prevent the desegregation of athletic teams and public 
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facilities from the 1940s to the early 1960s.
60
 Collegeville’s team was the league 
champion for three years in a row, enabling it to play other teams in national and 
international competitions in Houston, Kansas City, and Tokyo.
61
 White ONB members 
also arranged for winning teams to meet the New York Yankees and the Baltimore 
Orioles.
62
  
 
Figure 6.2 An unidentified Collegeville youth with a first-place trophy for the Police Athletic Team 
championship, 1973. (Courtesy of Birmingham Public Library.) 
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PAT provided “disadvantaged boys,” as Tutwiler described them, with the 
opportunity to travel outside of Birmingham and the South and to escape, however 
briefly, the urban poverty that surrounded them.
63
 By describing African American youth 
in class terms, Tutwiler and ONB directors removed race from a program that primarily 
derived from bridging race and power relations between black Birminghamians and white 
officers. Holt believed that PAT was the most critical tool in fostering good police-
community relations and relating to urban youth. “The boys learned many of the officers 
names where heretofore they were just a blue uniform, a symbol to keep away from,” he 
remarked.
64
 
 While PAT primarily challenged black youth perceptions of the Birmingham 
Police Department, black and white civic elites working in CAC sought to reform the 
police force. CAC members worked with Police Chief James C. Parsons to launch major 
public relations campaigns in black and white media and hosted special seminars 
promoting police employment among African Americans.
65
 From 1969 to 1972, their 
efforts raised the number of blacks in uniform from 1 to 18. These new recruits belonged 
to a force of 669 officers, making CAC’s efforts symbolic more than substantial.
66
 CAC 
members also lobbied county officials to appoint an African American to the Jefferson 
County Personnel Board, which controlled the civil service system for municipal 
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employment. They finally succeeded in December 1973, two years after one of the three 
seats remained vacant.
67
 Reform also proceeded within the police department under 
Parsons, who earned a masters degree in sociology at UAB. He implemented a series of 
meetings between white officers and black residents of neighborhoods to enhance 
communication between them. The number of police brutality claims reported to the 
department, the Birmingham City Council, and the local National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) declined. W. C. Patton, the local NAACP 
president, remarked in a June 1973 CAC meeting, “Changes in the Police Department 
might not have happened so rapidly unless all of [us] had been sitting around the table on 
Monday morning.”
68
   
Between 1969 and 1974, Menefee, Holt, and CAC shifted the attention of ONB 
and municipal government from downtown to the neighborhoods, African Americans, 
and the poor. Their layered biracial and cross-class communication represented a 
breakthrough in metropolitan race relations and politics. Black and white citizens who 
worked through ONB personally experienced a new Birmingham as they formed 
professional and personal relationships with those they otherwise never would have 
known. CAC’s co-chair W. Cecil Bauer declared that Birmingham’s “white leaders have 
discovered the human anguish behind the statistics of poverty and discrimination while 
Negroes have learned that whites are genuinely concerned.”
69
 A devoted member of CAC 
who was heavily involved in efforts to meet the needs of Collegeville residents, Bauer 
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believed the committee “produced a physical as well as a moral reshaping of the city.” 
Perhaps with a nod toward Lula Menefee, he insisted that the key to change was 
“responsible black leadership which wanted to build Birmingham––not burn it” and “the 
so-called white ‘power structure’ which recognized that the power which resides in the 
hearts of men is as potent as that which flows from an economic base.”
70
 The Community 
Affairs Committee and Holt’s programs connected people who had different life 
experiences and understandings of urban problems but who believed total community 
welfare must address the needs of all Birmingham citizens. 
 
“We Have Them Listening to Us”: African American Opposition, the Politics of 
Racial Solidarity, and the Citizen Participation Program 
 
 Many African Americans in neighborhoods destroyed by industrialization, 
poverty, and urban renewal rejected Operation New Birmingham’s (ONB) programs and 
new municipal role in community development. Residents wanted more than sewer lines 
and stop signs. Public improvements based on the philosophy of self-help could not 
address joblessness, structural inequalities, or systematic racism in municipal 
government. “Rather than attacking the root causes of poverty,” one Collegeville youth 
perceptively noted, “they’re attacking the results of poverty.”
71
 Another remarked to a 
journalist, “We don’t have any money, and there isn’t anything to do. You know as well 
as I do that things ain’t getting better, so don’t go telling me what I should do.”
72
 
Perpetual neglect of black neighborhoods had made many residents disdainful of the new 
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power structure and its plans for Birmingham. Mattie Coleman, a public housing resident 
in Collegeville, explained the disconnect between what people in the neighborhood 
experienced and what civic leaders in downtown promoted: “An All-America City ought 
to be able to provide jobs for its people…. Nobody wants to live in a slum, but sometimes 
it’s all you can do to get a piece of bread.”
73
   
Since the 1940s, Birmingham World editor Emory O. Jackson was one of the 
most powerful black voices who spoke out against Jim Crow as well as the actions of 
blacks elites. In his “Tip Off” column, Jackson wrote editorials on racial zoning battles, 
unequal teacher salaries in Jefferson County, and the importance of voting. A former high 
school teacher, he saw his role at the World as extending public education to the masses. 
“To me,” he wrote in 1951, “an editor’s chair is little more than a teacher’s desk moved 
into the public square. For much of the work of an editor is the field of mass education. A 
good newspaper informs, enlightens, and entertains.”
74
 He also continually engaged in 
sparring matches with other black leaders of Birmingham whose tactics he found suspect. 
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Jackson repeatedly resigned in protest from his position 
as Secretary of the local NAACP because he believed it did not fight hard enough against 
Jim Crow.
75
 During the battle to overturn racial zoning laws, Jackson wrote to the 
national NAACP office to complain about “the faint and declining leadership we have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Christopher Jackson Davis, “Emory O. Jackson: A Traditionalist in Early Civil Rights Fight in 
Birmingham, Alabama” (master’s thesis, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2006), 61. 
75
 Ibid., 31, 109. 
 264!
here.”
76
 Despite the contradictions of his actions and words, Jackson fiercely believed 
racial solidarity was the key to liberating African Americans. 
 By the early 1970s, however, Jackson concluded racial solidarity had brought 
power for some blacks at the expense of liberation for all. “Black southerners have not 
yet found a working formula for building their own power as a means of progress rather 
than as a contest,” he wrote in a 1971 opinion piece that took aim at the “shackled” black 
civic elite.
77
 Jackson personally experienced the cost of building a new Birmingham. In 
the late 1960s, the new interstate-highway system quartered his neighborhood Enon 
Ridge, home to middle-class blacks since the turn of the century. His health was also 
failing; prostate cancer finally killed him two days after his sixty-seventh birthday in 
September 1975. Toward the end of his life, his personal writings reflected bitterness 
over a cause and strategy—racial solidarity—that professionally and personally failed 
him. After years of editorial interference by C. A. Scott, Republican owner of the 
Atlanta-based World syndicate, he angrily wrote that after a lifetime of “hop[ing] that the 
Negro group would build great enterprises, I now realize that there was no justification 
for such a faith. I would have perhaps been better off materially and certainly richer 
spiritually had I taken a different road.”
78
 Six months later, he confided to his unrequited 
love, “I should have done something for myself…like buy an automobile…take a 
vacation…build a bank account.”
79
 Jackson was a life-long bachelor who lived alone and 
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financially supported his siblings on a meager salary. He translated his overwhelming 
sense of frustration and impotence into scathing editorials against his old allies.
80
  
 Jackson’s opposition to black civic elites working through ONB revealed the 
enormous class, ideological, and strategic divisions within black Birmingham. The editor 
privately acknowledged that the Birmingham World gave him “a vehicle and a voice” as 
a “means to campaign for political unity” when black civic elites pushed for biracialism 
after 1965.
81
 Jackson spoke for the thousands of African Americans who opposed the 
leaders of the biracial metropolitan coalition and resented black civic elites.
82
 CAC’s W. 
Cecil Bauer insisted on inviting him as a guest speaker because “we need to hear people 
who do not agree with us.” Jackson, however, repeatedly denounced the group as a “grits 
club,” a description many African Americans adopted in their attacks on ONB.
83
 He 
repeatedly denied requests by ONB directors to run public service announcements for 
recruiting blacks for the civil service exam in the World; he claimed they were 
advertisements. In a 1972 World editorial, he asked, “Are NAACP leaders in such debt to 
the downtown power structure that they no longer can speak out against wrongs 
committed against black citizens?”
84
 His question reflected where he lived and worked in 
Birmingham: the black business district, hard-won neighborhoods, and the imagined 
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public forum of the Birmingham World. All of these traditional black spaces were 
shrinking in the “new” Birmingham.   
 Because black civic elites actively participated in remaking Birmingham after 
1965, their perspectives on the importance of biracial communication were vastly 
different from Jackson’s. Biracialism had won them civic and political power. Councilor 
Arthur Shores and City Clerk Judge Peter A. Hall had spent over thirty years pushing 
civil rights issues with whites, and they won high profile spots in municipal government 
for their efforts. Postwar economic growth and civil rights organizations produced new 
systems of power from which black civic leaders emerged. Louis J. Willie, executive 
vice-president of A. G. Gaston Enterprises, became a proxy for Gaston, who kept a busy 
calendar filled with civic affairs and business activities. Miles graduate and faculty 
member Dr. Richard Arrington Jr. joined Shores on the council in 1971. Rev. Edward 
Gardner, president of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR), 
Shuttlesworth’s former group, became a CAC member in 1970. Gardner worked side-by-
side the same white men whose stores he picketed just a few years before. The rise of the 
ACMHR to civic power prompted civil rights activists such as Shuttlesworth and Rev. 
Abraham L. Woods II to use the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) as 
their organization of protest. All of these elites believed their high-profile political and 
civic positions would benefit black Birminghamians.   
Black civic elites occupied a contentious middle ground in Birmingham politics 
by balancing the interests of white civic elites against an emerging black electorate that 
increasingly rejected biracialism. To businessman A. G. Gaston, white support was 
necessary to open avenues of economic opportunity, social mobility, and first-class 
 267!
citizenship for African Americans. Black economic power had not yet proved sufficient 
to do these tasks alone. In the 1970s, Gaston continued to shape black consumerism 
through his radio station WENN-FM, which enjoyed the largest listening audience in 
metropolitan Birmingham as the only “black” station.
85
 Radio and print advertisements 
for Gaston’s companies continued to hawk his beliefs in thrift, charity, and “green 
power.”
86
 Gaston also peddled his message about the importance of black economic 
power to audiences around the state of Alabama. “Black power minus economic power is 
no power. It’s essential that we get our economic power,” Gaston argued. “We’ve got 
more power than we can afford. We’ve got more rights than we can afford.”
87
 Without 
economic self-determination, Gaston believed, black political power would remain 
marginalized and ineffective in liberating African Americans. Gaston’s status as a 
multimillionaire, however, separated him from the experiences of the overwhelming 
majority of black Birminghamians.
88
  
The 1973 midterm election revealed a division among African American voters 
over the political strategy of biracialism. The majority of the black electorate pushed U. 
W. Clemon into a run-off race for a city council seat. Clemon was a graduate of Miles 
College and Columbia University School of Law, both of which should have indicated to 
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Gaston and white civic elites that the newcomer was a respectable black candidate. 
Clemon, however, represented a new generation of black leaders who drew support 
strictly from the neighborhoods. Gaston joined whites in ONB in a smear campaign that 
labeled the newcomer as a “black radical.” Many blacks decried Gaston’s actions as a 
betrayal to the race. Black elites in the Jefferson County Progressive Democratic Council 
(JCPDC) responded to the outrage in black neighborhoods by endorsing Clemon.
89
 The 
JCPDC also supported a white incumbent. Other black elites joined their white allies in 
the Community Affairs Committee to repudiate the actions of Gaston and ONB, the 
committee’s parent organization. CAC co-chairs Rev. Gardner and W. Cecil Bauer 
“deplore[d] the fact that race has been injected into the election;” they refused to endorse 
a candidate.
90
 White and black civic elites had different ideas about what biracialism 
meant based on their personal and political beliefs.  
The 1973 midterm election also coincided with an intense public debate regarding 
citizen participation and ONB’s control of Birmingham. Earlier that summer, the 
Birmingham area director of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
notified Mayor Seibels that the city needed to involve citizens directly in the overall 
planning process to qualify for federal funds. ONB previously served as the city’s 
representative citizens group for workable programs such as urban renewal. The limited 
nature of the Neighborhood Planning Program, which was in 1 of every 5 neighborhoods, 
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was not a sufficient replacement either.
91
 Before the election, Seibels announced a new 
citizen participation plan that essentially expanded the role and programs of ONB in the 
neighborhoods even more. The plan ignored residents’ perceptions of neighborhood 
boundaries, and it organized neighborhoods into larger communities.
92
 For example, 
Collegeville was part of the North Birmingham community. From the community 
districts, elected representatives would sit on the Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) to the 
mayor; the mayor also would appoint one-third of that body’s members.
93
 ONB would 
work with CAB in meeting neighborhood objectives, primarily in public improvements. 
Local NAACP President W. C. Patton warned Vincent Townsend that ONB “would sign 
its own death warrant by such involvement” in the plan.
94
 
 Even though the Neighborhood Planning Program was a success, it had divided 
African Americans between those who worked with ONB and those who demanded 
autonomy in their neighborhoods. Lula Menefee, who was a member of ONB’s Board of 
Directors by 1973, earned considerable power in shaping Collegeville’s public 
improvements agenda.
95
 ONB field worker Ralph Logan informed his boss that she “will 
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send [us] a letter in a few days telling us what projects she wants to do.”
96
 For some 
residents, however, Menefee had become too closely associated with ONB. Some 
residents “accus[ed] her for the delay” in promised projects such as the construction of a 
community center adjacent to Carver High School or increased police patrol after a 
random gang shooting into the school killed a teenage girl.
97
 The lag in building a 
community center resulted from a general deficiency of federal and municipal funds, a 
problem that would plague the new citizen participation program as these funds 
continued to decline. The massive development of the University of Alabama at 
Birmingham (UAB) in the early to mid-1970s also pulled valuable municipal resources 
like engineering and sanitation away from neighborhoods. The municipal government 
simply did not have the manpower or the financing to upgrade the entire city. Crime, 
however, was too deeply embedded in Collegeville to be removed by small prevention 
programs like police-youth baseball teams. Despite Menefee’s influence in ONB and 
municipal government, all of these delays and the general decline of Collegeville made 
many residents believe that things in Birmingham had not changed.   
 African Americans strongly opposed the mayor’s new program of citizen 
participation based on the grounds of self-determination. They made their opinions 
known at the first public meeting held in Collegeville and organized by ONB. Benjamin 
Greene asked, “Why can’t we use the organization we already have? Why do YOU have 
to organize us?”
98
 Some Collegeville residents enjoyed working with ONB, but they saw 
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themselves as the catalyst for change. “We in Collegeville,” Menefee declared three years 
before, “are the ones who started much of the work” in improving the neighborhood.
99
 
Greene led the Collegeville-Harriman Park Civic League, which was older and more 
established than Menefee’s Collegeville Coordinating Council. Some tension existed 
between the two groups. One resident confided, “We need more cooperation and 
coordination of efforts and less bickering between people to see who gets their name in 
the paper or an award first.”
100
 Menefee and Greene, however, worked together in 
organizing their neighborhood against the mayor’s plan. Indeed, Collegeville’s concerns 
played a large role in reshaping the city’s plan, no doubt influenced by Menefee’s 
relationship with ONB and municipal leaders.
101
 “Since we have talked loud and clear,” 
Menefee and Greene wrote in a letter to their neighbors, “we have them listening to 
us.”
102
   
 White liberals also influenced the revision of the citizen participation plan. 
Edward S. LaMonte, director of UAB’s Center for Urban Affairs, had advised ONB on 
new housing developments in Southside in the early 1970s when the neighborhood 
experienced dramatic shocks in the wake of the university’s expansion. Many Center 
staff members had become involved in the Southside Action Committee, a biracial group 
dedicated to preserving community in a neighborhood that increasingly became a 
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commercial area. LaMonte was familiar with how differently blacks and whites saw 
urban spaces. Despite his professional ties to ONB, he was against the organization’s 
involvement in the citizen participation plan. “It simply seems to me odd––and perhaps 
inappropriate––to allow any essentially private organization to stand between the citizens 
of the community and their government,” he wrote.
103
 LaMonte worked with Charles F. 
Lewis of the city’s Community Development Department in re-drafting the plan. Lewis 
had recommended Collegeville over the racially mixed Ensley neighborhood, ONB’s top 
choice, as the site of the first open meeting to discuss the citizen participation plan. His 
department worked with neighborhood representatives, including Menefee, in designing 
districts and the structure of the program. 
 Intense African American opposition to the biracial metropolitan coalition and the 
multi-layered networks of communication in Birmingham pushed municipal leaders into 
adopting one of the most democratic citizen participation plans in the nation. It went far 
beyond what was federally required of the city. The plan was a model of political self-
determination. Everyone who was sixteen years of age or older had the right to vote for 
representatives in neighborhood districts with political borders defined by residents.
104
 
For the first time, Collegeville as Menefee, Greene, and others knew it appeared on 
municipal maps. “When the program began, feeling by some citizens’ groups for city 
officials included misunderstanding, antagonism, and distrust,” Lewis recalled years 
later. “When the new map was prepared which…changed the boundaries in accordance 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103
 Edward S. LaMonte to Charles F. Lewis, February 22, 1974, File 3.16, Center for Urban Affairs 
Director’s Files, UAB Archives. 
104
 Citizens chose from neighborhood officers to represent them at the community level. Community 
representatives were eligible to run for the Citizens Advisory Board (CAB) in a citywide election. There 
were 86 neighborhoods and 19 communities. 
 273!
with citizens’ recommendations, an important step was taken in establishing a trust 
relationship and two-way communication between citizens and city officials.”
105
 As 
historian Charles E. Connerly noted, the plan recognized that “Birmingham’s black 
neighborhoods reflected the historical identities that their residents, often through the 
civic leagues, had given them.”
106
 
 After decades of federal mandates and black activism, Birmingham’s Citizen 
Participation Program (CPP) guaranteed blacks representation in municipal government. 
In November 1974, about 8,500 residents elected presidents, vice-presidents, and 
secretaries to represent their neighborhoods. A majority of the seats were competitive. 
Although it is unknown if Menefee ran for office, Benjamin Greene won Collegeville’s 
presidency. Residents from fifteen other black neighborhoods elected civic league leaders 
to represent them in the new program.
107
 The CPP replaced the function of ONB’s 
Neighborhood Planning Program, which continued working in neighborhoods outside the 
city’s borders that had potential annexation value. Citizens elected to the CPP allocated 
resources for public improvement projects for all of Birmingham’s 86 neighborhoods. 
Yet, this widespread dispersion of declining federal funds could not address all citizens’ 
demands.
108
 One steep cost of the CPP was the loss of support from white civic elites 
who had lobbied municipal agencies and corporations on the behalf of citizens in black 
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neighborhoods. But through the new Citizen Participation Program, black 
Birminghamians not only gained spatial representation—access to municipal government 
based on neighborhoods—but won political self-determination.  
 
The New Face of Birmingham: The Vann-Arrington Alliance and the Bonita Carter 
Controversy 
 
 With the implementation of the Citizen Participation Program and the continued 
advocacy of the Community Affairs Committee, Birmingham moved closer to adopting 
the more responsive and representative government first promised by reformer David J. 
Vann in the early 1960s. In 1975 he became mayor of the city he politically engineered 
through municipal reform. “We can be proud of our progress,” Vann told one of the last 
graduating classes of Daniel Payne College in 1976, a historically black college soon to 
close its doors, “but we cannot be satisfied. A void still exists….that cannot be removed 
by inaction, good intentions, rhetoric, marches, or even open minds by themselves. It is a 
void that can only be filled through patient, competent hard work.”
109
 Vann, who used 
many of the strategies he cited, had spent over fifteen years trying to move Birmingham 
toward a post-civil rights era he and others envisioned. Although metropolitan 
consolidation had failed to unite the suburbs and the city, Vann continued to use biracial 
communication and measures of inclusion to build a new Birmingham. He also 
maintained his belief that municipal government should work for its citizens, which now 
decisively included black urbanites.  
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 The 1973 midterm election revealed that the balance of electoral power within the 
biracial coalition was shifting to African Americans. Urban whites were divided between 
those who supported biracialism and those who rejected it. Black voting behavior 
revealed class distinctions and strategic differences among African Americans, but they 
favored both black candidates and white liberals at the polls. When organized behind a 
candidate, blacks were a powerful minority power. Vann earned 51 percent of the total 
vote by winning 76 percent of the black vote and the support of union whites.
110
 He was 
the only mayor until 1999 who did not receive white middle-class backing.
111
 The 
biracial metropolitan coalition counted on black voters from the beginning, but now it 
was utterly dependent on them. Some of its leaders such as Vann more easily navigated 
the changes within the urban electorate and political landscape. 
 In one of his first acts as mayor, Vann publicly announced his Tuesday mornings 
would be reserved for meeting directly with citizens, from both the neighborhoods and 
downtown. No other mayor or public official in Birmingham’s history opened their office 
like Vann. By all accounts, the portly, jolly mayor conveyed empathy and compassion 
whenever he listened to anyone. He might have been satisfied with ribbon-cutting had it 
not been for his love of policy. He had an unquestionable faith in the law and its capacity 
to promote change. In 1977 he signed an executive order requiring municipal employees 
to live in the city of Birmingham, a policy designed to increase black hires. Until this 
decision was overturned, suburbanites could no longer work for the city. Vann’s decision 
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narrowly defined citizenship to residence in Birmingham. This interpretation resembled 
the one advocated by former Police Commissioner T. Eugene “Bull” Connor and 
contradicted the inclusive vision of citizenship Vann promoted during the 1962 municipal 
referendum campaign. Vann’s new definition of citizenship, however, meant that he 
governed Birmingham for racially undefined residents rather than white suburbanites. 
 The “absence of a door” to Vann’s mayoral office indicated his commitment to 
move Birmingham’s government more toward citizen participation.112 Indeed, as a 
councilor he had devised an alternative plan based on aspects of his failed “One Great 
City” legislative package when he had tried to reform the city council from at-large to 
district seats.113 His support of spatial representation was also good politics. At a 1977 
US Conference of Mayors, Vann boasted that Birmingham’s Citizen Participation 
Program was worth $62 million. Citizens recently approved a successful bond issue 
mainly to fund public improvements desperately needed in black neighborhoods. The 
Citizens Advisory Board (CAB), which was the highest tier in the program, originally 
had objected to “frills” in the bond such as the rehabilitation of Sloss Furnaces into a 
museum of early southern industrialization. After CAB’s input, the bond received wide 
support.114 “The people who live in” the neighborhoods, Vann wrote, “know best what 
they want.” The Citizen Participation Program gave residents “a more direct link with 
their elected City officials.”115    
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 Vann formed a close partnership with Dr. Richard Arrington Jr. when they joined 
the Birmingham City Council in 1971. Arrington was raised in Fairfield; his house was 
on an “all-dirt street” equipped with one water faucet and an outhouse.
116
 Out of these 
inequitable beginnings, Arrington climbed to prominence in Birmingham by way of 
Miles College. Between 1952 and 1971, Miles was his home base. He had been a student 
and later became an instructor there after he earned a masters degree at the University of 
Detroit. Although Arrington had been privy to some meetings involving various black 
leaders during the Miles Student Selective Buying Campaign in the spring of 1962, he 
left Birmingham the next year during the height of its civil rights crises. He came back to 
Miles as its academic dean in 1966 after earning his doctorate in zoology at the 
University of Oklahoma. He joined an administrative team that included Pitts and John 
Munro, director of Freshman Studies, to reaccredit the college. Arrington found allies 
with his peers at UAB, including Center for Urban Affairs Director Edward S. LaMonte, 
and served on the faculty there in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1971, he became 
executive director of the Alabama Center of Higher Education (ACHE), a consortium of 
the state’s eight historically black colleges.
117
 Arrington was well on his way to becoming 
the most important black educational figure in Alabama when a few young black men 
asked him to run for mayor. 
Because he had worked in colleges and universities throughout his adult life, 
Arrington was a blank slate in municipal politics. As LaMonte, one of his closest 
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advisors, explained, “He had not been an activist during the civil rights movement.”118 He 
was a highly educated African American man in a city with civic leaders and an 
electorate who desired respectable black political representation to mark progress for 
them. Lucius H. Pitts, Arrington’s mentor, departed for his alma mater Payne College in 
Georgia in the summer of 1971 after turning Miles College into a civic powerhouse in 
race relations and civil rights activism. Arrington, who loved academic life, had high 
hopes to become president of Miles. As a self-described “foot-washing primitive 
Baptist,” however, his religious background conflicted with the beliefs of the Christian 
Methodist Episcopal institution.119 Arrington moved on to ACHE, but he also chose to 
run for a city council seat based on the suggestion of the young black men.  
 Arrington handily won a four-year council seat in 1971 with broad black and 
white support.120 Even though Arrington was a drafted candidate of black civil rights 
activists, he won the support of the biracial civic elite. He was the protégé of Pitts, who 
had served as CAC’s co-chair with W. Cecil Bauer until his departure from Birmingham. 
A. G. Gaston, Arrington’s advisor to white civic elites, also arranged for Vincent 
Townsend to endorse the young man in the Birmingham News. Emil Hess, owner of 
Parisian, a downtown department store, gave Arrington his largest campaign contribution 
of $500. Arrington received Hess’ gift from Vann, who peeled off bills from a fat roll of 
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cash.
121
 The department store owner, who had negotiated civil rights demands with Pitts 
throughout the early 1960s, hoped his donation would yield a second African American 
on the city council. It did. Arrington joined Vann and Angi Grooms Proctor, daughter of 
the federal circuit judge who continually ruled in favor of civil rights activists in the 
1950s and 1960s, as new council members. Their elections signified a decisive political 
shift in the biracial metropolitan coalition toward supporting white liberals and black 
civic elites as municipal officials.
122
  
  In his years on the city council, Arrington became embroiled within the old and 
new systems of power vying to govern Birmingham. By Arrington’s own admission, his 
desire to win a “civil rights badge” drove his council activities. Many African Americans 
did not trust him because he chose academics over protests in the streets.
123
 Arrington did 
not have regrets about his personal choices, but he felt the weight of responsibility toward 
black Birmingham. As LaMonte explained, Arrington felt compelled to “be an example 
of black political leadership” and to “take advantage of the opportunities that the civil 
rights movement had created.”
124
 Arrington used his seat to become the “new black 
political voice and power of Birmingham.”
125
 He addressed issues such as police brutality 
and civil service reform in the city council and in ONB’s Community Affairs Committee 
(CAC). Vann often advised him, too. Arrington’s clashes with Mayor Seibels made him a 
hero in black neighborhoods, while Seibels and more conservative whites accused 
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Arrington of “‘t[ying] the hands’ of police officers.”
126
 Arrington appealed to both 
middle-class and liberal whites, who saw his up-from-poverty background as evidence of 
self-help, and blacks, who recognized themselves in his struggles against injustice, 
segregation, and racism.  
Throughout the 1970s, Vann and Arrington formed a solid governing relationship 
based on their personal friendship and deep admiration and respect for one another. They 
were highly intellectual and prone to collaboration, whether in the academic halls, courts, 
or council chambers. Born six years apart, Arrington and Vann experienced parallel lives. 
Jim Crow had dictated where they could live and go to school. Vann remained in 
Alabama and Birmingham, while Arrington’s pursuit of education led him to leave the 
city at key times in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These circumstances influenced their 
participation in local civil rights campaigns. Yet, both men were connected to institutions 
of power that shaped Birmingham once Jim Crow began to fall. Through ONB, Miles 
College, and City Hall, Vann and Arrington arrived at middle-age with a shared political 
vision based on biracialism, equality of citizenship, and democratic governance. 
 Their shared vision of Birmingham became evident after a police shooting 
controversy in the summer of 1979. A two-day riot in Kingston, two miles east of 
Collegeville, broke out in response to the latest incident of police brutality. On a Friday 
afternoon in late June, Alger Pickett shot a gas station manager over a minor dispute. In 
his escape, Alger spotted Bonita Carter, a friend, and ordered her to drive his car. Officer 
George Sands arrived on the scene at this time and shot Carter, who had ducked under the 
dashboard of the getaway car. A riot soon emerged. Vann and Arrington spent the 
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weekend in Kingston speaking with residents and calming protestors. Arrington 
described it as “a pretty tense situation out there.”
127
 After Vann talked with concerned 
residents and onlookers, he sympathetically understood the riot to be one “against the 
police.”
128
 
On Monday morning, Dr. James Montgomery, the first black faculty member of 
UAB, called for a discussion of the events at a CAC meeting. Vann and CAC members 
displayed strengths in understanding the different points of view on the Carter 
controversy and their steadfast commitment to citizen participation. Although prompted 
by a white officer’s use of deadly force against a black citizen, Vann noted that the 
Kingston riot called “in[to] question” the actions of police officers to maintain order and 
secure the personal safety of innocent bystanders and themselves. Vann unequivocally 
accepted the neighborhood’s view that Carter was “innocent” despite her participation in 
an unfolding crime.
129
 He adamantly pushed CAC to endorse a state legislative bill he 
had spent a year lobbying for that would create a coroner’s jury, an independent citizens 
body to investigate questionable deaths. The jury would counter the Birmingham Police 
Department’s Internal Affairs division that usually dismissed claims of police brutality 
without any sanction to the officer in question. Vann also wanted CAC to form an 
independent ad hoc committee to investigate the Carter shooting. Vann believed an ad 
hoc citizens group, an organizational form that had continued success in influencing 
municipal government, was the best answer to the unfolding controversy.  
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Liberal whites and other public officials also voiced the need for change in 
community-police relations. Councilwomen Nina Miglionico, who had strong labor 
union support, and Bessie Estell, a former elementary school principal, joined Chief of 
Police Bill Myers as representatives of municipal government in CAC. Myers, who 
replaced Frank C. Parsons in 1978, fully supported the ad hoc citizens committee even 
though the Fraternal Order of Police had fought such oversight since the early 1960s. 
UAB’s Center for Urban Affairs staff member and Southside neighborhood President 
Betty Bock urged CAC to include representatives of the Citizen Participation Program. 
“If we are going to make decisions,” Bock said in reference to CAC’s image in the 
neighborhoods, disaffected blacks “are going to continue to throw rocks.” James A. 
Cotton, former director of the Jefferson County Committee for Economic Opportunity, 
Birmingham’s official community action agency in the War on Poverty, heartily agreed. 
The group clearly understood that any citizens committee charged with investigating the 
Carter shooting would “have a credibility problem.”
130
   
 Black civic elites dominated the discussion and exposed the deep divisions 
between themselves and “the thinking of every black man in this metropolitan area.” In 
the ten-year history of CAC, black members had never acknowledged to whites the 
depths of intraracial conflict. “We have come a long way,” Judge Peter Hall lectured to 
the group. “When we came on this committee 10 years ago we were almost put out of the 
tribe. We were attacked daily by our own black press. We had to fight. I had to fight at 
every meeting to justify why I sat here at this meeting.” Hall advised the group to 
consider a black person’s “experience in [their] neighborhood” in CAC members’ 
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discussion of an issue that uniquely affected them.
131
 CAC had been an enormous source 
of political power for black leaders. They sought to protect its credibility and strengthen 
its ability to adapt to residents’ demands.  
 CAC’s selection process for the ad hoc committee was fraught with self-
aggrandizement and hesitation from black leaders. Rev. Edward Gardner, whose church 
was one block from where the crime occurred, immediately volunteered his participation. 
Despite his stated closeness to the Kingston community, Gardner was unaware that a riot 
had occurred until two days after it started. A. G. Gaston supported Gardner’s 
participation in the proposed citizens committee to investigate the Carter shooting but 
with the caveat that “some black leaders…are against” Gardner.
132
 Indeed, Gardner had 
rejected protest methods in favor of politics earlier in the decade. In 1972 he admonished 
a local pastor who had attempted to organize a demonstration by lecturing, “The days of 
marching and acting without some basis or character were over.”
133
 CAC members 
wanted the outspoken Montgomery to serve on the ad hoc committee. Montgomery had 
insisted that CAC review the “Fourteen Points” every five years and discuss the issues of 
police brutality whenever they occurred. ONB directors had blamed him for the long 
absences of the Birmingham chief police and Jefferson County sheriff from regular CAC 
meetings.
134
 Montgomery’s activism in CAC, however, was not well known among black 
Birminghamians. The doctor pushed for Arrington’s participation over his own because 
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the councilor “has the respect of the community.” Arrington’s image as a crusader against 
the police department would give the committee credibility among blacks but “might 
open it for criticism” from whites or those who questioned an elected official’s 
participation in a citizens committee. The councilor “didn’t mind serving on it,” but CAC 
wisely appointed Montgomery over Arrington.
135
 
 Vann’s ad hoc citizens committee evolved from his conversation with CAC over 
two days and included diverse representation. Four whites and four blacks, each 
connected to neighborhoods or educational and religious institutions, held court over the 
police shooting of Carter.
136
 Within this group, Rev. Gardner and Rabbi Milton Grafman 
reprised their roles from the early 1960s campaigns as civil rights negotiators. This time, 
however, the clergyman sat together on the same side of the discussion. Historian Blaine 
A. Brownell’s participation spoke to the intellectual contributions UAB’s Center for 
Urban Affairs made to Birmingham’s civic dialogue. Two neighborhood presidents from 
the Citizen Participation Program, including Emmett Lockett of Kingston, also served on 
the mayor’s ad hoc committee. Vann wanted his CAC-approved committee to “lay all the 
evidence on the table” and gave it the power to call witnesses and subpoena 
documents.
137
 Within three weeks of Carter’s death, the ad hoc committee, with one 
abstention, unanimously found the actions of Officer George Sands unjustified.  
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Although the ad hoc committee conveyed moral guilt, Vann still needed to take a 
course of official action regarding Sands. During deliberations, Arrington had provided 
local SCLC leader Rev. Abraham Woods with Sands’ internal record that showed a 
history of unpunished police brutality.
138
 Woods and Arrington had crossed paths many 
times before. Woods had graduate degrees from and was a former faculty member of 
both Miles College and UAB. He demanded Vann form a permanent civilian police-
review board, which was in the same vein as a coroner’s jury, and fire Sands. Vann, 
however, was limited by current laws and policies designed or approved by Jefferson 
County. Sands acted in accordance with Birmingham Police Department policies 
regarding firearm use and general officer training. Thus, the Jefferson County-controlled 
civil service system, which forbid firing a municipal employee without due cause, 
protected the officer. The system, no less than the individual, was at fault. Because Vann 
did not have the legal grounds to fire Sands, he placed the policeman on desk duty and 
immediately sought revisions to the firearms policy and officer training program. Those 
reforms were attempts to resolve the perpetual racism embedded within the police 
department, which complemented Vann’s strategies for implementing affirmative action 
in the municipal workforce. Vann’s decision was a legal one that pleased no one. 
 As a private citizen, Vann joined Woods in a demonstration march from Kelly 
Ingram Park to City Hall to protest yet another unpunished incident of police brutality. 
On their way, marchers chanted, “Sands, Vann, and the Klan must go.” One speaker 
equated the mayor with former Police Commissioner T. Eugene “Bull” Connor, the man 
who refused to step down after Vann successfully launched a political coup to remove 
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him. Vann no doubt felt utter humiliation as African Americans compared him with 
segregationist whites he had fought so hard to remove from power. Woods summarized 
his and others’ feelings by telling him, “You have turned on your black folk.”
139
 Vann’s 
participation in the demonstration, however, indicated his twenty-year personal 
commitment to civil rights causes and reforming the system that inhibited change in 
Birmingham.  
 In the wake of the Carter controversy, Vann’s future in the upcoming mayoral 
primary looked bleak. Vann represented liberal whites, a small minority in Birmingham’s 
electorate, but African Americans from the churches and neighborhoods refused to 
acknowledge any difference between those whites and conservative whites. The Carter 
controversy drove extremely questionable white candidates, including the local Ku Klux 
Klan’s Imperial Wizard, to run in the 1979 mayoral election. Blacks did not have viable 
candidates to represent their interests, an argument Woods used to convince Arrington to 
run for mayor. Arrington wrestled with the personal ramifications for running against his 
political mentor, but Vann fully supported his friend. Vann placed a humiliating fourth in 
the primary, while the full support of the black vote carried Arrington into the run-off. 
Affluent and middle-class white support in Birmingham’s southern neighborhoods then 
transferred from Vann to Arrington.  
 Arrington’s eventual election as mayor maintained the core of the biracial 
metropolitan coalition. He won the support of black neighborhood leaders from the 
Citizen Participation Program and, as LaMonte described, “the upper middle-class white 
community among professionals and people who by virtue of their own education, their 
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own experiences, were far more open to the possibility of a white southerner supporting a 
black political candidate.”
140
 Many hailed Arrington’s election as a breakthrough in civil 
rights and race relations in America. President Jimmy Carter called to congratulate the 
new mayor, and the Kennedy family visited Birmingham during Arrington’s 
inauguration. Although Arrington had the unquestionable support of black 
neighborhoods, black civic elites and white liberals saw in his election their continued 
quest to make Birmingham reflect their values and their efforts to achieve progress. 
Arrington became the new face of the fraying but intact biracial metropolitan coalition.
141
  
 
Conclusion 
 In October 1976, a month before Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter won the White 
House, TIME magazine declared Birmingham “a city reborn” in its special issue “The 
South Today.”
142
 The profile neatly resembled the one Vincent Townsend put forth in 
Ebony magazine five years before. Townsend had declared ONB a “community action 
agency” in an attempt to emphasize how much Birmingham had changed.
143
 Now, TIME 
had the statistics in population, education, voting, and employment to prove the oft-
repeated claims of progress. These markers of change appeared when racial unrest 
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occurred in Boston and Detroit just a few years before, which made Birmingham and the 
South appear more normal in the eyes of the nation.
144
 The waves of anniversaries 
marking civil rights victories moved journalists, politicians, academics, and activists to 
comment on the South in celebratory tones.
145
 The 1977 conviction of Robert Chambliss 
for the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing further signaled Birmingham’s rejection 
of its past and embrace of the lessons of the civil rights movement.
146
 Arrington’s 
mayoralty, widely pitched in the local and national media as the first African American 
mayor of “America’s Most Segregated City,” represented the pinnacle of change. 
Collectively, these events and statistics created the exact image of progress the biracial 
metropolitan coalition sought since its assumption of power in the early 1960s. 
 Birmingham arrived at progress through the continued collision of oppositional 
politics and the politics of power.
147
 The spectacles of these collisions, such as riots and 
elections, may have forced immediate change, but the continued dialogue prompted by 
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these events actually fostered new modes of behavior and policy. As Emory O. Jackson 
cynically observed, “Events often are a dramatic coming to head of gradualism.”
148
 Black 
and white citizens across the metropolitan area worked within various systems of power 
to effect change in the city and municipal government despite various barriers and local 
opposition. Lula Menefee, for example, was instrumental in using moral suasion to 
convince suburban white businessmen to broaden their conceptions of a Birmingham 
community. Menefee navigated neighborhood civic leagues, the Community Affairs 
Committee, and Operation New Birmingham to make Collegeville a livable space. Her 
neighborhood advocacy provided the template for the Citizen Participation Program. Her 
civic voice moved from Collegeville to downtown over the decade, revealing the fluidity 
and cross-membership between the systems of formal and informal power in the city. 
 All of these systems of political power worked toward achieving the basic 
structural changes and service demands Menefee outlined to make Birmingham a livable 
space in the summer of 1969. White and black participants did not agree on what that 
meant or the strategies to achieve that goal, but they believed in the basic idea of helping 
others help themselves. Experimental programs derived from their dialogues. Each 
system of power governing Birmingham was elastic enough in its representation to allow 
black civic elites, white liberals, suburban businessmen, and neighborhood advocates 
room to assert their points of view, move disagreements toward resolutions, and influence 
municipal policy. These systems formed from the internal power struggles of the biracial 
metropolitan coalition and the ideas of democratic reform and biracialism that had been 
central to its creation. A key turnover in civic leadership beginning in the mid-1970s, 
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including the deaths of Miles College President Lucius H. Pitts, editor Emory O. Jackson, 
and editor Vincent S. Townsend and the departures of South Central Bell President W. 
Cecil Bauer and UAB President Joseph F. Volker from Birmingham, made room for the 
remaining black civic elites and white liberals to reshape the biracial metropolitan 
coalition around neighborhoods. 
 The political shift in the mid-1970s from Seibels to the Vann-Arrington alliance 
moved these dialogues from the private sphere of ONB to the public forum of City Hall. 
African Americans used the central lessons of the Citizen Participation Program––the 
political organization of neighborhoods––to launch a new coalition that represented black 
Birminghamians in 1977. Arrington was its leader, but he understood the importance of 
biracial communication, especially with whites who shared similar views. Two of 
Arrington’s top mayoral advisors were UAB’s Edward S. LaMonte and former mayor 
David J. Vann. Despite the increasing calls of racial solidarity espoused by neighborhood 
leaders, black civic elites and white liberals continued to communicate with each other as 
well as with neighborhood residents to make Birmingham a livable space. Who led the 
government set the tone for how Birmingham responded to continued collisions of race, 
class, and residence.  
CHAPTER 7 
 
“CITY STAGES”: DIRECTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN BIRMINGHAM’S NEW DOWNTOWN, 1979-1992 
 
To celebrate its thirtieth anniversary in 1987, Operation New Birmingham (ONB) 
asked Mayor Richard Arrington Jr. to pose for the Birmingham Post-Herald to promote 
downtown revitalization and economic growth. A shoeless Arrington jumped on a 
trampoline to showcase downtown’s new skyscrapers. “The city center is jumping 
because of cooperation between the public and private sectors,” he enthusiastically 
proclaimed.
1
 Suburban white businessmen agreed. Investment banker James White III 
advised, “You can do a deal with Richard Arrington because he knows how to be a good 
partner.”
2
 Although the mayor was quick to note that his publicity stunt did not signal a 
change in his political style, the photograph perfectly captured it. At the beginning of his 
third term, Arrington was managing a magnificent turnaround of Birmingham’s 
economic base, and its growth potential was only in the beginning stages. Those 
skyscrapers and the ones to come were as much his accomplishments as they were 
ONB’s. National attention shined on him. US News and World Report recently had 
named Arrington one of the nation’s best mayors, and he enjoyed a reputation as a black 
moderate in national politics. By acting out a scene ONB directed, Arrington’s race was 
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central to selling the idea of a new Birmingham: Once at odds, black political power and 
white economic power coexisted harmoniously in downtown.  
 
Figure 7.1 Mayor Richard Arrington Jr. jumping in downtown, spring 1987. (Photograph from Mendelson, 
“ONB Notes Achievements, Reveals Plans.”)  
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Arrington’s mayoralty signaled the fruition of a post-civil rights, post-industrial 
Birmingham that arose from a twenty-year civic investment in economic development, 
social change, and democratic reform. In his inaugural speech in the fall of 1979, he 
proclaimed, “We no longer deserve the image of the Birmingham of the early 60s….Our 
record of hard work for biracial communication and cooperation has earned for us a new 
image.”
3
 Arrington remained committed to the core of the biracial metropolitan coalition, 
linking together black neighborhood advocates, white liberals, and suburban 
professionals. “I pay the greatest tribute to local people, homegrown folk,” he said in a 
2001 interview, “in that we were able to juggle…three important transitions at the same 
time.” Since the early 1960s, they had “move[d] the city out of the doldrums of steep 
racism and bigotry…a really sick economy, and…exclusion of people from the political 
system. We’ve moved to inclusion of people in the political system, and of course I am a 
symbol of that, being the first black mayor.”
4
   
Although the city thrived under Arrington’s mayoralty, historic racial and class 
tensions and long-term shifts in the systems of power governing Birmingham brought an 
end to biracial moderate politics. Instead of becoming the center of a new Birmingham, 
Arrington’s downtown became a contested site of citizenship among metropolitan whites 
and blacks. Arrington continued to use biracialism as a governing strategy to meet the 
challenges of economic restructuring and urban redevelopment, but it increasingly lost 
electoral viability among whites and blacks in the city of Birmingham. In 1981, urban 
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whites controlled 51 percent of the electorate even though they represented about 45 
percent of the city’s population, a lingering legacy of black disenfranchisement before 
1965. As more whites continued to leave the city limits throughout the 1980s, those who 
remained feared losing their political influence in Birmingham to African Americans. 
They also resented Arrington’s close relationship to Birmingham’s white business 
community.  
Systematic and internal changes within Operation New Birmingham, the 
University of Alabama at Birmingham, and City Hall disrupted the unrecognized 
metropolitan coalition of urban blacks and suburban whites who supported Arrington. 
Bankers and doctors remade key downtown districts to reflect the continued growth of 
the professional service economy through deregulation and privatization, the new mantra 
emanating from Washington, DC, in the 1980s. The Reagan administration accelerated 
the shift in urban policy from targeting neighborhoods to encouraging downtown private 
enterprise, and Birmingham’s neighborhoods, schools, and other public services suffered 
for it. Arrington, however, retained his base of electoral power in African American 
neighborhoods. He earned their loyalty in his challenge of white suburban oversight in 
municipal government in his first term, and their electoral dominance in an at-large city 
council further advanced the image of black home rule in Birmingham. Arrington 
managed these two sides of the metropolitan coalition, but the nature of it changed 
throughout his mayoralty. The new stages of white economic power and black political 
power in downtown effectively weakened biracial civic democracy as the key governing 
system of a post-civil rights, post-industrial Birmingham. 
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Governing a Black and White Birmingham: The Limits of Racial Solidarity and the 
Decline of Biracial Moderate Politics, 1979-1983 
 
 Before Dr. Richard Arrington Jr. became mayor in 1979, it was easy for some 
whites to forget that he was an African American. A 1975 Birmingham Post-Herald 
editorial in favor of his city council reelection stated, “Arrington happens to be black and 
is often viewed as a spokesman for black causes [but this view] misses the whole point.” 
Editor Duard LeGrand explained, “His interest is in people and seeing that government 
and its representatives treat all individuals with respect.”
5
 By the late 1970s, however, 
both whites and blacks questioned Arrington’s image as a politician who used biracialism 
as a governing strategy. Birmingham was experiencing the height of deindustrialization 
and racial tensions unmatched since the early 1960s. Although many in Birmingham had 
formed personal or professional relationships with others of a different race, “whites” as a 
group “worried not so much about Richard Arrington Jr.,” his biographer noted, “but 
about blacks, the group they believed he represented.”
6
 
 The 1977 emergence of Arrington’s political organization the Jefferson County 
Citizens Coalition (JCCC) sparked fear in many whites in eastern and suburban 
Birmingham. Despite the deep economic and political divisions among African 
Americans, the JCCC acted as a front of racial solidarity in municipal politics. Unlike the 
Citizen Participation Program that provided African American citizens with municipal 
representation based on the neighborhood unit, the JCCC was a citywide network 
untethered to political districts that connected blacks in southwest Birmingham with 
those in the northeast. Some neighborhood presidents in the Citizen Participation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 Franklin, Back to Birmingham, 84. Brackets original. 
6
 Ibid., 172. 
  296!
Program served as JCCC leaders. All members equally decided its agendas, 
recommendations, and endorsements in public forums. Using the rhetoric of citizen 
participation, the JCCC successfully concentrated black electoral power to win high-
profile political positions for African Americans. Arrington’s 1979 mayoral challenger 
Frank Parsons compared the JCCC to the “Negro bloc vote” that white segregationists 
harangued about before 1965. The purported danger of the organization, Parsons accused, 
was that it exploited, en masse, naïve black voters “who ought to make up their own 
minds.”
7
 Ignoring the fact that most whites also voted along racial lines, urban whites like 
Parsons saw the JCCC as Arrington’s black political machine that threatened their 
political power and racial status in Birmingham.  
 African Americans, however, increasingly disagreed over the strategies of racial 
solidarity and biracialism in municipal politics. Their divisions largely fell along class 
lines. The JCCC evolved out of an ideological split from the more established Jefferson 
County Progressive Democratic Council (JCPDC) run by black civic elites. Since the 
1930s, the JCPDC had used racial solidarity as an effective strategy to build minority 
electoral power. John Drew and A. G. Gaston, some of its longtime leaders, drew on that 
power to gain civic influence and engage in local politics. After the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 expanded black suffrage, JCPDC leaders continued to support white liberals and 
moderates for office as part of biracial governance. Biracialism remained the source of 
power for black civic elites, who mediated the debate between urban blacks and white 
suburban elites over the direction of Birmingham. Affluent and middle-class blacks used 
a variety of power networks, from Miles College and the University of Alabama at 
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Birmingham (UAB) to the JCPDC and ONB, to create more economic and political 
opportunities for African Americans from the 1950s onward. These opportunities, 
however, were out of reach for many African Americans who lacked access to middle-
class prerequisites such as homeownership, higher education, and basic public services.  
 As poor and working-class blacks began to exercise their vote after 1965, they 
used racial solidarity to disrupt the JCPDC’s long-standing practice of using black votes 
to support white candidates. In the 1973 midterm election, these new voters pushed U. W. 
Clemon, a Columbia-trained lawyer and Miles graduate, into the city council run-off 
race. Despite his credentials, Clemon drew the ire of white civic elites who managed to 
keep their influence on the city council with the help of the JCPDC. To an increasing 
majority of black voters, biracialism hindered progress in advancing black political power 
through gains in office and appointed boards. When the JCPDC endorsed a white 
incumbent over Arrington’s protégé Jeff Germany for a 1977 council seat, Arrington 
broke ranks with the established black leadership by organizing the JCCC. The new 
organization, supported by disgruntled black voters, won Germany a spot on the council.  
 Unlike the black civic elite, the rank-and-file members of the JCCC lived 
primarily in a black Birmingham. “‘Carryovers’ from the old days of civic leagues,” as 
Arrington called them, core members of the JCCC were black men from declining 
neighborhoods who had “paid their dues” but had been sidelined from leadership 
positions in civil rights organizations. They had “less formal education” and held more 
militant racial and political views than black civic elites.
8
 The JCCC allowed heretofore 
obscure African American male leaders to organize and wield power across the city. 
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Benjamin Greene, for example, who first represented Collegeville in the Citizen 
Participation Program, was the president of the JCCC by 1987. He also was an appointed 
board member of the Housing Authority of the Birmingham District throughout the 
1980s.
9
 According to Arrington, core JCCC members like Greene believed they “were 
entitled to some of the harvest” of the civil rights movement by “being the first of their 
race to hold these important [appointed] offices.”
10
 If Birmingham was a majority black 
city, JCCC members reasoned, then it needed a black government.  
 Although blacks represented more than half of the city’s population in 1981, 
whites were the majority of the voting and working public. Jefferson County, which was 
two-thirds white, virtually controlled the look and composition of the city’s public 
service workforce, further undermining black visibility in Birmingham. The 
discriminatory policies of the Jefferson County Personnel Board such as seniority hires 
and civil service exams continued to favor whites and deny blacks access to municipal 
employment. By 1984, only 35.1 percent of municipal workers were African American, 
and the majority of those worked as maintenance men and clerical support staff.
11
 Former 
mayor David J. Vann made a point to hire an equal number of blacks and whites on his 
staff, something that Arrington continued. Vann’s office “serve[d] as an example of what 
can and must be done” to achieve “equilibrium” in employment and City Hall.
12
 Neither 
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Vann nor Arrington, however, had control over the general municipal workforce or 
choice in their division heads. The city engineer and the chief of the Birmingham Police 
Department were positions that had no term limits and no affiliation with a sitting mayor. 
Openings for these public offices were rare. With so many key positions in municipal 
service vetted through the county, the process of desegregating Birmingham’s public life 
and implementing equal racial representation took decades.  
 When the first opportunity arose to challenge the Jefferson County Personnel 
Board, Arrington struck at the heart of white power in Birmingham. In January 1981, 
Police Chief Bill Myers resigned over his frustration with new reforms and his inability 
to control the nearly all-white Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) that was hostile to 
Birmingham’s first black mayor.
13
 Previously in 1977, Mayor Vann entered into a 
consent decree, fully backed by the US Department of Justice, to implement a 
comprehensive affirmative action plan targeting the police and fire departments. The FOP 
legally challenged the decree, but the issue was not settled until its reaffirmation by a 
federal judge in 1981. By then, only 62 African Americans served on a force of nearly 
700 officers.
14
 Vann also began the process of departmental reform by instituting a new 
weapons policy and an officer-training program in the wake of the controversy 
surrounding the police shooting of Bonita Carter that vaulted Arrington into office. 
Arrington, who carried on virtually every initiative Vann implemented, bore the brunt of 
the white officer backlash. Gaining control of the Birmingham Police Department was 
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not only a mandate from African Americans outraged at unpunished police brutality but 
also a key symbol in crushing the culture of white supremacy that continued to run 
rampant through the department and municipal government.  
 Arrington refused to accept the Personnel Board’s first recommendation to 
replace Myers with former Chief James C. Parsons.
15
 Parsons recently had left 
Birmingham for New Orleans to become the city’s white chief of police under its first 
black mayor Ernest “Dutch” Morial. His Big Easy tenure was hardly that. In his less than 
three years as chief, a police strike caused the first-ever cancellation of Mardi Gras and a 
police-murder scandal tainted both Parsons and Morial.
16
 Parsons wanted his old job 
back, but Arrington refused. The new mayor did not want a white chief who fled another 
majority black city after generating disastrous police-community relations there. Whites 
saw Arrington’s refusal as an act of revenge against an old enemy. Although the two 
publicly butted heads in their work as municipal officials in the 1970s, Arrington 
conceded thirty years later that their relationship was “[n]ever anything but professional.” 
Indeed, Arrington had recommended Parsons to Morial based on his “progressive steps to 
upgrade the department.”
17
   
 Throughout his nearly twenty-year career in the Birmingham Police Department, 
Parsons cultivated an image as a reformer among white and black civic elites. Parsons 
attributed his lack of “racial hang-ups” to living in coal mining communities in the 1930s 
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as his father sought to organize workers. Company police often ran his father out of 
various towns, and Parsons confessed that he “really broke his [father’s] heart when [he] 
became a police officer.” After a decade working for the US Navy, he joined the 
Birmingham Police Department in 1954 and was shocked by what he saw. The 
departmental culture “would just absorb” young officers “and corrupt them so fast.” 
Parsons’ vocal objections to corruption often resulted in multiple reassignments that 
stunted his career. Public Safety Commissioner Eugene T. “Bull” Connor frustrated his 
ambitions to make detective despite merit-based recommendations from the Jefferson 
County Personnel Board. In a public speech at UAB in 1978, Parsons denounced Connor 
as “the most vindictive, vengeful bastard that [he] ever met.” He also cited his crucial yet 
secretive support of the 1962 municipal referendum to change Birmingham’s 
government.
18
 While chief in Birmingham, Parsons used open meetings to foster 
communication between white officers and black community members over issues such 
as police harassment and neighborhood improvements. To many civic elites, Parsons’ 
leadership was the result of continued reform and biracialism in Birmingham. 
 Because the Jefferson County Personnel Board acted as a system of white 
governance in a black city, Arrington saw the battle over Parsons as a larger test of black 
self-determination. “It is a very serious matter which cannot be ignored or go 
unchallenged,” Arrington wrote to the concerned president of the Birmingham Area 
Chamber of Commerce. The board’s refusal to submit more candidates was “a position 
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[it] has never taken before with any other Mayor of this City or any other cities under its 
jurisdiction….Why the Board chose to impose restrictions on me,” he carefully posed to 
his white supporter, “or to take me to court without any discussion of the matter is a 
mystery to me.”
19
 Former Mayor Vann argued Arrington’s position in court, citing the 
need for a city to be politically independent of a county, but the county circuit court 
ultimately forced Arrington to choose a chief by mid-November 1981. The mayor 
selected Brooklyn police captain and sometime pulp fiction writer Artie Deutsch, who 
ranked third among the board’s original candidates. Deutsch’s selection was a forced 
compromise, but Arrington clung to victory. By denying the Personnel Board its first 
choice, Arrington made clear that Birmingham’s black mayor would fight the system of 
white oversight in municipal government. 
 Arrington’s unwavering position of black self-determination, however, had a 
disastrous impact on the fall 1981 midterm election for black supporters of racial 
solidarity. White fears of “black Birmingham” were at an historic high. The JCCC, 
emboldened by the mayor’s actions against the Jefferson County Personnel Board, further 
inflamed white anxieties by endorsing an all-black slate of city council candidates. The 
Fraternal Order of Police and former mayoral challenger Frank Parsons named an all-
white slate in response, but the JCCC’s actions were more controversial. The all-black 
slate ignored Nina Miglionico, a white incumbent who had consistently enjoyed black 
support and had championed civil rights causes for nearly forty years. Although 
Arrington was not its president, the JCCC was widely regarded as his organization. His 
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detractors roundly portrayed the mayor as “a king to whom all must bow down.”
20
 The 
mayor’s promise of biracial governance rang hollow in the wake of controversies over 
the police chief selection and the JCCC’s slate. The result was a reduction of black 
representation and Arrington supporters on the city council after the election.  
Although some whites cheered the defeat of the JCCC, others raised questions 
about the viability of biracial moderate politics as evidenced by Miglionico’s near 
dismissal from the city council. Harry Brock, CEO of Central Bancshares, believed the 
“real strong building of rapport” between blacks and whites that Miglionico had 
encouraged was “deteriorating.”
21
 Miglionico represented an older generation of liberal 
whites who had campaigned for equal rights and social justice as they came of age in the 
1930s and 1940s. Born in 1913 to Italian immigrant grocery store owners, she stood out 
in her neighborhood of Avondale. “You walked to school,” she recalled in 1975, and “all 
your neighbors were white, and of course the black people lived in the alleys around 
you.” The Klan terrorized white ethnics and Catholics, including the Miglionico family, 
during the Red Scare following the first world war. Only later did Miglionico realize that 
her family stopped attending St. Paul’s Cathedral for a time after a Klansman 
assassinated a priest there. Despite these tensions, Miglionico’s family was financially 
secure. Nina worked for “pin money,” not her tuition or board for Samford (née Howard) 
College and the University of Alabama School of Law, where she was one of five 
“girls.”
22
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 While struggling to establish a law practice in the late 1930s, Miglionico quickly 
became involved in women’s organizations and political issues such as the campaign to 
abolish the poll tax. Few women, either married or single, could afford the tax. In 1944, 
she linked the battles for women’s and African American suffrage in an open protest 
against the Boswell Amendment, which the state legislature designed as a response to 
Smith v. Allwright (1944) to limit the black electorate.
23
 By the end of the decade, black 
and white women in civic and professional associations across the South began having 
conversations about “the commonalities of gender and racial prejudice,” as historian 
Sarah Wilkerson-Freeman observed. Miglionico’s “democratic feminist principles” 
heavily influenced her continued involvement in the long civil rights movement.
24
 In 
1961, she was one of twenty civic, political, and religious leaders from across the country 
selected for John F. Kennedy’s Presidential Commission on the Status of Women.  
 “Miss Nina,” as she was known, was the most notable, high-profile member of the 
first city council, which was filled with car salesmen, insurance agents, dentists, and 
other white men who thought museums rather than finance suited her abilities.
25
 Standing 
just 4’11,” she fended off sexism in City Hall and won respect citywide after surviving an 
assassination attempt on April 1, 1965. In response to the “March on Selma” as well as 
local desegregation measures, Ku Klux Klan members placed a bomb on Miglionico’s 
front porch in a home she shared with her parents. Miglionico held her ground when 
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challenged on her positions, such as her defense of the 1964 occupational tax after 
Birmingham’s top business leaders belittled her. “She was really, really tough,” 
Arrington recalled, but thankfully, he “happened to be on her side on most issues.” John 
Katopodis, the mayor’s top political rival in the early 1980s, fondly remembered her 
“patronizing manner” when he first joined the council in 1977. “Every meeting she was 
slamming me out of order” in her role as council president, but Miglionico would become 
an advisor and close friend of Katopodis throughout his twenty-year political career.
26
 
Despite the controversy of the racial slates in 1981, she earned 18 percent of the black 
vote to win her seat on the council for another four years.
27
       
 The near dismissal of Miglionico from municipal government in 1981 exposed 
the continuing decline of biracial politics in the face of racial solidarity promoted by both 
blacks and whites. Throughout her career on the city council, Miglionico received broad 
support from “middle-ground voters who didn’t look at color,” including African 
Americans, white union workers, and white liberals.
28
 As Birmingham transitioned from 
a majority white to a majority black city during the late 1970s and early 1980s, those 
voters increasingly disappeared. “We had black folks perceiving that the white folks were 
going to try to take it all,” Alabama’s state representative Antonio Harrison explained 
about the 1981 election, but “then white folks responded that way, too.”
29
 Heightened 
racial animosity in the last five municipal elections had created an electorate that 
distrusted the biracialism practiced by Miglionico and Arrington.  
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 Arrington’s desire to reduce racial tensions in the electoral process led to a 
gentleman’s agreement with John Katopodis to bring civility back to Birmingham politics 
in the 1983 mayoral campaign. Both rejected race-baiting strategies and rhetoric in favor 
of biracialism. Katopodis, who was twelve years younger than Arrington, grew up as the 
son of Greek immigrants in a white working-class neighborhood in west Birmingham 
near Arrington’s hometown of Fairfield. Like the mayor, Katopodis experienced 
Birmingham’s shift from an industrial Jim Crow political order to biracial systems of 
governance sustained by the professional service economy. “You have two individuals,” 
Katopodis explained to the New York Times, “who have seen the bitterness of the past in 
Birmingham, and don’t want to see it again.”
30
 Even if voters agreed with his argument, 
the bulk of them disagreed on what “past” that meant: black home rule or white 
supremacy. The racial composition of the electorate largely determined the number of 
votes cast for Katopodis and Arrington. With blacks now the majority electorate, 
Arrington won in a landslide with 60 percent of the vote, and one more black 
representative joined the council.    
Arrington understood the critical importance of biracialism in the ongoing project 
to build a new Birmingham. It allowed blacks and whites to feel represented in the 
political process. Although he could win on the basis of the black vote alone after 1983, 
Arrington cultivated white support for black governance throughout his mayoral career. 
Indeed, the all-black JCCC slate in 1981 was never replicated. After retaining 10 percent 
of the white vote primarily from those in affluent south Birmingham neighborhoods, 
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Arrington remarked in 1983, “We’ve begun to fashion a new coalition of voters.”
31
 This 
coalition of urban blacks and affluent whites, however, was not new. Its look had 
changed to reflect the racial shifts in the city’s electoral base and population. Most 
Birminghamians, however, failed to see the nuances behind Arrington’s coalition. Voting 
strictly along racial lines, the majority of the black and white urban electorate continued 
to reject biracialism in a municipal government led by an African American. 
  
Creating Public-Private Partnerships: Block 60 and the Remaking of Operation 
New Birmingham, 1979-1989 
 
 Arrington assumed office during a time of major transition in Operation New 
Birmingham (ONB) after the death of its longtime Chairman of the Board and editor of 
the Birmingham News Vincent S. Townsend in 1978. Giving voice to white suburban 
ideas of community and the common good since the early 1960s, Townsend’s boosterism 
in ONB and the News was an attempt to “inspire confidence” in Birmingham and its 
citizens as they wrestled with the implications of political and economic change in their 
daily lives.
32
 Along with entrepreneur A. G. Gaston, the city’s most powerful African 
American, he occupied a middle ground, if rightward leaning, in Birmingham politics. 
Both men had the power to put opposing groups such as white suburban businessmen and 
black neighborhood advocates into communication with each other. Townsend’s key 
endorsement of Arrington in both city council races in the Birmingham News came out of 
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his personal and professional relationship with Gaston.
33
 As Jessie J. Lewis, editor of the 
black newspaper the Birmingham Times, remembered decades later, “Townsend was a 
typical Southerner, born in Mississippi, and very typical of people during those times, but 
I had a way of getting along with those kind of people.”
34
 The type of personal and 
private communication Townsend and Gaston engaged in, or the old ways in race 
relations, had been central to forming new relationships between blacks and whites in a 
post-civil rights era.  
 Townsend’s death, as well as the loss of key leaders in the biracial civic elite in 
the 1970s, represented the passing of an older generation who had negotiated the 
transition between the old and new Birmingham.
35
 Although Lucius H. Pitts, president of 
Miles College, left Birmingham in 1971, his sudden death from a heart attack at age 59 
three years later was a blow to those blacks and whites he befriended and continued to 
advise. The Unitarian Universalist Church, the spiritual home of white liberals such as 
Charles F. Zukoski Jr. and Dr. Joseph F. Volker, organized a memorial service for Pitts.
36
 
Volker, the visionary behind UAB, left Birmingham for Tuscaloosa in 1976 when he 
became chancellor of the University of Alabama System.
37
 Although he retained his 
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Vestavia Hills residence, Volker never returned to his high level of civic engagement 
once he returned to Birmingham in 1982. Finally, W. Cecil Bauer, the president of South 
Central Bell who used ONB’s Community Affairs Committee as an instrument of social 
welfare and personal change in racial attitudes, was reassigned to another regional 
headquarters branch in 1978. His company, which ONB hailed as the most prominent 
new arrival to Birmingham in the late 1960s, left downtown for the suburbs. 
 With these key losses in civic leadership, ONB slowly shook off its role as a 
community action agency working toward improved race relations in Birmingham. The 
activities of ONB’s biracial Community Affairs Committee (CAC) in the 1970s alienated 
some white suburban supporters as white liberals and black elites steered it toward a 
more activist body working with Birmingham neighborhoods. In April 1978 Dr. James T. 
Montgomery bitterly noted that top ONB leaders, those who represented “the power 
structure,” had stopped attending CAC meetings. Townsend, who did so “at a great 
sacrifice,” was the only exception.
38
 Peggy Spain McDonald of the Greater Birmingham 
Foundation and state senator Paschal P. Vacca resigned from CAC earlier that spring, 
signaling the departure of white philanthropists and suburban politicians from biracial 
metropolitan governance. The group, Vacca wrote, “is too large and continuously 
growing” and should keep to “matters relating to the purpose designed by [CAC] when 
founded.”
39
 In that year, CAC’s steering committee, led by retired principal and 
councilwoman Bessie Estell, had more blacks than whites for the first time. “We are 
going to have to stand up to Mrs. Estell and other blacks,” Jane House, Townsend’s 
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longtime assistant, advised to ONB’s new Executive Director William C. Green Jr. in 
1980. “We will never have a good CAC until we get rid of all the paid staff people” who 
run the neighborhood programs and “put the policy makers back on it.”
40
  
 After a decade of working in the neighborhoods, with the problems of poverty 
hardly abated, Green announced that ONB would “return to its basic role of revitalizing 
the Central Business District of Birmingham.”
41
 By the late 1970s, however, stagflation, 
high interest rates, and a decaying downtown made redevelopment a risky business. 
Foremost among white businessmen’s concerns was crime, which had spread from 
deteriorating black neighborhoods surrounding downtown. A planned nightclub district 
suffered a mortal blow when a gang of black youths murdered out-of-town white 
executives in 1978. The historic Redmont Hotel on Nineteenth Street North, less than two 
blocks from City Hall, became known for its hourly rates and clientele of prostitutes and 
drunks. Such illicit activity further eroded sales in downtown department stores as 
shoppers increasingly visited branches spread across the metropolitan area. Concerned 
about “urban decay,” Emil Hess, owner of the department store Parisian, advocated for a 
higher property tax in 1975 to improve downtown conditions and business volume for his 
store. Although handsomely profiting and paying higher taxes on his suburban stores, 
Hess was “willing to pay a more modern price for city privilege” if it meant the survival 
of downtown Birmingham.
42
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 Downtown’s rapid deterioration after nearly a decade of growth reflected many 
structural changes in national and local urban policy. In 1973, federal officials began to 
shut down the very programs civic leaders had used to support the creation of a new 
Birmingham. Large-scale redevelopment projects were a thing of the past; as one civic 
leader explained, “The Federal Government is going out of the urban renewal 
business.”
43
 It also went out of the public housing business. By 1975, urban funding that 
had been earmarked for social welfare and infrastructure projects consolidated into one 
package, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). The Citizen Participation 
Program gave residents access to CDBGs for neighborhood improvements, but a portion 
of funds were set aside for economic development and other public projects. The 
continued decline in federal funding and its widespread dispersion throughout eighty-six 
neighborhoods and downtown made CDBGs inefficient urban redevelopment tools. 
Downtown’s survival depended on private redevelopment. 
 Although ONB recommitted to downtown by 1980, its reputation among 
powerful white business leaders had been damaged by its foray into community matters. 
Moreover, it lacked a strong leader who could corral the business community behind new 
projects. Many powerful members of the white Birmingham business community 
distrusted Arrington and the implied promise of black home rule in the city of 
Birmingham. “I really cannot find words to adequately express how totally unprepared 
the white community was for a black mayor and particularly the white business 
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community,” Edward S. LaMonte, Arrington’s executive secretary, recalled in 2004.
44
 
Important differences among suburban white businessmen, however, always existed.  
Although Henry Goodrich, president of Southern Natural Gas Company, and 
James White III, from one of Birmingham’s leading financial advisory firms, had never 
been involved with ONB, they proposed the Business Advisory Group (BAG) to 
Arrington near the beginning of his mayoral career.
45
 Acutely focused on downtown 
rather than “people’s problems,” BAG was the virtual remaking of the Birmingham 
Downtown Improvement Association, ONB’s original parent organization.
46
 Except for 
Arrington, A. G. Gaston, nearing ninety years in age, was the only African American 
who met with the presidents of UAB, Alabama Power, Engel Enterprises, Liberty 
National Life Insurance Company, Rust Engineering, and South Central Bell as well as 
downtown retailers Emil Hess and Richard Pizitz. Bank presidents, who largely had been 
absent in the civic crusade to build a new Birmingham, also joined the group.
47
 In these 
“candid conversations” that were “always unpublicized” as LaMonte described, 
Arrington and Birmingham’s top 25 business leaders “got to know one another” and 
talked city affairs.
48
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 As Arrington’s executive secretary for two terms, LaMonte played a key role in 
forging relationships between the mayor’s office and the white business community on 
downtown redevelopment projects. Based on his decade of experience as the director of 
UAB’s Center for Urban Affairs, LaMonte brought his unique knowledge of 
Birmingham’s political landscape and networking skills to his job. In his meetings with 
white business leaders, LaMonte “was able to…persuade members of a very agitated and 
concerned white business community that they ought to at least give [Arrington] a 
chance.” LaMonte and Arrington had formed a lasting personal and professional 
relationship since their days at Miles and UAB in the late 1960s, and they developed a 
synergy in governing Birmingham. “I have never worked more comfortably or easily 
with anyone in a working relationship than I did with Dick,” LaMonte noted. Over time, 
LaMonte’s role “was to interpret [Arrington] to others” and rally support around him 
from the business community.
49
    
 LaMonte was the key point person on Block 60, an urban redevelopment project 
the city hoped would attract visitors, bring in white-collar professionals, and ease crime 
and fear in downtown. Metropolitan Properties, Inc., a real estate development company 
founded by two Birmingham natives, won the city’s bid to develop Block 60 in the 
summer of 1980. Its plan included high-rise office towers, condominiums, and a Westin 
International Hotel. The design, project architect Roger W. Dodson remarked, would 
make Block 60 “a good neighbor with the existing buildings” such as the South Central 
Bell building, the new headquarters of the Alabama Power Company, and Park Place 
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Tower, which Metropolitan Properties had developed a few years before.
50
 The new 
structures on Block 60 would be made of glass, marble, and stone; these reflective 
surfaces would highlight existing downtown architecture and would make the new city 
center feel bigger to its pedestrians than it was. LaMonte called Block 60 a “critical 
turning point” in downtown: “A long process of steady erosion will be halted and a real 
reversal will take place.”
51
   
 Although Metropolitan Properties recently had developed downtown’s Park 
Place, owners Raymond D. Gotlieb and Robert D. Bohorfoush did not have the 
experience of cobbling together contracts from so many invested parties that Block 60’s 
development required.
52
 In a little over ten years, Metropolitan Properties had grown into 
an upstart real estate firm specializing in suburban development. Neither Bohorfoush nor 
Gotlieb expressed any larger reason for developing in downtown other than economic 
gain. “There’s no limit on how much money you can make, if you’re willing to work at it 
and take some risks,” Bohorfoush explained.
53
 Gotlieb flatly dismissed public assistance 
for Block 60 from municipal resources or federal grants that encouraged partnerships 
between the public and private sectors. “There’s nothing wrong with doing business 
without federal grants,” Gotlieb rationalized; referring to his earlier success without 
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them, Gotlieb stated, “The proof is in the pudding.”54 Others scoffed at their intent to 
forgo public support to develop the $120 million project. One prominent banker 
anonymously confided, “I cannot imagine that it is economically feasible to pay for 
anything like that….I’d hate like hell to have any of my money in it.”55 Brimming with 
youthful arrogance, lacking a larger civic purpose, and promoting a free-market ideology, 
the two developers failed to inspire confidence in Block 60.  
 Property and business owners quickly painted Block 60 as an attack on locally 
owned mom-and-pop stores by Birmingham’s biracial partnership between city officials 
and business leaders. A small number of these businesses, which had served bankers, 
industrialists, and lawyers, had been in the same location since the 1920s, including 
Birmingham’s first Chinese restaurant, Joy Young’s. By the 1970s, drug stores, 
restaurants, and specialty shops of low caliber such as an adult bookstore occupied one- 
or two-story buildings on the block. J. Edmund Odum Jr., co-owner of Cliff’s Cleaners, 
pointedly argued, “The city claims to want thriving businesses in downtown. They claim 
to actively solicit businesses. Then they take a business like ours that’s been in the same 
place for 30 years and they put them on the street.”56 Block 60, tenants argued, was one 
of the most profitable and occupied blocks in downtown Birmingham, but that claim bore 
little weight given that the entire central business district qualified as blighted. Restaurant 
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owner George Sarris, an immigrant from southern Greece, remarked, “I’m not against the 
progress of the city,” but Block 60 “won’t fill my belly.”
57
  
 Fearing the loss of Block 60, especially during a midterm election season 
dominated by the personnel board controversy, LaMonte and the mayor urged the pro-
Arrington city council to take action. Metropolitan Properties only had acquired 30 
percent of the block within a year of the project’s announcement.
58
 LaMonte argued that 
the cornerstone of downtown redevelopment was for “the public good.”
59
 Block 60 was 
too important to lose. On September 8, 1981, the council declared the majority of the 
block blighted, which would allow the city to condemn the land and force owners to sell 
at reduced market value. Birmingham’s municipal government and white business 
leaders previously used such tactics in the building of “Design for Progress” in the 1960s, 
resulting in public projects with economic value such as UAB, the Civic Center, and Red 
Mountain Expressway that primarily benefited white suburbanites. Although these 
projects incited public opposition, federal policies and Townsend’s control of local media 
effectively silenced the voices of those affected by urban renewal. The loss of African 
American living spaces was also of little concern to most white Birminghamians. This 
time, however, victims of revitalization were white small business owners. 
 Block 60 revealed an increasing division between whites who rejected the biracial 
partnership between city officials and business leaders and those who realized the 
necessity of it in making Birmingham a post-industrial city. Arrington’s leadership 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Kitty Frieden, “Block 60 Spokesmen Protest, City Delays Vote on Whether to Condemn,” Birmingham 
News, August 25, 1981, Block 60 Clipping Files. 
59
 Kitty Frieden, “Block 60 ‘Splintered’ Interests Converge on City,” Birmingham News, August 30, 1981, 
Block 60 Clipping Files. 
  317!
remained under question, but he used his weekly conversations with influential white 
suburban businessmen to rally their support for the larger goal of redeveloping 
downtown. Near the end of 1982, portions of financing for Block 60 suddenly fell apart. 
Cameron Grammas suddenly demanded sharply higher prices for his properties that 
Metropolitan Properties had not yet acquired. With the entire project at stake, Arrington 
asked SouthTrust Corporation to float a last minute loan. Formerly known as the 
Birmingham Trust and Savings Company, SouthTrust demanded certain conditions such 
as office space in the planned towers even though it initially refused to relocate its 
headquarters there. The city also insured the project by entering into an agreement to 
purchase nearly half the block should Metropolitan Properties fail to gain final financing 
within a set time frame.
60
       
 Despite these hurried efforts by Arrington and SouthTrust, the Block 60 project 
fell apart at the beginning of 1983. Gusty Yearout, the lawyer for Grammas, the last 
property-owner holdout, unexpectedly left the city for vacation on December 30 in the 
midst of renegotiating contracts with the city of Birmingham and Metropolitan Properties 
that were due the next day. This missed deadline voided the contracts between the city, 
the redevelopment company, and property owners that stipulated the full purchase of 
Block 60 by then. Grammas was a prominent member of Birmingham’s small Greek 
community, which included John Katopodis, Arrington’s rival on the city council. After 
the 1981 midterm council election, Katopodis led a new conservative white majority. He 
was an outspoken critic of Metropolitan Properties and the city’s potential new role as a 
private property owner. Arrington was furious with all three men, but he continued to 
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negotiate with them into the new year. Pleading with Yearout, the mayor told the lawyer 
that he would “step aside” in his role as the one who brought the project to completion. “I 
will even go along with you to a press conference and stand with you,” he argued. “You 
can give credit to whomever you want, [but] the city needs the project.”
61
   
 Arrington learned hard lessons in the struggle to redevelop Block 60 in the wake 
of shifting federal policy, local politics, and deindustrialization. The rules and players had 
changed since “Design for Progress” in 1965. Although industrial flight began in the 
early 1970s, the shutdown of U.S. Steel operations in early 1982 pushed the city’s 
unemployment rate up to 16 percent.
62
 This economic environment discouraged public 
spending. The Reagan Administration also drastically cut funding to urban areas and 
social programs, but the funds that did exist required private investment and a 
concentrated target. Free enterprise was the new ethos in Washington, which launched a 
wave of financial deregulation that reverberated in downtown Birmingham. Arrington 
chose a development firm that promoted the ideology to lay the cornerstone for a new 
city center, demonstrating his administration’s commitment to private investment. Civic 
boosters had a history of promoting both privatism and public-private partnerships, but 
since the 1930s, redevelopment had been contingent on massive infusions of federal 
funds. Even though Reagan’s urban policies favored private redevelopment in downtown, 
white Birminghamians as well as the owners of Metropolitan Properties largely rejected 
the principle of government involvement in business affairs.    
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Arrington and LaMonte, however, brilliantly nurtured relationships with 
Birmingham’s major corporations that depended on favorable federal policy. SouthTrust 
Corporation, which Arrington hailed for its “corporate and civic commitment” to 
downtown, eventually bought the Block 60 site for its new headquarters.63 SouthTrust 
and AmSouth Bancorp, formerly First National Bank of Birmingham, were entering their 
second decade of rapid expansion thanks to a 1972 Alabama state law that allowed banks 
to form holding companies. In the 1980s, other state and federal deregulatory laws 
allowed these companies to cross state lines and extend consumer credit. By the early 
1980s, AmSouth controlled nearly one-fifth of all deposits in the state of Alabama, with 
local deposits reflecting the transition in Birmingham’s workforce.64 Healthcare 
providers, financiers, realtors, and other professional services accounted for 3 of every 10 
workers in metropolitan Birmingham in 1980, whereas in the decade before they 
represented 10 percent.65 UAB’s economic impact on personal income alone yielded 
$298.7 million in local deposits in 1982.66 SouthTrust had the capital to develop Block 60 
by itself.  
 SouthTrust and AmSouth were instrumental in helping Arrington revitalize 
downtown and expand Birmingham’s commercial tax base. The new SouthTrust tower, 
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completed in 1986 with the distinction as the state of Alabama’s largest building, used 
materials intended for the Metropolitan Properties project. It provided a reflective mirror 
to highlight the new buildings popping up in downtown. AmSouth and Harbert 
Construction Company, an internationally recognized firm, used light brown marble and 
a modern art deco style for their joint tower, completed in 1989. Donald Hess, heir of 
Parisian, quickly set up a small, upscale branch of his department store in this new 
building. Regions, which had formed as a holding company in 1971, constructed a new 
headquarters across the street from SouthTrust. The intersection of Twentieth Street and 
Fifth Avenue North held all three new skyscrapers, creating a new finance center to 
match Birmingham’s position as the fourth largest financial district in the nation by the 
late 1980s. This explosion of construction from Birmingham’s preeminent banks caused a 
wave of revitalization across the downtown area.  
 The long redevelopment of Block 60 revealed both the weakening and 
strengthening of Birmingham’s biracial partnership between municipal government and 
business leaders that traditionally had operated through ONB. The loss of Vincent 
Townsend as ONB’s leader had implications on the entire Block 60 campaign. Even 
while the Birmingham News lavished attention on another private redevelopment project 
in downtown, it remained skeptical of Block 60. After Townsend’s death in 1978, the 
News had developed a new cynicism about public institutions and leaders that other 
media outlets adopted earlier in the decade. Its newly pessimistic tone represented a shift 
in its orientation toward the city of Birmingham. Older civic leaders recognized it and 
called the News’ coverage destructive. Don Newton, an original ONB member and 
current president of the Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce, declared, “If the 
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newspapers had stayed away from” critical stories highlighting the point of view of 
property owners, the failure of Block 60 “might not have happened….When you’re 
dealing with private property, too much knowledge is a dangerous thing.”
67
 The News, 
the former mouthpiece for ONB, was now one of the biggest public detractors of Block 
60 and Arrington. 
 New leadership at ONB, which largely had been silent during the Block 60 
campaign, remade the organization in response to changes in federal policy and public 
opinion. Mike Calvert arrived in Birmingham in the spring of 1982 as ONB’s new 
Downtown Development director. Calvert quickly went to work on the Block 60 project, 
explaining available options to tenants and collaborating with LaMonte. An architect 
turned city planner, Calvert came to Birmingham from Baltimore, where he used federal 
programs to keep small businesses in neighborhood commercial districts and on the 
much-praised Inner Harbor project. In Birmingham, he strongly pushed for federal grants, 
condemnation acts, and eminent domain, citing the assembly of land as “a valid public 
purpose.” Many Birminghamians saw eminent domain as a government takeover of 
private property. Given the temper of land politics, LaMonte and others in the Arrington 
administration believed that Alabama courts would not favor the use of eminent 
domain.
68
 Nonetheless, Calvert pushed forward. Favorable laws and federal programs 
were vital to economic development, and he aggressively pursued them. 
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 Calvert further transformed the rhetoric and function of ONB, the former 
epicenter of a biracial metropolitan Birmingham, to reflect a national and local political 
culture enthralled by ideas of privatism. Reagan’s urban and economic policies concealed 
the public’s crucial role in redevelopment and economic growth. Calvert made it clear 
that ONB represented business interests, not the Birmingham public or the city. The new 
ONB letterhead rolled out in 1983 even reflected this change. “A partnership of 
Businesses, Civic Leaders and Public Officials” replaced the “All-America City” tagline 
also found on municipal letterhead, previously making the city and the organization 
indistinguishable. Vincent Townsend’s ONB assumed it represented a broad, inclusive 
Birmingham public, and he believed the Community Affairs Committee brought private 
citizens closer to their public officials. By the 1980s, some former members of ONB 
moved those discussions directly into the mayor’s office. Calvert’s relationship with 
LaMonte and the Business Advisory Group’s one with Arrington drove the planning of 
city affairs. Not surprisingly, new development strategies in downtown primarily 
benefitted white suburbanites. ONB’s divestment of a larger civic vision of Birmingham 
reflected a new conservatism that diminished public life at the expense of private gain.  
 
The University that Ate Birmingham: The Kirklin Clinic and the End of Volker’s 
Urban University, 1979-1992 
 
 As the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) became the city’s largest 
employer by the mid-1970s, the institution entered into an identity crisis. From the 1940s 
onward, Dr. Joseph F. Volker and other administrators had justified the growth of the 
Medical Center and then UAB as meeting the needs of citizens in an urban environment. 
UAB was the only public university in the area, and it had long been a site of African 
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American advancement and employment. UAB had become so well known as a site of 
black higher education that after 1983 student breakdown by race was no longer featured 
in the annual “Facts and Figures.”
69
 In 1980 UAB reached an enrollment peak of around 
14,500 students. Given this stagnation, the thousands of unemployed industrial workers 
hardly found refuge in higher education.
70
 After Edward LaMonte’s departure for 
municipal government, the Center for Urban Affairs focused less on shaping public 
policy and more on implementing community programs. The Urban Studies Department 
also folded into the Department of Political Science in 1980.
71
 UAB’s apparent success 
seemingly mitigated its earlier mission based on urban needs.
72
 The crucial part of UAB’s 
identity––its urbanness––was losing its relevance.    
 S. Richardson Hill, former dean of the School of Medicine who served as 
president from 1977 to 1987, led the charge to give UAB a new identity. UAB’s rapid 
and unusual growth prevented the formation of a cohesive, unified university. In the late 
1970s, it was still referred to as the “Medical Center” or as part of but not different from 
the University of Alabama. “‘UAB’ was probably not in their vocabulary,” Public 
Relations Director Gloria Goldstein recalled. “What a tremendous job we had to do, 
public relations-wise, of promoting the name of this place.” Goldstein began referring to 
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“UAB” in all public relations announcements as a way to brand the university.
73
 Hill 
launched a men’s Division I basketball program in 1978 by attracting championship-
winning coach Gene Bartow from the University of California, Los Angeles, a move an 
outside critic described as “the answer to UAB’s identity crisis.”
74
 Bartow led the new 
UAB Blazers, who played in the Civic Center Coliseum, to prominence within three 
years, landing the team a coveted spot in the 1982 national quarterfinals. These actions 
helped to give UAB its name––a singular identity anyone could refer to and easily 
recognize in Birmingham, the state, or across the country.   
 Despite an emerging athletic brand, UAB remained synonymous with healthcare. 
Its long-term effect on the metropolitan political economy began to show in dramatic 
ways in the 1980s. People came to Birmingham for world-class healthcare, and UAB was 
consistently ranked as one of the top five medical centers in the nation by the late 1980s. 
Once again, faculty growth in the Medical Center far outpaced University College, rising 
from an already impressive number of 589 in 1981 to 1,188 in 1987.
75
 Local competitors 
such as St. Vincent’s Hospital Services and HealthSouth Corporation surrounded the 
campus and hired UAB’s healthcare graduates. Over 30,000 people visited the UAB 
campus each day by using Eighth Avenue South exits located on both Red Mountain 
Expressway and Interstate 65. In 1984, Hill petitioned the city council to rename the 
avenue “University Boulevard” in recognition of the primary purpose of the 
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thoroughfare. It was the first street in downtown Birmingham, which only had numbered 
and directional roads, to be named.
76
   
 Healthcare support industries such as Liberty National Life Insurance Company 
benefited tremendously from UAB’s growth. Top executives sat on the University of 
Alabama Board of Trustees, directed UAB’s two major urban renewal programs, and 
earned enormous financial rewards for themselves as their company grew in relation to 
the healthcare economy. Intricately connected to UAB, Liberty National’s growth across 
the Southeast attracted the attention of a competitor, Torchmark Insurance of Texas, in 
1986. By then, Liberty National’s headquarters were in the explosively growing suburb 
of Hoover, home to a new middle class squeezed out of the three historic Over-the-
Mountain suburbs.
77
 Corporate relocation partly was explained as the result of moving 
the workplace to where employees lived, which were in suburban municipalities with 
better public services than the city of Birmingham. 
 By the late 1980s, Liberty National’s former headquarters housed the 
administrative offices of the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation (HSF), a 
private non-profit corporation that organized UAB’s medical and dental faculty into a 
private practice. Established in 1972 by UAB’s Chief of Surgery John W. Kirklin, the 
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Foundation had become an even more powerful entity within the university. In 1986 
Kirklin announced to top university administrators his intentions to build new office and 
clinical space for HSF members. In an era of healthcare maintenance organizations, 
Kirklin argued that the new mega-facility spanning four blocks would provide better 
patient care than the maze of hospitals and clinics at UAB. Modeled after the Mayo 
Clinic, which Kirklin left for UAB twenty years before, the facility would offer a team 
approach to healthcare, one billing system, and increased patient-per-diems. Hill and 
Charles A. “Scotty” McCallum, who succeeded him as president of UAB in 1987, joined 
Kirklin in negotiations with the city of Birmingham and Operation New Birmingham.  
 As long-time allies of UAB in their work to rebuild Birmingham, Arrington and 
ONB fully supported Kirklin’s brick-and-mortar project for the Health Services 
Foundation.
78
 Mike Calvert, one of the clinic’s primary boosters, declared that ONB 
“sees the future of Birmingham as tied very closely to the health field and to UAB.”
79
 
Now ONB’s new executive director, Calvert strongly argued for the use of eminent 
domain. Block 60 had failed, he believed, because the city was too hesitant in using the 
powers available to it. “We don’t intend to repeat the mistakes of that project,” he told 
reporters; “we learned lessons from that.” He won Birmingham’s right to use eminent 
domain in a 1985 Alabama Supreme Court case, and Calvert used that in his negotiations 
with property owners. “If the project is important enough to the city to use 
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condemnation,” Calvert explained, “everyone needs to know that up front.”80 Arrington 
fully embraced the project and Calvert’s methods. “We must seize this opportunity,” he 
remarked in a 1987 mayoral debate. “There are, in our short history as a city, too many 
examples of missed opportunities and resulting hindsights filled with regrets.”81    
 Despite the overwhelming support from Birmingham’s biracial public-private 
partnership, criticism of the proposed clinic arose from within the Medical Center, the 
city council, and the metropolitan public. Internal resistance at UAB to the clinic 
reflected the perpetual tension within its identity as a provider of public and private 
services, which the practices of the Foundation had made more apparent over a fifteen-
year period. The proposed clinic emphasized private practice over research and teaching 
responsibilities among Medical Center faculty. Even though faculty and department 
chairs financially benefited from the HSF, they largely opposed the new facility on the 
grounds that it would lead to a loss of control over patient services. They also did not like 
the “Kirklin Tax,” which tapped into their professional fees to fund the new clinic to the 
tune of $68 million.  
 Kirklin attributed internal opposition to his plans as the fetishization of academic 
freedom. “Faculties feel that they are the university,” he remarked, rather than “simply 
employees…in a corporation.” The Health Services Foundation changed academic 
healthcare at UAB to a “more corporate instead of, less of a collegiate type of enterprise,” 
Kirklin explained.82 Aside from housing the largest private practice in Birmingham, the 
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HSF was also a major investor through a subsidiary company of a rapidly growing 
healthcare maintenance organization, Complete Health, Inc. In 1987, McCallum fended 
off plans from some University of Alabama trustees who wanted to create a new 
organizational structure that effectively would have acknowledged Kirklin’s observation 
and separated UAB’s academic and healthcare functions.
83
 Although UAB was a divided 
campus, former President Joseph F. Volker always had envisioned a full-fledged 
university as a central partner to the Medical Center. 
 Because members of the Health Services Foundation were UAB faculty, it was 
one of the most powerful yet largely unknown healthcare corporations in the region. The 
Birmingham public only knew Kirklin as UAB’s star cardiologist. A reader of the 
Birmingham News raised a question of critical importance when she asked of the clinic, 
“Is it or is it not a UAB undertaking?”
84
 Area citizens widely supported the public 
university, but they were wary of public-private initiatives in the wake of Block 60. That 
debacle, roundly used by Arrington’s critics as proof of his failed leadership, colored the 
discussions of the Kirklin Clinic, which the new facilities would be called. Although it 
was co-developed by UAB, the Kirklin Clinic was a project of the Health Services 
Foundation, a private corporation.  
 A vocal minority of white public officials spoke out against the role of the city of 
Birmingham in the Kirklin Clinic project, which reflected a shift in white thought about 
the relationship between the public and private sectors. In the past, city and county 
officials heartily endorsed urban redevelopment projects, most of which federal grants 
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and programs spurred, to provide public services and attract private investment. ONB and 
UAB drove key development projects in the late 1960s, but their benefits were spread 
unevenly throughout the metropolitan area. Urban whites had opposed the city’s 
relationship with ONB since then, but their conservative voices gained influence on the 
council and in federal government by the early 1980s. John Katopodis, who had moved 
from the city council to the Jefferson County Commission by 1987, objected to Calvert’s 
threat of eminent domain. Looking back on Block 60, he said, “I could not vote to 
condemn [Grammas’] property so someone else could make a profit.”
85
 Councilor Bettye 
Fine Collins, a Katopodis ally, publicly stated that “to allow a private developer” such as 
the Health Services Foundation “to come in and use a power that belongs to us by law, I 
think, is abdicating our responsibility. This [matter] should stay over there in the private 
sector.”
86
 As a private company, Collins reasoned, the HSF should use the free market to 
bargain with the owners of thriving Southside businesses.  
 Restaurant owner George Sarris, previously evicted from Block 60, dominated the 
public outcry with his folksy charm, idiosyncratic sound bites, and faith in free enterprise. 
Launching S.O.S. (Southside Organization of Small Businesses), Sarris’ group plastered 
the city with flyers “in the memory of a Healthy Small Business Climate in 
Birmingham.” Although Kirklin and Calvert promoted the clinic, Sarris found 
Arrington’s government responsible: “Have you ever worked very hard for something 
only to have someone else take it away from you for their own personal gain? Well, we, 
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the members of S.O.S., believe that is exactly what is happening to us at the hands of the 
city planners of the City of Birmingham who apparently are working in concert with the 
University of Alabama Health Services Foundation.” HSF executives, Sarris argued, 
“surely should understand and appreciate our view towards property ownership and 
private enterprise. We simply are business people who want to earn a living, serve the 
public, and enjoy the advantages of living in Birmingham.”
87
 To Sarris and his 
supporters, the city, not private business, was to blame. Such intense outcry as well as 
incomplete planning forced the HSF to scale back its project by one block. Sarris’ Fish 
Market Restaurant was saved, but he mocked the move. “With that kind of planning,” he 
said, “if the Health Services Foundation was NASA and they tried to put a man on the 
moon, as far as they would go probably is Bessemer,” about ten miles west of 
downtown.
88
   
 Sarris and other critics also zeroed in on the private nature of the HSF, tapping 
into long-standing class antagonisms between whites in the metropolitan area. Sarris 
confessed to the reading audience of the Birmingham News, “I gave my allegiance to 
America and became a citizen, never knowing that I was not good enough to own 
property if some big doctors wanted my property to make themselves more rich and 
famous.”
89
 Another citizen wrote that unbeknownst to the public, the HSF “became the 
money handler and administrative arm of UAB’s medical system….Nearly unlimited 
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hidden wealth can corrupt the motivations of even the most honorable men and 
organizations if given a particular set of circumstances.”90 Such sentiments expressed 
local opinion that doctors, rather than industrialists, now controlled Birmingham. The 
intense backlash against the HSF pressured Kirklin, an intensely private man, into 
publicly revealing his salary, about $379,000 in 1986. Even though he believed demands 
for such information were “inflammatory, divisive, and damaging,” Kirklin’s 
astronomical salary only fed the fire of critics such as Sarris whose livelihood was 
threatened by the project.91   
The dominance of the healthcare economy and the new image it provided for 
Birmingham drowned out the intense public outcry against the Kirklin Clinic. When the 
clinic opened in 1992, city officials and civic boosters heralded it as a new era in 
healthcare. A private super-clinic of medical all-stars, it increased patient-per-diems, 
consolidated services, reduced costs, and ensured higher profits for clinicians; more 
patients meant more money. Internationally recognized architect I. M. Pei, fresh off the 
success of reimagining the Louvre courtyard as a series of glass pyramids, designed the 
facility. C. Mark Smith, director of Birmingham’s economic development office, boasted, 
“Having an I. M. Pei building in town says something.”92 The selection of Pei suggests a 
more ambitious meaning than patient care in launching the new clinic. The building was 
a monument to Kirklin’s achievement in privatizing academic healthcare and 
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revolutionizing Birmingham’s image as a world-class medical center for specialized 
healthcare services. 
 
Figure 7.2 Aerial view of Birmingham from the southwest, 1992. The UAB campus is in the foreground, 
and downtown is in the background. University Boulevard connects US Interstate 65, on the left, and Red 
Mountain Expressway on the right. (Courtesy of UAB Archives.) 
 The Kirklin Clinic effectively ended any attempt by UAB administrators to create 
an integrated urban university, but that vision, so beloved by former President Volker, 
never had a chance. Student life expanded under both of Volker’s successors, and 
University College accounted for much of UAB’s physical growth in the 1990s and 
beyond.
93
 Every president of UAB, however, has been a healthcare professional. Less 
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than two months after Volker’s untimely death due to complications from surgery in the 
early spring of 1989, Kirklin resigned from UAB and divorced the clinic completely from 
the university.
94
 As long as Volker was alive, the cold, analytical surgeon could have 
never pulled the project away from UAB. Kirklin’s move symbolized the autonomy and 
privatization of academic healthcare that further undermined Volker’s vision of a fully 
integrated urban university. By 1992, the Kirklin Clinic occupied three blocks with 
modern, reflective buildings designed by a Pritzker Prize-winning architect that clearly 
distinguished them from the red brick campus and matched downtown’s new finance 
center. In sharp contrast, Volker Hall, home to the Basic Sciences program in University 
College that had been so crucial to establishing an interdisciplinary research life in the 
1950s, was a small, utilitarian, yellow-brick building tucked behind University Hospital.    
In the debate over the Kirklin Clinic, urban and suburban whites called into 
question the power of the second generation of biracial civic elites led by Arrington, 
Calvert, and Kirklin to direct Birmingham. Black and white civic elites working through 
City Hall, ONB, and UAB had united in the 1960s to reform the economic, political, and 
social structures of Birmingham that had limited progress and restricted citizenship. Over 
twenty years later, urban whites accused civic elites of committing the same crimes. The 
new generation of coalition leaders operated from an incredibly strong base of economic 
power––the healthcare economy––to accomplish their redevelopment goals. ONB’s 
Calvert was a dynamic and aggressive leader who saw the way things were done in 
Birmingham as inefficient, which was similar to how Kirklin saw the need to 
revolutionize patient care at UAB. Although they officially divorced their activities from 
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the city of Birmingham and UAB, area citizens did not acknowledge the separation 
between the public and private entities. When the Kirklin Clinic opened in 1992, Sarris 
remarked, “I’ve never seen anything UAB built that they didn’t run out of space….It 
could be the monster who eats the Southside.”95 The “University that Ate Birmingham,” 
as it was nicknamed in the 1990s, was no longer a sacred cow in metropolitan politics. 
 
The End of Biracial Moderate Politics 
 Within his first ten years in office, Arrington oversaw a political, economic, and 
material transformation of downtown Birmingham that was nothing short of remarkable. 
Civic leaders since the 1940s had invested in the growth of a federally subsidized 
segment of the national economy––healthcare––that was strong enough by the 1980s to 
offset the effects of deindustrialization. Arrington worked with his Business Advisory 
Group, Operation New Birmingham, and other redevelopment groups in adding 10 new 
buildings to the central business district, renovating 80 office buildings through the 
strategic use of Urban Development Action Grants and historic preservation grants, and 
encouraging over $1 billion of public and private investment in downtown.96 Black 
representation in municipal government continued to improve, with 6 African Americans 
sitting on the city council by 1987. Arrington won his second re-election in another 
landslide victory in that same year. National publications and municipal associations 
began calling Birmingham one of best places in the nation to live, work, and invest.97 
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 In 1989, civic pride reached new levels with the arrival of City Stages, a three-day 
annual music festival in downtown. Organized by George McMillan, Alabama’s former 
Lieutenant Governor from 1979 to 1983, the first event showcased musical acts Chuck 
Berry, the Temptations, and the Georgia Satellites playing on three stages surrounding 
downtown’s new skyscrapers and newly renamed Linn Park, the city’s civic square. City 
Stages rapidly gained national attention. Few outdoor music festivals were held in 
downtown centers, but Birmingham’s success proved their usefulness as a revitalization 
tool for 1990s urban America. Within a few years, Atlanta, Charlotte, NC, Jackson, MS, 
and Mobile, AL, all attempted their own downtown festivals. By 1998, City Stages grew 
to 15 stages and 270 musical acts that the Chicago Tribune called “one hot, glorious 
weekend.”98 The impact of City Stages on Birmingham was more than national acclaim 
for its creative use of urban space and popular culture. It was central to bringing people to 
Richard Arrington’s Birmingham. As former Mayor Larry Langford noted, the festival 
“brought people inside the city who don’t live in the city and maybe dispelled some false 
notions about” it.99 
 Despite the image of growth conveyed by these happenings in Birmingham in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, a close look at metropolitan demographics reveals how blacks 
and whites reordered themselves in response to the local political economy. Arrington’s 
mayoralty, a key symbol of racial progress, and the growth in finance and healthcare 
attracted blacks and whites from across the state and nation to Birmingham, but overall 
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the city, county, and metropolitan area showed population decline between 1980 and 
1990.100 Although the city gained 10,053 new black residents, 29,074 whites left. Of 
those whites, only 10 percent stayed within the limits of Jefferson County. The areas that 
experienced population loss––Birmingham, Fairfield, Forestdale, Midfield, and Tarrant 
City––were historically homes to a white working class employed in heavy industry (See 
Appendix, Tables 1, 2, and 3). Although Birmingham’s manufacturing base transitioned 
from durable to non-durable goods during the decade, the area experienced a net loss of 
8,322 industrial jobs. Twenty-five percent of the 73,125 new jobs in the metropolitan area 
were in healthcare services, finance, and real estate (See Appendix, Tables 5 and 6).101 
Middle-class suburban growth tied to the professional service economy occurred in the 
Over-the-Mountain area, spilling into neighboring Shelby County, which grew by 33,000 
(See Appendix, Table 13). Mountain Brook, known as the “Tiny Kingdom,” had a 
median family income of $80,366 in 1990 that made it one of the top ten wealthiest cities 
of its size in the nation. In contrast, the city of Birmingham’s was $23,892, giving it the 
distinction as one of America’s ten poorest large cities (See Appendix, Table 4).102 The 
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geographic contours of class within metropolitan Birmingham became much starker in 
the 1980s.   
 As Birmingham transitioned from a majority white to a majority black city 
between the 1960s and the 1980s, the at-large nature of the city council sustained biracial 
moderate politics and diluted extremism. As Arrington explained in 1989, “In the past, 
people who had to run for office had to moderate their views because they couldn’t afford 
to offend blacks or whites.”
103
 In Arrington’s Birmingham, many whites, including those 
who supported biracialism, became increasingly uncomfortable with the majority black 
electorate and increasing power of the Jefferson County Citizens Coalition (JCCC). The 
debates over Block 60 and the Kirklin Clinic also revealed class antagonisms between 
whites in the metropolitan area. Sarris and his supporters believed that Arrington favored 
Over-the-Mountain suburbanites instead of the “little guy.” Indeed, Sarris, whose 
livelihood both Block 60 and the Kirklin Clinic threatened, symbolized those whites who 
felt under attack by Arrington’s Birmingham.  
 When endorsed candidates of the Jefferson County Citizens Coalition swept the 
mayoral and council races in 1987, many urban whites and some conservative blacks 
believed that they had lost their voice in Birmingham. Defeated councilor Russell 
Yarbrough was one of them. Since his first council term in 1969, Yarbrough had enjoyed 
the reputation as a conservative in city politics and often found himself at odds with Nina 
Miglionico. His concern over his community North Birmingham, however, which had 
experienced racial transitioning and economic decline in the 1970s, earned him the 
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endorsement of the JCCC in 1979 and in 1983. Yarbrough and other whites like him 
remained in Birmingham in the 1980s as one-fourth of urban whites fled the borders of 
Jefferson County. This decrease in population amplified white fears of black home rule 
(See Appendix, Tables 2 and 12). City councilors Yarbrough, John Katopodis, and Bettye 
Fine Collins spoke on whites’ behalf as constant critics of Arrington. With black 
neighborhood leaders and white suburban businessmen behind him, however, Arrington 
was unstoppable by the 1987 election. 
 After losing his council seat, Yarbrough filed a suit against the city of 
Birmingham for violating his rights as a minority protected under the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965. Many observers found the case baseless because three whites served on the city 
council. To Yarbrough, the issue was not the racial composition of the council but the 
dominance of the JCCC, which endorsed whites after the 1981 midterm fiasco. “The 
preferred candidates of the black racial majority,” he observed, were the only ones who 
could be elected.
104
 Bettye Fine Collins, who also lost her seat in 1987, displayed little 
understanding of Birmingham’s history when she explained, “We as a white community 
are seeking the same representation blacks were seeking in the 1960s.”
105
 Benjamin 
Greene of the JCCC called the suit “sour grapes.”
106
 By the 1980s, whites had forgotten 
how they used racial solidarity disguised as white supremacy in municipal politics and 
encouraged widespread disenfranchisement to stymie black political power. 
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 Across the country, Yarbrough v. the City of Birmingham and other cases like it in 
the rural South raised the question of whether or not whites could be considered 
minorities and receive civil rights protections. These cases arose as whites fled cities, 
small towns, and rural areas for suburbs, which left whites who remained in those places 
with decreased electoral power at the local level. City attorney Donald V. Watkins 
remarked, “So-called reverse discrimination cases will be the wave of the future….The 
new attitude of the US Supreme Court…seems to be giving encouragement to white 
citizens to challenge black gains in virtually every aspect of social and economic life.”
107
 
Indeed, white firefighters filed suit against the city of Birmingham for its purported 
discriminatory affirmative action plan approved by federal officials in 1981. This reverse-
discrimination case resulted in a landmark US Supreme Court decision in 1989 that 
allowed whites across the country to challenge affirmative action plans and federal 
decrees in employment across the public and private sectors.
108
    
Although Yarbrough’s challenge to at-large council seats represented a larger 
white conservative backlash against black home rule, it raised fundamental questions 
about the state of Birmingham’s biracial civic democracy. Without the influence of the 
Operation New Birmingham’s Community Affairs Committee and its activities, which 
had bridged the class, racial, and spatial divides of its members and program recipients, 
the metropolitan coalition had become a perverted mechanism for expressions of white 
economic and black political power by the late 1980s. The language of the “public good” 
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Edward LaMonte first invoked in the decade had disappeared from civic rhetoric, and the 
community-oriented vision of Birmingham advocated by Vincent Townsend, David 
Vann, and Joseph Volker had been abandoned. Indeed, metropolitan readers of the four 
local editions of the Birmingham News only read community items from their geographic 
area, whereas in the early 1970s Townsend introduced Lula Menefee and Collegeville, a 
declining black neighborhood, to citizens across metropolitan Birmingham. Menefee, 
who first initiated political and personal contact between poor urban blacks and affluent 
white suburbanites, continued to work with ONB until 1982, but her death three years 
later received a standard obituary treatment in the News. White suburban businessmen 
and black neighborhood leaders, the two most powerful groups in the coalition, each had 
the ear of Arrington, yet they shared almost nothing else in common except making 
downtown––from Southside to Linn Park––a reflection of their power.  
 Arrington was one of the only politicians in Birmingham who could bridge the 
differences between this unlikely coalition of white suburbanites and black urbanites who 
lived in completely separate worlds. He rose to political power based on the support of 
black civic leaders and white liberals, two groups whose voices within the coalition had 
been drowned out by the JCCC and white suburban businessmen by the 1980s. The black 
civic elite lost their political influence as the younger JCCC overtook the more-
established Jefferson County Progressive Democratic Council, but they continued to 
exert economic and civic power. A. G. Gaston added a construction company to his 
enterprises to meet the demands for minority contractors, and Black Enterprise named 
him “Entrepreneur of the Century” in 1992. Some white liberals bemoaned the loss of 
civic identity among white businessmen. Long-time reformer James A. Head believed too 
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many leaders “spen[t] too much time and effort to ‘cash in now’ for themselves rather 
than thinking of the good of the ‘community’ and the future!”
109
 Although white liberals 
and black civic elites had lost visibility in shaping Birmingham, Arrington and LaMonte 
embodied the legacy of moderate biracialism first established by them.  
The at-large representation of the city council had kept the biracial coalition in 
power and accommodated the shift from a majority white to a majority black city. Since 
1962, David Vann and others had sought to change the representation of the city council 
because they recognized the discriminatory nature of at-large seats. A majority of voters 
selected councilors without any room for candidates supported by a minority of voters. 
Nina Miglionico, who represented the seven white and four black plaintiffs of Yarbrough, 
also shared Vann’s concerns. She enjoyed broad political support in Birmingham during 
the height of biracial moderate politics, but she recognized that those days were over. “If 
we are working towards a color-blind society,” she argued in 1989, “a district system 
would seem to be the wave of the future.”
110
 Although Birmingham had never been 
color-blind as Miglionico liked to think, race mattered in post-1965 Birmingham politics 
as evidence of progress for both whites and blacks who believed in a biracial civic 
democracy. By the late 1980s, whites and blacks no longer agreed on that vision. They 
now used race to claim power in ways that pitted blacks and whites and urbanites and 
suburbanites against each other.  
 Instead of insuring a fairer democracy in Birmingham, the arrival of district seats 
in 1989 politicized racial and class segregation and brought even more political 
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polarization. The new council organization, based on neighborhoods, included three 
white seats and six black seats. The 1989 election saw Arrington lose a black and a white 
ally on the council. The new city council reflected the deep racial and class antagonisms 
in Birmingham. The mayor had predicted that district seats would produce “candidates 
whose views are more extreme, white and black, on racial issues.”
111
 They did. The new 
seats, however, enabled the Jefferson County Progressive Democratic Council to regain 
some of its former power. Increasingly in the 1990s, black politicians on the council such 
as future Mayor Bernard Kincaid challenged Arrington. The mayor’s acute focus on 
downtown development came at the cost of public education, transportation, and other 
social services; the city’s expanding commercial tax base required perpetual reinvestment 
that siphoned public funds away from urban residents. Resentment began building in 
black neighborhoods. When Arrington resigned a month before the end of his fifth term 
in 1999, the JCCC was finished as a political power in Birmingham. 
 By the 1990s, where people lived had become a more significant factor in 
representational politics in Birmingham and across the nation. Reynolds v. Sims, the 
lawsuit filed by Vann that created the opportunity for municipal reform, had far-reaching 
and unintended consequences. As early as 1973 and again in 1981, the Alabama state 
legislature considered reapportionment to create single-member districts, but its plan 
violated federal statues of the Voting Rights Act until a federal court finally approved the 
revised districts in 1983. Between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s, the legislative 
intent of single-district seats changed from diluting the effect of newly enfranchised 
African Americans to marginalizing politically powerful minority bodies. In 1992, the 
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Alabama State Legislature split metropolitan Birmingham’s federal legislative district 
served by white Democrat Ben Erdreich into two new districts.
112
 After 1993, Republican 
Spencer Bachus represented white suburban Birmingham while Democrat Earl Hilliard 
served urban blacks. All of these state decisions further politicized Birmingham’s 
suburban and urban spaces that were already marked by class and racial antagonisms. 
Within these new spatial frameworks of political power, biracial moderate politics could 
not survive. 
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Year Birmingham Jefferson County Shelby County Birmingham SMSA
1940 267,583 459,930 28,962 NA
1950 326,037 558,928 30,362 558,928
1960 340,887 634,864 32,132 634,864
1970 300,910 644,991 38,037 739,274
1980 284,413 671,324 66,298 847,487
1990 265,968 651,525 99,358 907,810
2000 249,459 662,047 153,000 985,025
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 
1960, Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, n.d.), Tables 5 and 10; Census of Population, 1970, 
Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1973), Tables 6 and 13; Census of Population, 1980, 
Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Chapter C: General Social and Economic 
Characteristics, Alabama (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), 
Table 56; Census of Population, 1990, Volume 1: Characteristics of Population, Chapter 
C: General Social and Economic Characteristics, Alabama (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 1; Census of Population and Housing, 1990, 
Population and Housing Characteristics for Census Tracks and Block Numbering Areas 
in Birmingham, Alabama MSA (Washington, DC: US Government and Printing Office, 
1993), Table 19; "Population Division, Population Estimates Program, Metropolitan 
Area Population Estimates for July 1, 1999 and Population 1990 to July 1, 1999 
(Includes April 1, 1990 Population Estimates Base)," 
http://census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/ma99-01.txt; "Jefferson County, 
Alabama Population, 1830-2000," Government Documents, Birmingham Public Library, 
Digital Collections, 
http://www.bham.lib.al.us/resources/government/JeffersonCountyPopulation.aspx.
Table 1
Populations for Birmingham, Jefferson County, and Birmingham SMSA,           
1940-2000
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Jefferson
Year Birmingham White Black County White Black
1940 267,583 158,622 108,938 459,930 280,756 179,150
1950 326,037 195,922 130,025 558,928 350,053 208,616
1960 340,887 205,620 135,113 634,864 415,035 219,542
1970 300,910 173,911 126,388 644,991 437,433 206,464
1980 284,413 124,729 158,224 671,324 444,426 223,759
1990 265,968 95,655 168,277 651,525 418,317 228,521
2000 249,459 58,457 178,372 662,047 384,639 260,608
Sources:  "Birmingham, Alabama Population 1880-2000," Government Documents, 
Digital Collections, Birmingham Public Library, 
http://www.bplonline.org/resources/government/BirminghamPopulation.aspx; 
"Jefferson County, Alabama 1830-2000," Government Documents, Digital Collections, 
Birmingham Public Library, 
http://www.bham.lib.al.us/resources/government/JeffersonCountyPopulation.aspx.
Table 2
Populations for Birmingham and Jefferson County by Race, 1940-2000
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City, Town, or Place 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Birmingham 326,037 340,887 300,910 284,413 265,968
Birmingham SMSA 558,928 634,864 739,274 847,487 839,942
Over-the-Mountain Suburbs (South)
Cahaba Heights CDP NA NA NA NA 4,778
Homewood 12,866 20,289 21,137 21,412 22,922
*Hoover NA NA 1,393 19,792 39,788
Mountain Brook 8,359 12,680 19,509 19,718 19,810
Vestavia Hills NA 4,029 8,311 15,722 19,749
Shelby County Suburbs (South)
Alabaster NA 1,623 2,642 7,079 14,732
Calera NA 1,361 1,928 1,655 2,136
Helena NA 421 523 1,110 3,918
Inverness CDP NA NA NA NA 2,638
Meadowbrook CDP NA NA NA NA 4,621
Pelham NA NA 931 6,759 9,765
East
Center Point CDP NA NA 15,675 23,317 22,658
Irondale 1,876 3,501 3,166 6,510 9,454
Leeds 3,306 6,126 6,991 8,642 9,946
Trussville 1,575 2,510 2,985 3,507 8,266
West
Bessemer 24,445 33,054 33,428 31,729 33,497
Fairfield 13,177 15,816 14,369 13,040 12,200
Midfield NA 3,556 6,340 6,547 5,559
Pleasant Grove 1,802 3,097 5,090 7,102 8,458
North
Adamsville NA 2,095 2,412 2,498 4,161
Forestdale CDP NA NA 6,091 10,814 10,395
Fultondale 1,304 2,001 5,163 6,217 6,400
Gardendale NA 4,712 6,537 7,928 9,251
Graysville 879 2,870 3,182 2,642 2,241
Tarrant City 7,571 7,810 6,835 8,148 8,046
Table 3
Population of Cities, Towns, and Places by Geographic Region, 1950-1990
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Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 
1960, Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, n.d.), Tables 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10; Census of Population, 
1970, Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, 1973), Tables 6, 10, 13, and 16; Census of Population, 
1980, Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Chapter C: General Social and 
Economic Characteristics, Alabama (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1983), Table 56; Census of Population, 1990, Volume 1: Characteristics of the 
Population, Chapter C: General Social and Economic Characteristics, Alabama 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 1; Census of 
Population and Housing, 1990, Population and Housing Characteristics for Census 
Tracts and Block Numbering Areas in Birmingham, Alabama MSA (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 19.
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1960 1970 1980 1990
National $5,620 $9,867 $21,023 $35,353
Regional $4,384 $8,552 $19,142 $31,727
Birmingham SMSA $5,103 $8,295 $18,548 $31,527
Birmingham City $4,947 $7,737 $15,210 $23,892
Cahaba Heights CDP NA NA NA $45,523
Homewood $8,242 $11,068 $22,455 $42,598
Hoover NA NA $30,069 $53,472
Mountain Brook $14,689 $21,163 $42,389 $80,366
Vestavia Hills $10,000 $16,816 $33,544 $61,182
Alabaster NA $7,539 $14,250 $42,446
Inverness CDP NA NA NA $70,367
Meadowbrook CDP NA NA NA $71,019
Pelham NA NA $24,583 $47,482
East
Center Point CDP NA $11,112 $21,104 $36,704
Irondale $5,025 $7,980 $25,830 $42,893
Leeds $4,603 $7,562 $17,654 $27,721
Trussville $6,629 $10,652 $21,681 $42,862
West
Bessemer $3,755 $6,548 $14,448 $21,013
Fairfield $4,822 $8,709 $17,376 $26,521
Midfield $6,743 $9,347 $21,524 $31,764
Pleasant Grove $6,180 $10,154 $24,063 $43,236
North
Forestdale CDP NA $10,448 $23,835 $39,851
Fultondale NA $9,682 $22,221 $34,953
Gardendale $5,652 $9,630 $22,139 $37,488
Graysville NA $5,021 $8,024 $17,060
Tarrant City $5,337 $8,448 $16,436 $24,277
Over-the-Mountain Suburbs (South)
Shelby County Suburbs (South)
Median Family Income by Cities, Towns, or Places, 1960-1990
Table 4
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Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 
1960, Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, n.d.) Tables 33 and 34; Census of Population, 1970, 
Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1973), Tables 41 and 42; Census of Population, 1980, 
Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Chapter C: General Social and Economic 
Characteristics, Alabama (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), 
Tables 124, 161, and 169; Census of Population, 1990, Volume 1: Characteristics of 
Population, Chapter C: General Social and Economic Characteristics, Alabama 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 3; Census of 
Population and Housing, 1990, Population and Housing Characteristics for Census 
Tracks and Block Numbering Areas in Birmingham, Alabama MSA (Washington, DC: 
US Government and Printing Office, 1993), Tables 19 and 21.
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1960 1970 1980 1990
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 1,457 2,802 2,693 5,453
Mining 5,812 4,804 9,211 5,702
Construction 11,661 15,303 20,892 27,379
Manufacturing 59,241 66,038 67,341 59,009
     Durable Goods 46,074 50,015 50,221 37,888
     Nondurable Goods 13,167 16,023 17,120 21,121
Transportation 10,268 11,051 15,504 16,818
Communications and other Public Utilities 6,690 10,795 18,731 21,153
Wholesale Trade 9,780 17,256 20,650 22,210
Retail Trade 34,519 42,573 54,610 66,246
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 11,307 15,057 24,539 31,825
Business and Repair Services 4,792 7,733 10,422 19,064
Personal Services 20,614 17,501 11,882 11,501
Entertainment and Recreation Services 1,285 1,511 2,187 4,133
Professional and Related Services 22,930 45,352 72,484 99,535
     Health Services 6,295 16,642 31,642 42,691
     Educational Services 7,637 17,888 25,562 30,233
     Other Professional and Related Services 8,998 10,822 15,280 26,611
Public Administration 7,670 11,103 14,867 15,887
Industry Not Reported 7,185 NA NA NA
Total 217,420 268,879 349,013 405,915
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 
1960, Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, n.d.), Table 75; Census of Population, 1970, Volume 1:  
Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1973), Table 87; Census of Population, 1980, Volume 1: Characteristics 
of the Population, Chapter C: General Social and Economic Characteristics, Alabama 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), Table 122; Census of 
Population and Housing, 1990, Population and Housing Characteristics for Census 
Tracts and Block Numbering Areas in Birmingham, Alabama MSA (Washington, DC: 
US Government and Printing Office, 1993), Table 18.
Table 5
 Industry of Employed Persons in Birmingham SMSA, 1960-1990
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1960 1970 1980 1990
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 0.7% 1.0% 0.8% 1.3%
Mining 2.7% 1.8% 2.6% 1.4%
Construction 5.4% 5.7% 6.0% 6.8%
Manufacturing 27.3% 24.6% 19.3% 14.5%
     Durable Goods 21.2% 18.6% 14.4% 9.3%
     Nondurable Goods 6.1% 6.0% 4.9% 5.2%
Transportation 4.7% 4.1% 4.4% 4.1%
Communications and other Public Utilities 3.1% 4.0% 5.4% 5.2%
Wholesale Trade 4.5% 6.4% 5.9% 5.5%
Retail Trade 15.9% 15.8% 15.7% 16.3%
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 5.2% 5.6% 7.0% 7.8%
Business and Repair Services 2.2% 2.9% 3.0% 4.7%
Personal Services 9.5% 6.5% 3.4% 2.8%
Entertainment and Recreation Services  0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 1.0%
Professional and Related Services 10.6% 16.9% 20.8% 24.5%
     Health Services 2.9% 6.2% 9.1% 10.5%
     Educational Services 3.5% 6.7% 7.3% 7.5%
     Other Professional and Related Services 4.1% 4.0% 4.4% 6.6%
Public Administration 3.5% 4.1% 4.3% 3.9%
Total 217,420 268,879 349,013 405,915
 Industry of Employed Persons in Birmingham SMSA by Percent, 1960-1990
Table 6
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 
1960, Volume 1: Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, n.d.), Table 75; Census of Population, 1970, Volume 1: 
Characteristics of the Population, Part 2: Alabama (Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1973), Table 87; Census of Population, 1980, Volume 1: Characteristics 
of the Population, Chapter C: General Social and Economic Characteristics, Alabama 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), Table 122; Census of 
Population and Housing, 1990, Population and Housing Characteristics for Census 
Tracts and Block Numbering Areas in Birmingham, Alabama MSA (Washington, DC: 
US Government and Printing Office, 1993), Table 18.
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Percent Federal Federal Federal
Year Total Non-Federal Federal Service Training Research
1969 $18,190,620 $1,118,653 93.9% $2,904,451 $5,145,027 $9,022,489
1970 $20,649,463 $1,455,211 93.0% $4,002,258 $6,187,671 $9,004,323
1971 $23,955,873 $2,086,967 91.3% $4,393,325 $7,785,071 $9,690,510
1972 $30,792,327 $2,123,532 93.1% $6,051,302 $9,184,974 $13,432,519
1973 $32,556,229 $3,926,856 87.9% $6,090,601 $8,152,024 $14,386,748
1974 $35,948,960 $3,803,185 89.4% $6,205,087 $8,487,591 $17,453,097
1975 $41,887,411 $6,220,343 85.2% $2,837,279 $11,567,861 $21,261,928
1976 $41,942,718 $6,462,231 84.6% $2,927,739 $9,966,738 $22,586,010
1977 $41,910,563 $7,921,195 81.1% $2,224,714 $11,039,736 $20,724,918
1978 $43,418,977 $9,003,893 79.3% $3,964,425 $10,295,974 $20,154,685
1979 $46,815,431 $7,860,995 83.2% $3,027,903 $10,681,870 $25,900,260
1980 $48,573,932 $7,351,719 84.9% $2,453,056 $13,101,896 $25,667,261
1981 $53,875,739 $7,474,826 86.1% $3,176,598 $12,954,492 $30,269,823
1982 $48,450,670 $6,908,062 85.7% $3,579,352 $5,189,072 $32,774,184
1983 $46,166,166 $7,477,401 83.8% $3,599,625 $3,679,186 $31,409,954
1984 $52,424,884 $7,890,619 85.0% $3,282,353 $4,157,538 $37,094,374
1985 $60,897,120 $10,318,089 83.1% $2,640,481 $7,104,079 $40,834,471
1986 $74,174,054 $15,338,811 79.3% $3,551,983 $7,834,488 $47,453,772
1987 $82,065,219 $14,614,414 82.2% $3,148,490 $7,363,200 $56,939,115
1988 $96,142,445 $17,513,084 81.8% $2,483,244 $7,673,261 $68,472,856
1989 $105,571,876 $21,409,859 79.7% $2,189,288 $5,959,269 $76,013,460
1990 $99,852,858 $18,821,860 81.2% $1,204,459 $6,464,429 $73,362,110
Table 7
Total UAB Active Grants and Contracts, 1969-1990
Sources: University of Alabama in Birmingham, Financial Report, For the Year Ended 
September 30, 1969, University of Alabama in Birmingham, A Campus of the University 
of Alabama (Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1970), 4; University 
of Alabama in Birmingham, 1969-1978 (Birmingham: University of Alabama in 
Birmingham, 1979), 48; UAB Office of Institutional Studies and Services, Facts and 
Figures, 1979-1980 (Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1980), 76; 
Facts and Figures, 1990-1991 (Birmingham: University of Alabama at Birmingham, 
1991), 101.
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Year UAB Revenue Grants    Grants as Revenue
1969 $46,815,431 $18,190,620 38.86%
1970 $54,263,491 $20,649,463 38.05%
1971 $63,050,735 $23,955,873 37.99%
1972 $77,903,000 $30,792,327 39.53%
1973 $89,985,333 $32,556,229 36.18%
1974 $109,224,559 $35,948,960 32.91%
1975 $126,436,872 $41,887,411 33.13%
1976 $156,665,437 $41,942,718 26.77%
1977 $168,341,433 $41,910,563 24.90%
1978 $200,600,634 $43,418,977 21.64%
1979 $235,322,402 $47,471,028 20.17%
1980 $261,125,715 $48,573,932 18.60%
1981 $292,846,165 $53,875,739 18.40%
1982 $303,806,140 $48,450,670 15.95%
1983 $313,450,176 $46,166,166 14.73%
1984 $346,684,162 $52,424,884 15.12%
1985 $350,805,587 $60,897,120 17.36%
1986 $409,884,784 $74,174,054 18.10%
1987 $461,252,002 $82,065,219 17.79%
1988 $498,538,131 $96,142,445 19.28%
1989 $556,846,334 $105,571,876 18.96%
1990 $629,933,554 $99,852,858 15.85%
Table 8
Total UAB Revenue, 1969-1990
Sources: University of Alabama in Birmingham, Financial Report, For the Year 
Ended September 30, 1969, University of Alabama in Birmingham, A Campus of the 
University of Alabama (Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1970), 
4; University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1969-1978 (Birmingham: University of 
Alabama in Birmingham, 1979), 46; UAB Office of Institutional Studies and Services, 
Facts and Figures, 1979-1980 (Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 
1980), 76; Facts and Figures, 1983-1984 (Birmingham: University of Alabama in 
Birmingham, 1984), 98; Facts and Figures, 1987-1988 (Birmingham: University of 
Alabama at Birmingham, 1988), 93; Facts and Figures, 1990-1991 (Birmingham: 
University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1991), 95.
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Construction Expansion
Year Business Volume Business Volume  of Credit Base
1974 $220,819,000 $13,580,100 $106,078,000
1977 $306,855,000 $22,530,000 $187,275,000
1982 $409,809,025 $31,200,000 $300,000,000
1985 $634,936,248 $29,200,000 $1,457,914,602
1987 $838,029,138 $50,039,587 $1,704,369,571
1991 $1,222,948,916 $128,817,722 $2,224,705,549
Sources: University of Alabama in Birmingham, Economic Impact of the University 
of Alabama in Birmingham on the State of Alabama, Fiscal Year 1973-1974 
(Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1974), 3, 5, 6; Economic 
Impact of the University of Alabama in Birmingham on the Birmingham Community, 
Fiscal Year 1976-1977 (Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1977), 
3, 5, 7; Economic Impact of the University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1981-1982 
(Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1982), ii, 22; Division of 
Business and Economic Data Services, Economic Impact of the University of 
Alabama at Birmingham: 1985 (Birmingham: University of Alabama at 
Birmingham, 1985), 34A; UAB's Impact on the Birmingham Economy: 1987 
(Birmingham: University of Alabama at Birmingham,1987), 6; UAB's Impact on the 
Birmingham Economy: 1991 (Birmingham: University of Alabama at Birmingham, 
1991), 5.
Note: Some 1987 figures are from UAB's Impact on the Birmingham Economy: 
1991. The method for calculating UAB's impact on the expansion of the local credit 
base changed between 1982 and 1985.
Economic Impact of UAB on Businesses, 1974-1991
Table 9
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Construction Personal
Year Employment Employment Income
1974 14,696 1,118 $117,078,000
1977 18,772 1,950 $161,011,000
1982 24,670 1,844 $298,688,613
1985 32,645 1,151 $390,691,066
1987 44,244 916 $482,354,688
1991 62,033 4,768 $695,794,478
Sources: University of Alabama in Birmingham, Economic Impact of the University of 
Alabama in Birmingham on the State of Alabama, Fiscal Year 1973-1974 
(Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1974), 3, 5, 6; Economic Impact 
of the University of Alabama in Birmingham on the Birmingham Community, Fiscal 
Year 1976-1977 (Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1977), 3, 5, 7; 
Economic Impact of the University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1981-1982 
(Birmingham: University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1982), ii, 22; Division of 
Business and Economic Data Services, Economic Impact of the University of Alabama 
at Birmingham: 1985 (Birmingham: University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1985), 
34A; UAB's Impact on the Birmingham Economy: 1987 (Birmingham: University of 
Alabama at Birmingham, 1987), 6; UAB's Impact on the Birmingham Economy: 1991 
(Birmingham: University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1991), 5.
Table 10
Economic Impact of UAB on Individuals, 1974-1991
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Blighted Blighted
Neighborhood (Y or N) Neighborhood (Y or N)
Airport Hills Ensley
Airport Highlands Y Ensley Y
Brownsville Heights Y Sherman Heights Y
Brummitt Heights Y Tuxedo Y
Maple Grove Y Wylam Y
Penfield Park Y Grasselli
Central Park-  Grasselli Y
Five Points West Y Hillman Y
Belview Heights Y Hillman Park Y
Bush Hills Y Industrial Center Y
Central Park Y Tarpley City Y
Ensley Highlands Y West Goldwire Y
Fairview Y Huffman
Green Acres Y Huffman N
Crestline Killough Springs N
Crestline N Spring Lake N
Eastwood N North Birmingham
Crestwood Acipco-Finley Y
Crestwood North N Collegeville Y
Crestwood South N Fairmont Y
East Birmingham Harriman Park Y
East Birmingham Y Hooper City Y
Inglenook Y North Birmingham Y
Kingston Y Northside
North Avondale Y Central City Y
East Lake  Druid Hills Y
Brown Springs Y Evergreen Y
East Lake Y Fountain Heights Y
Gate City Y Norwood Y
North East Lake Y Pratt
Wahouma Y Central Pratt Y
Zion City Y North Pratt Y
East Pinson Valley Sandusky Y
Apple Valley N Smithfield Estates N
Bridlewood N South Pratt Y
Echo Highlands N Thomas Y
Pine Knoll Vista N
Sun Valley N
Table 11
Classification of Birmingham Neighborhoods, 1979
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Blighted Blighted
Neighborhood (Y or N) Neighborhood (Y or N)
Red Mountain Southwest
Forest Park-South Avondale N Jones Valley Y
Highland Park N Mason City Y
Redmont Park N Powderly Y
Roebuck Riley Y
Roebuck N Titusville
Roebuck Springs N North Titusville Y
South East Lake N South Titusville Y
Smithfield Woodland Park Y
College Hills Y West End Y
Source: Community Development Department, "Community Renewal Plan for the City 
of Birmingham," (August 1979), 8, File 22.6, David J. Vann Papers, Department of 
Archives and Manuscripts, Birmingham Public Library.
Table 11, continued
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Neighborhood White Black Neighborhood White Black
Central Park- Pratt
Belview Heights 78.5% 21.5% Central Pratt 2.7% 97.3%
Bush Hills 40.0% 60.0% North Pratt 28.1% 71.9%
Central Park 86.7% 13.3% South Pratt 0.3% 99.7%
Ensley Highlands 81.3% 18.7% Thomas 0.3% 99.7%
Fairview 57.3% 42.7% Roebuck
Green Acres 93.3% 6.7% South East Lake 98.1% 1.9%
East Birmingham Smithfield
East Birmingham 3.9% 96.1% College Hills 0.8% 99.2%
Inglenook 72.2% 27.8% East Thomas 0.3% 99.7%
Kingston 2.9% 97.1% Enon Ridge 0.1% 99.9%
North Avondale 9.4% 90.6% Graymont 13.6% 86.4%
East Lake Smithfield 0.8% 99.2%
East Lake 73.4% 26.6% Southside
Gate City 14.8% 85.2% Five Points South 82.7% 17.3%
North East Lake 93.2% 6.8% Southside 3.4% 96.6%
Wahouma 78.2% 21.8% Southwest
Zion City 18.4% 81.6% Jones Valley 14.1% 85.9%
Ensley Mason City 0.3% 99.7%
Ensley 30.1% 69.9% Powderly 2.3% 97.7%
Wylam 56.1% 43.9% Riley 3.0% 97.0%
North Birmingham Titusville
Acipco-Finley 2.5% 97.5% North Titusville 0.2% 99.8%
Collegeville 0.3% 99.7% South Titusville 2.2% 97.8%
Fairmont 19.1% 80.9% Woodland Park 0.2% 99.8%
Harriman Park 0.1% 99.9% West End  
Hooper City 1.7% 98.3% Arlington-West End 41.4% 58.6%
North Birmingham 6.4% 93.6% Germania Park 32.1% 67.9%
Northside Oakwood Place 30.5% 69.5%
Central City 31.8% 68.2% Rising Station 18.1% 81.9%
Druid Hills 9.5% 90.5% Woodlawn
Evergreen 1.3% 98.7% East Avondale 27.7% 72.3%
Fountain Heights 1.2% 98.8% Oak Ridge Park 5.9% 94.1%
Norwood 12.3% 87.7% Woodlawn 59.8% 40.2%
PercentagePercentage
Source: "Racial Characteristics of Birmingham Neighborhoods, 1980," in Charles E. 
Connerly, "The Most Segregated City in America": City Planning and Civil Rights in 
Birmingham, 1920-1980 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 257-58.
Table 12
 Racial Classification of Selected Birmingham Neighborhoods, 1980
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City, Town or Place
Birmingham SMSA 25.6% $31,527
Shelby County 32.9% $42,549
Jefferson County 26.7% $31,609
St. Clair County 16.4% $27,388
Blount County 15.1% $26,323
Cahaba Heights CDP 49.5% $45,523
Hoover 45.1% $53,472
Homewood 43.8% $42,589
Mountain Brook 58.2% $80,366
Vestavia Hills 51.5% $61,182
Alabaster 30.1% $42,893
Helena 30.2% $42,892
Inverness CDP 47.6% $70,367
Meadowbrook CDP 55.4% $71,019
Pelham 34.1% $47,482
East
Trussville 30.6% $42,862
North
Forestdale CDP 29.8% $39,851
Gardendale 26.1% $37,488
Percent in Professional 
Employment Median Family Income
Over-the-Mountain Suburbs (South)
Shelby County Suburbs (South)
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 
1990, Characteristics of the Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, 
Alabama (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 13; Census 
of the Population and Housing, 1990, Population and Housing Characteristics  for 
Census Tracts and Block Numbering Areas in Birmingham, Alabama, MSA 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 18.
Note: These municipalities were chosen because more people living in these cities 
worked in Managerial, Professional, and Specialty occupations than the Birmingham 
SMSA average.
Table 13
Percentage of Workforce in Managerial, Professional, and Specialty Occupations 
and Median Family Income in Selected Places, 1990
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